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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Supreme Court Case No. 47909-2020

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate
Asphalt Plant
Petitioner / Appellant /
Cross Respondent

vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners,
a public agency of the State of Idaho,
Respondent / Cross Appellant

vs.
Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott,
Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company
Intervenors-Cross Appel Iants

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District,
in and for the County of Bonner
HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
§
§
§
§
§

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
Petitioner,

vs.

Bonner County Board of Commissioners

vs.

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Bonner County District Court
Brodie, Jeff M.
05/01/2019
Docket No. 47909-2020

Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott
Respondent.
CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Transcript Bond
5/5/2020
3/30/2020
Counts: 1

Cash Bond
3/30/2020
Counts: 1

Case 04/01/2020 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

$100.00
Posted Cash

Transcript Bond
5/5/2020
3/23/2020
Counts: 1
Cash Bond
3/23/2020
Counts: 1

L3 - Appeal or Petition for
Case Type: Judicial Review or Cross
Appeal

$200.00
Converted
Posted Cash

$200.00
Converted
Posted Cash

$100.00
Posted Cash

CASE ASSIGNMENT

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV09- l 9-0629
Bonner County District Court
05/30/2019
Brodie, Jeff M.

PARTY INFORMATION

Petitioner

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant

Respondent

Bonner County Board of Commissioners

DATE

05/01/2019
05/01/2019

EVENTS

&

ORDERS OF THE COURT

Lead Attorneys
Allen, Gary Guerdrum
Retained
208-388-1200(W)
Wilson, William Steven
Retained
208-263-6714(W)
INDEX

New Case - Judicial Review

IIJ Appeal or Petition for Judicial Review
ofAgency Action

05/01/2019

'II Summons Issued

05/01/2019

&\) Civil Case Information Sheet
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
05/01/2019

Summons
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Unserved

05/16/2019

II Motion to Dismiss

05/16/2019

9

05/16/2019

'II Notice of Hearing

Notice of Appearance
Special (Attorney W Wilson)

-Motion to Dismiss (Respondents)
05/16/2019

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Dismiss

05/16/2019

II Affidavit
William S. Wilson

05/17/2019

9

05/21/2019

Ill Notice

order of Voluntary Disqualification (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.)
(Judge Buchanan)

ofReassignment
05/30/2019

9

05/30/2019

'II Order of Reassignment -Administrative (Judicial Officer: Gaskill, Jay P.)

Order of Reassignment - Administrative (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
- to Judge Gaskill

- to Judge Brudie
05/30/2019

11 Opposition to
Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss

05/30/2019

'II Declaration
ofJack W Relf in Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss

05/30/2019

Ill Declaration
ofStacy Warde in in Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss

06/12/2019

'II Notice of Hearing
Amended - re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

06/13/2019

'II Notice of Hearing
Second Amended re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

06/14/2019

II Motion
Stipulated to Appear Telephonical/y

06/26/2019

'II order (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
Granting Motion to Attend Telephonical/y

06/27/2019

Motion to Dismiss (1:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
No Courtroom is Needed. Judge to call all Parties From Nez Perce County.
06/27/2019

06/27/2019

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Linda Carlton Less Than JOO Pages

9

Court Minutes

- Motion to Dismiss held 06/27/2019
07/26/2019

'II Order (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
Opinon and Order on Motion to Dismiss

08/01/2019

9Motion
to Intervene (By Special Appearance)-Frank & Carol Linscott

08/01/2019

IJ Civil Case Information Sheet

08/01/2019

II Notice of Hearing
re: Motion to Intervene (Interstate concrete & Asphalt Attorney Te/lessen)

08/01/2019

II Motion
to Intervene - Interstate Concrete & Asphalt

08/02/2019

II Notice
ofLodging with Agency

08/02/2019

II Stipulation
and Waiver ofAppearance

08/14/2019

'II Response
to Motions to Intervene Filed by Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company and Frank E.
Linscott and Carol Linscott - Joint

08/15/2019

Motion to Intervene (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM. ;Location: Courtroom 1)

08/15/2019

II Court Minutes
- Motion to Intervene held 08/15/2019

08/15/2019

9

08/19/2019

II Order (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)

Scheduling Order (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)

For Intervention
08/21/2019

II Notice of Filing Agency Record

08/21/2019

'II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 7 of 7

08/21/2019

'Ill Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Transcript January 11, 2019 Hearing

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Transcripts March 22, 2019 Hearing
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 1 of 7

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
-Agency Record 2 of 7

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 3 of 7

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 4 of 7

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 5 of 7

08/21/2019

II Agency Record on Judicial Review
- Agency Record 6 of 7

08/23/2019

II Order (Judicial Officer: Brudie, Jeff M.)
on Motion to Intervene

08/30/2019

II Certificate of Mailing
- CD "How it's made" part of the Agency Record filed 08-21-2019 to Honorable Judge Brudie
via USPS.

09/03/2019

10/08/2019

11JNotice
of Clerical Correction - Respondent, Bonner County-four pages omitted when copyingfrom
hardcopy to digital

II Memorandum
in Support ofPetitioner's Petition for Judicial Review

10/11/2019

Scheduling Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brudie, Jeff M. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Hearing Held in Chambers, no minutes

10/11/2019

II Scheduling Order (Judicial Officer: Brudie, JeffM.)

11/04/2019

II Brief Filed
Respondent's

11/07/2019

11 Opposition to
Petition for Judicial Review - Interstate Concrete

11/07/2019

II Brief Filed
Intervenor Linscotts Respondents' Brief- Part 1 of2

11/07/2019

WI Brief Filed
Intervenor Linscotts Respondents' Brief-Part 2 of2

11/27/2019

II Reply
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
12/13/2019

Review Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
Petition for Review
(To be held in Bonner County County)

12/13/2019

12/13/2019

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
Linda Carlton Less Than JOO Pages

'II court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
- Review hearing held 12113/2019

02/05/2020

'II Decision or Opinion (Judicial Officer: Brodie, JeffM.)
and Order on Petition for Judicial Review

03/18/2020

11 Notice of Appeal
- (Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant Attorney Allen)

03/18/2020

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
- Docket No. 47909-2020

03/23/2020

Bond Posted - Cash
- Transcript on Appeal to /SC (Givens Pursley)

03/23/2020

Bond Posted - Cash
- Record on Appeal to /SC (Givens Pursley)

03/30/2020

Bond Posted - Cash
- Transcripts on Appeal /SC (Finney)

03/30/2020

Bond Posted - Cash
- Record on Appeal to /SC (Finney)

03/30/2020

II Notice of Cross Appeal
- (Linscott Attorney Finney)

03/30/2020

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
- Cross Appeal

03/31/2020

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
- Cross Appeal

03/31/2020

111 Notice of Cross Appeal
- (Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Comp. Attorney Te/lessen)

04/01/2020

II Notice of Cross Appeal
(Bonner County - Attorney Wilson)

04/01/2020

04/27/2020

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
- Cross Appeal

II Notice of Preparation of Transcript
Lodged - (L. Carlton)

04/27/2020

Transcript Filed
- Motion(s) (L. Carlton)

05/05/2020

Bond Converted
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BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV09-19-0629
- Transcript (Linda Carlton)

05/05/2020

Bond Converted
- Transcri t 'Linda Carlton

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Intervenor Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/6/2020

265.00
265.00
0.00

Intervenor Linscott, Frank E
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

266.60
266.60

Balance Due as of 5/6/2020

0.00

Petitioner Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 5/6/2020

221.00
221.00
0.00

Payor of Cash Bond Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.

Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/6/2020

63.50

Payor of Cash Bond Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/6/2020

100.00

Payor of Cash Bond Givens Pursley LLP
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/6/2020

100.00

Payor of Cash Bond Givens Pursley LLP

Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/6/2020

1.75

Payor of Cash Bond Givens Pursley LLP
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 5/6/2020

794.40
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Electronically Filed
5/1/2019 12:03 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

CV09-19-0629
Case No.: - - - - - - -

Petitioners,

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY ACTION

vs.
CATEGORY FEE: L.3
FEE AMOUNT: $221.00

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State ofldaho
Respondent.

Petitioners Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (the "Citizens") an
unincorporated Idaho non-profit association, by and through its attorneys of record Givens
Pursley LLP, and pursuant to Idaho Code sections 65-6501 through 67-6539 and 67-5270 through
67-5279 and Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby file this petition ("Petition")
seeking judicial review of an agency action by the Bonner County Board of Commissioners
("BOCC") or the "Board").

Buchanan, Barbara A.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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1.

The name of the entity for whose action judicial review is sought is the Bonner

County Board of Commissioners (the Board).
2.

The District Court before which this Petition is taken is First Judicial District of

the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, and the Citizens have standing to bring this
action before this Court which has jurisdiction over this matter and before which venue is proper.
a.

The Citizens have standing to bring this action. The Citizens are a group
of concerned citizens of Bonner County who own real property in Bonner
County in the immediate vicinity of the site of a proposed asphalt plant
approved by the Board at the heart of this dispute. The Citizens are in
immediate danger of and/or have already incurred a distinct and palpable
injury in fact which is fairly traceable to the conduct of the Board in
approving a conditional use permit. Specifically, because of the conduct of
the County, Citizens' real property is in immediate danger of injury from
noise pollution, air pollution, increased traffic, and other injury, and those
risks have been or will be economically injurious to Citizens' real
property. Members of the Citizens include the following without
limitation, who all reside and own real property within approximately a
quarter-mile of the proposed asphalt plant:
i.

Daniel and Jonna Plante;

ii.

Larry and Sandra Smith;

iii.

Sharon and Tom Walton;

lV.

Don and Reanna Sharp

V.

Corrine and Mark Jones

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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v1.
vii.
b.

Jerry and Carol Halstriter;
Bob and Phylis Staats

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 84 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code section 67-6521 (d) which
incorporates the judicial review process set forth in chapter 52, title 67 of
the Idaho Code. The Citizens are an entity aggrieved by a final decision
rendered by the Board.

c.

Citizens have exhausted their administrative remedies with the Board, as
they have exercised their rights to request reconsideration of the decision
underlying this matter, and there is no statute, rule, or regulation that
would allow for further reconsideration of the decision that is the subject
of this Petition.

d.

Venue is proper before this court pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5272
because the hearings that occurred in this matter were held in Bonner
County, the Final Decision issued by the Board was issued in Bonner
County and affects actions and property in Bonner County, and the real
property for which a conditional use permit was sought and issued in this
case is located in Bonner County.

3.

The heading or case caption from the Board for which judicial review is sought is

BOCC Docket No. Cl015-18, with a final order date of March 25, 2019.
4.

A brief procedural synopsis of the events which occurred in this matter is set forth

for the convenience of the Court, including identification of whether and how hearings or oral

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3
I 4624_2; I4631692 _2.doc
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presentations were recorded or reported, and the name and address of the person with possession
of such recordings.
a.

In 2018, Frank and Carol Linscott (the "Linscotts") applied to the Bonner
County Planning Department for a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") to use
the Linscott/Interstate gravel pit (the "Gravel Pit") for an asphalt batch
plant (the "Batch Plant").

b.

Despite failing to comply with the Bonner County Code ("BCC") and
with the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act ("LL UPA"), the Bonner
County Planning Department approved project File No. C1015-18 on
November 15, 2018 following an oral hearing,1 and issued a written
explanation of its approval on November 16, 2018 (the "P&Z Decision").

c.

Pursuant to the BCC, Citizens timely appealed the P&Z Decision to the
Board on December 11, 2018, indicating that the P&Z Decision was not
supported by substantial evidence, was contrary to state, local, and federal
law, was contrary to public policy, and was based upon incomplete and/or
inaccurate evidence.

d.

On January 11, 2019, the Board conducted a public hearing regarding the
appeal of the P&Z Decision, and on January 14, 2019, the Board issued a
written decision regarding the appeal of the P&Z Decision (the "Initial
Decision"), in which it considered the evidence presented and approved

the Linscotts' requested CUP. The January 11, 2019 hearing was recorded

1 The hearing before the Bonner County Planning Department was recorded electronically verbatim and
that recording is in the possession of the Bonner County Planning Department, 1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 208, Sandpoint, ID
83864.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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electronically verbatim and that recording is in the possession of the
Bonner County Board of Commissioners, c/o Jessi Webster, 1500 Hwy 2,
Ste. 308, Sandpoint, ID 83864.
e.

Citizens timely requested reconsideration of the Initial Decision, and
submitted its letter in support ofreconsideration on March 15, 2019,
indicating that the CUP should be denied because: (1) the Gravel Pit is not
a lawful non-conforming use for the property in question; (2) even if it
were a lawful non-conforming use, the proposed Batch Plant would
unlawfully enlarge, increase, extend, and/or alter the Gravel Pit; and (3)
the ordinance under which the Batch Plant was approved was not lawfully
adopted under the requirements of LLUP A.

f.

The Board conducted a public hearing regarding Citizens' request for
reconsideration on March 22, 2019 and approved the Linscotts' CUP
request. The March 22, 2019 hearing was recorded electronically verbatim
and is in the possession of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners,
c/o Jessi Webster, 1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 308, Sandpoint, ID 83864.

g.

The Board issued a written decision explaining its approval of the
Linscotts' requested CUP and denying Citizens' request for
reconsideration on March 25, 2019 (the "Final Decision").

5.

Citizens presently intend to assert the following issues in their Petition, provided

that they may file a separate statement of issues within fourteen (14) days of filing this Petition
and may assert other issues as discovered:

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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a.

The Final Decision was incorrectly and illegally decided by the Board for
at least the following reasons:
1.

The requested CUP is improper because the Gravel Pit does
not comply with the non-conforming use regulations of the
BCC;

11.

The requested CUP is improper because the proposed
Batch Plant unlawfully enlarges, increases, extends, and/or
alters the Gravel Pit;

111.

The requested CUP is improper because the ordinance
under which the Batch Plant was approved was not
lawfully adopted under the requirements of LLUP A.

b.

The Initial Decision was incorrectly and illegally decided by the Board for
at least the same reasons indicated in Paragraph 5(a).

c.

The P&Z Decision was improper for at least the same reasons indicated in
Paragraph 5(a), and for the reasons that it was not supported by substantial
evidence, was contrary to state, local, and federal law, was contrary to
public policy, and was based upon incomplete and/or inaccurate evidence.

d.
6.

Citizens reserve the right to augment and supplement the foregoing issues.

A transcript is requested, and pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5275(1), Citizens

request that the Board file a certified copy of the entire record of these proceedings as required
by law, including, but not limited to, all pleadings, filings, and written decisions before it or any
other agency or entity in this matter, all letters and other written correspondence, all exhibits
attached to any correspondence or pleading or filing, petitions, memoranda, staff reports, and

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 6
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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other documents, together with transcripts of all hearings and meetings of the Board with regard
to consideration of the CUP at issue here.
7.

The undersigned attorney for Citizens hereby certifies that:
a.

Service of this Petition has been made upon the state agency rendering the
underlying decision (the Board) via iCourt and via email;

b.

On April 18, 2019, Citizens paid the clerk of the Board the estimated fee
of $1,950.00 (as indicated by the clerk of the Board), plus applicable fees,
for preparation of the transcripts that have been requested; and

c.

On April 18, 2019, Citizens paid the clerk of the Board the estimated fee
of $580.20 (as indicated by the clerk of the Board), plus applicable fees,
for preparation of the transcripts that have been requested.

8.

As a result of Respondent's actions, Citizens have had to retain counsel. For

services rendered, Citizens are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees and costs should they
prevail in this action pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 2019.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 7
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of April, 2019, I caused to be filed and served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
DOCUMENT FILED:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
215 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

Fax: (888) 960-4885
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov

□
□
□
□

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

DOCUMENT SERVED:
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 308
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Fax: (208) 265-1460
Email: j essi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 8
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

Filed:05/01/2019 15:05:41
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Hadley, Charity

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

CV09-19-0629

Case No.:

SUMMONS

Petitioners,
vs.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho
Respondent.

NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE COURT
MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU
RESPOND WITHIN 21 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.

TO:

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written

response must be filed with the above designated court at 215 South First A venue, Sandpoint,
Idaho, (208) 265-1432, within 21 days after service of this Summons on you. If you fail to so
SUMMONS-I
14624_2; 14632472_1.DOC
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respond the court may enter judgment against you as demanded by the Plaintiff in the Petition for
Judicial Review.
A copy of the Petition for Judicial Review is served with this Summons. If you wish
to seek the advice of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly
so that your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 2 and other Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and must also include:

1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Petition for Judicial Review, it must
contain admissions or denials of the separate allegations of the Petition for
Judicial Review and other defenses you may claim.

3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing
address and telephone number of your attorney.

4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorney, as
designated above. To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your
response, contact the Clerk of the above-named court.

5/1/2019
DATED _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

SUMMONS-2
14624_2; 14632472_1.DOC
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Electronically Filed
5/16/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioners,
IRCP 84(n)
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.
COMES NOW, Respondent Bonner County, Idaho, by and through William
S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves to
dismiss the above-captioned matter with prejudice pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 84(n). Said motion is based on the concurrently filed

MOTION TO DISMISS

Page 18

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of William S. Wilson,
and any other materials the Court may review in its discretion.
Bonner County further requests attorney's fees in this matter pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-117 or any other relevant statutory provision.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this _1_6_th_ _ _ day of May, 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorney for the Petitioners

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant

MOTION TO DISMISS
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Electronically Filed
5/16/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

NOTICE OF SPECIAL
APPEARANCE

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.
COMES NOW, William S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, and hereby gives notice that the undersigned now makes a limited,
special appearance on behalf of the Respondent in the above-captioned matter
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4. l(b). Please remit all future papers
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and pleadings in this matter, except service of process, to the undersigned via
!court electronic submission.
DATED this _1_6t_h_ _ _ day of May, 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorney for the Petitioners

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
5/16/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

NOTICE OF HEARING
Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Respondent Bonner County, Idaho shall
call on for hearing their Motion to Dismiss on _ _
J_u_n_e_l_9_ __
hour of 11:00 a.m.

20l 9

atthe

, before the Honorable Barbara Buchanan, in the

Courtroom of the above-entitled Court at the Bonner County Courthouse, 215
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South First Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho, or as soon thereafter as Counsel may be
heard.
DATED this

16th day of May, 2019

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorney for the Petitioners

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
5/16/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.
COMES NOW, Respondent Bonner County, Idaho, by and through William
S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby submits its
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The

Bonner

County

Planning

Department

administers

land

use

regulations within County limits. In that capacity, the Planning Department
received a conditional use permit application (No. C10125-18) from Frank
Linscott requesting permission to place an asphalt batch plant (owned by
Interstate Concrete and Asphalt) in an already-existing gravel pit located in
Sagle, Idaho. Affidavit of William S. Wilson,

,r 3. The application wound its way

through the administrative process until the Bonner County Board of County
Commissioners ("BOCC") issued a final, written decision approving Mr. Linscott's
application on March 25, 2019. Id. at

,r 2.

On April 19, 2019, the Petitioner attempted to overturn that approval by
submitting its Petition for Judicial Review to the Bonner County District Court
via !court electronic submission. Id. at 4. On the same day, counsel for Bonner
County received a "courtesy copy" of the Petition via email which did not contain
a case number. The Petitioner also attempted to serve Jessi Webster, another
Bonner County employee, via !court electronic submission at her Bonner County
email address. 1 On April 22, 2019, Bonner County received a copy of the Petition
via conventional mail which likewise did not contain a case number. Id. at

,r

5.

On April 30, 2019, counsel for Bonner County attempted to file a Notice
of Appearance in the case but could not do so. Id. at

,r

6. After consulting with

1 It appears from the Petitioner's Certificate of Service that counsel attempted to serve Jessi
Webster via Icourt by inputting her email address. If that is the case, it violates the electronic
filing rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court, specifically (3)(c), which prohibits filers
from creating or designating service contacts for other parties unless selected from the Public
Service Contact List.
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court staff, counsel for Bonner County determined that the Petition had been
rejected and notice of same sent to counsel for the Petitioner on April 22, 2019.
Id. On May 1, 2019, counsel for Bonner County contacted counsel for the
Petitioner to inform them of this fact. Id. at

,r 7. The Petitioner refiled the Petition

the same day, and it was accepted by the District Court. Id. However, Bonner
County did not receive notice that the Petition had been accepted by the Court
until May 6, 2019, when counsel for Bonner County received another "courtesy
copy" of the Petition via email directly from the Petitioner (this copy finally
contained a case number). Id. at

,r 8. As of this writing, the Petitioner has not

served Bonner County with a copy of the Petition which was accepted by the
District Court on May 6, 2019. Id. at

,r 9. In addition, based on the Affidavit of

Service submitted by the Petitioner, no other party from the underlying
administrative proceeding received service of the Petition.
Bonner County now submits its Motion to Dismiss based on the
Petitioner's failure to comply with jurisdictional time limits and failure to
effectuate service as set forth below.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act, I.C. §§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA")
allows judicial review of the approval or denial of a land use application,
including such a decision issued by county government.

See generally In re

Jerome Cnty. Bd. Of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076 (2012).

The

procedural rules for such an appeal are governed by the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act (Idaho Code§§ 67-5270-5279). I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d); Evans v. Bd.
3IPage
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Of Com'rs of Cassia Cnty. Idaho, 137 Idaho 428, 430-31 (2002). In addition,
because such an appeal is expressly authorized by statute, the proceedings must
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 where applicable. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(l).

III.

ARGUMENT
a. The case is time-barred and must be dismissed.

As stated above and acknowledged in the Petition itself, the BOCC
rendered a final, written decision approving application No. C10125-18 on March
25, 2019. Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Action,

,r 3. The Petitioner did

not initiate this action with the Bonner County District Court until thirty-seven
(37) days later, on May 1, 2019. This delay created a fatal defect which cannot
be cured.
Idaho Code § 67-6521 (d) states in relevant part:
An affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters
identified in section 67-6521 (1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twentyeight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local
ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 states as follows:

(n) Effect of Failure to Comply with Time Limits. The failure to
physically file a petition for judicial review or cross petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits
prescribed by statute and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause
automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review on motion of
any party, or on the initiative of the district court. Failure of a party
to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review will
not be deemed jurisdictional but may be grounds only for such other
action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the petition for review.
(Emphasis added). The combined effect of these statutory mandates is clear: The
Court must dismiss the Petition because it was not filed within 28 days of final
41Page
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agency decision. "Filing an appeal with the district court from an administrative
or governmental agency, body, or board within the time allowed by our rules of
civil procedure or by statute is jurisdictional." Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Com'n, 121 Idaho 515, 516 (1992). "A court has no power to
avoid a jurisdictional defect caused by a failure to file an appeal by extending the
time for the filing." Id. (citations omitted); See also Erickson v. Idaho Bd. Of
Registration of Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors, 146
Idaho 852, 854 (2009) (stating "The filing of a petition for judicial review within
the time permitted by statute is jurisdictional. Pursuant to Rule 84(n), the failure
to timely file a petition for judicial review shall be jurisdictional and shall cause
automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review.").
The Petitioner's failed attempt to initiate this action on April 19, 2019 does
not excuse its delay. All attorneys in Idaho are obligated comply with electronic
filing procedures as set forth in the Idaho Supreme Court's Order in In Re: Order
Amending

Rule

on

Electronic

Filing

and

Service

(available

at

www.isc.idaho.gov/main/idaho-court-rules). In the present matter, the Petition
was rejected on April 22, 2019. Notice of that rejection was sent to counsel for
the Petitioner on the same day via the email address from which the filing
originated.
The Supreme Court Order governing electronic filing states in relevant
part:

Subsection (b)(7)
Rejected Documents. Documents that do not comply with the rule,
or the requirements of the aforementioned Electronic Filing Guide,
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or court policy, may be returned to the filer for correction. If the
document is not corrected as requested within the time frame
provided for in subsection (e) (4) of this rule, the document will be
deemed to have not been filed.

Subsection (e)(4)
Request for Correction/Rejected Filings/Relief
A. If a document submitted electronically for filing is not accepted,
the electronic filing system will send notification to the filer that
explains why the document was rejected or will describe an error
or irregularity and request correction and resubmission by the
filer.
B. A filer who resubmits a document within 3 business days
(excluding legal holidays) of the date of the request for correction
under this section may request, as part of the resubmission, that
the date of filing for the resubmitted document relate back to the
date of submission of the original document to meet filing
requirements.

The cumulative impact of these rules demands dismissal of this action. The
Petitioner's attempt to initiate the present matter on April 19, 2019 cannot be
used to satisfy the jurisdictional timing requirements set forth above. The
Petitioner was given notice of the failed attempt but did nothing to correct it. As
such, the Petitioner lost the ability to relate back to its first filing attempt and
cannot cure the deficiency now.
In sum, the Petitioner was obligated to initiate this action within twentyeight (28) days of the BOCC's final decision. It failed to do so, and every relevant
rule or statute demands dismissal with prejudice.
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b. The case should be dismissed because the Petitioner failed
to serve the Petition on Bonner County and the other parties
in the underlying action.
Not only did the Petitioner fail to initiate this action within jurisdictional
time limits, but when it finally filed the Petition, it failed to serve all necessary
parties. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 states as follows:

(d) Serving the Petition. When the petition for judicial review is
filed, the petitioner must serve copies of the notice of the petition for
judicial review upon the agency whose action will be reviewed and
all other parties to the proceedings before the agency (if there were
parties to the proceeding). Proof of service on the agency and all
parties must be filed with the court as required by Rule S(e).
(r) Other Procedural Rules. Any procedure for judicial review not
specified or covered by these rules must be in accordance with the
appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules to the extent not
contrary to this Rule 84.
Idaho Appellate Rule 20 states as follows:
A notice of appeal or notice of cross-appeal from a district court or
an administrative agency, a petition for rehearing, and a petition for
review to the Supreme Court are not deemed filed until they are
physically received by the clerk of the respective court or
administrative agency. For the purpose of filing all other documents
involved in the appellate process, and for the purpose of service of
all documents upon parties to an action, including service of a copy
of a notice of appeal, a petition for rehearing or a petition for review,
if the document is transmitted by mail such filing and service shall
be deemed complete upon mailing. A certificate of mailing signed by
an attorney that a document was properly mailed in the United
States mail with postage prepaid to named persons on a day certain
shall create a rebuttable presumption that such mailing was so
made.
The Petitioner has failed to serve Bonner County with a legitimate, courtissued copy of the Petition. The only physical copy Bonner County received was
on April 22, 2019, but the copy did not contain a case number (and could not
71Page
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have done so, as no case existed). Since the Petitioner corrected its error and
filed the Petition on May 1, 2019, the only correspondence between the parties
has been another "courtesy copy" of the Petition. That document was emailed to
counsel for Bonner County five days after the Petition was accepted by the Court
and is the only reason Bonner County knew the case number required to file this
memorandum. That being the case, the Petitioner failed to comply with the
requirement that the clerk of an administrative agency receive a copy of the
appeal.
In addition, the Petitioner failed to serve copies of the Petition on both Mr.
Linscott, who sought the contested CUP in the first place, and Interstate
Concrete and Asphalt, which was represented by counsel and extensively
involved at every level of the underlying proceedings. By any objective standard,
Mr. Linscott and Interstate were parties in the underlying action. See IC § 675201 (defining "parties" as "each person or agency named or admitted as a party,
or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party"); IRCP 19
(requiring the joinder of interested parties in an action); IAR 7 .1 (permitting the
intervention of real parties in interest). Even the Petitioner's name suggests its
constituents were opposed to Mr. Linscott and Interstate during the underlying
proceedings. As such, both Mr. Linscott and Interstate should have received
service of process in this matter but did not.
Unlike the failure to file a timely appeal, this defect does not mandate
dismissal. However, Rule 84(n) still allows the District Court to dismiss an action
for such a failure in its discretion. The Court should exercise that discretion
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here. Mr. Linscott and Interstate deserve to be a part of any litigation seeking to
invalidate the CUP in dispute. Their absence is a glaring hole in this action which
cannot be ignored or condoned.

c. Attorney's Fees
Idaho Code§ 12-117 states as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a
reasonable
basis
in
fact
or
law.
Bonner County deserves the award of reasonable attorney's fees in this matter
because the Petitioner filed the Petition without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
As stated above, counsel for Bonner County personally called counsel for the
Petitioner to inform them that their filing had been rejected. As such, when the
Petitioner re-filed the Petition, it did so knowing the case was time-barred.
Further, the Petitioner has demonstrated a basic failure to understand and
comply with filing rules which has caused confusion and delay for Bonner
County and prejudiced other parties who belong in this case. On those bases,
the Court should award Bonner County its reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in defending this frivolous action.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Respondent Bonner County respectfully requests that the

Court dismiss this action with prejudice and award Bonner County its attorney's
fees incurred herein.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2019

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorney for the Petitioners

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
5/16/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Kathleen Steen, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208)263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM S.
WILSON

Petitioners,

v.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Res ondent.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonner
I, William S. Wilson, declare and state as follows:
1.

I am employed as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in the Bonner

County Prosecutor's Office. In that capacity, I represent the Bonner County
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Board of Com.missioners in land use related litigation. As such, I have personal
knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit, and if called as a witness I could
and would testify competently to those facts.
2.

On March 25, 2019, the Bonner County Board of Commissioners

issued a written decision approving CUP application No. C10125-18, which
conditionally permitted the placement of an asphalt batch plant within an
already-existing gravel pit.
3.

The application for C10125-18 was submitted by Frank Linscott, the

owner of the property in question.
4.

On April 19, 2019, counsel for the Petitioner attempted to file its

Petition for Judicial Review with the Bonner County District Court. On the same
day, the Petitioner emailed a "courtesy copy" of the Petition to me and several
other Bonner County employees. The copy was not court-issued and did not
contain a case number.
5.

On April 22, 2019, staff for the Bonner County Board of

Commissioners received a similar copy via physical mailing which also did not
contain a case number.
6.

On April 30, 2019 I attempted to file a Notice of Appearance in the

case but could not find evidence of its existence. After contacting the Bonner
County District Court; I was informed that the initial filing was rejected on April
22, 2019 and notice of same sent to counsel for the Petitioner.
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7.

On May 1, 2019, I contacted counsel for the Petitioner via telephone

to inform them that the case had never been filed. They refiled the case the same
day, and it was accepted by the District Court.
8.

On May 6, 2019, I received another "courtesy copy" of the Petition

via email from counsel for the Petitioner. This copy contained a case number.
This was my first indication that the Petition had been formally filed and
accepted by the District Court.
9.

As of this writing, no Bonner County employee has received a

physical copy of the filed Petition or any other service of process in this matter.
DATED this _1_6t_h_ _ _ day of May, 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

Subscrib ed and swor n to m e this ~ y of May, 2?19/J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _jfp___~y of May, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via lcourt electronic submission to:
Gary Allen

Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorney for the Petitioners
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Filed:05/17/2019 09:49:39
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rasor, Sandra
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

Case No. CV09-19-0629

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant
Petitioner,
vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Respondent.

Voluntary Disqualification
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 40(c)

I voluntarily disqualify myself from any further proceedings in this case pursuant to Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure 40(c) and request reassignment of this case.

Date: 5/17/2019
Judge Barbara A. Buchanan

Voluntary Disqualification (Civil) (October 30, 2017)
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Page 1 of 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:

Jack Widener Relf
Gary Guerdrum Allen
Bill Wilson

jackrelf@givenspursley.com
garyal len@g ivenspu rsley. com

[X] E-mail
[X] E-mail

prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov

[ ] By E-mail

~ By Email

Judge Christensen

Dated: 5/17/2019

By:

kw/Mu" ~

Deputy Clerk

Voluntary Disqualification (Civil) (October 30, 2017)
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S·TAJE OF IDAHO
_ COUNTY OF BONNER

r IRS T JUDICIAL 01S TRICT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D1STR1dflt?>,AY 2 I

AH 11 :_ 2 I

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOrelERK DISTRICT COURT

Citizens Against Linlcott/lnterstate
Asphalt Plant

Case No. CVOS-19-0629
Notice of Reassignment

Petit~,

va.
Bonner Ccu1ty Board of Commissioners
Respondent.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the
Honorable Lansing L Haynes.

Dated:05(21/2019

CER11FICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, I 88IV8d a copy d the attached to:
Jack VVldener Relf
Gary Guerdrum Allen
Wliam Steven Wilson

jaclaalf@givenspursley.com

garyallen@glvenapUraley.com
pR>Nftle@bonnerau,tyld.gov

,[X] By E-maH
,[X] By E-mal
,[X] By E-mail

Michael W. Rosedale
Clerk cl the Col.It

Dated: 05/21/2019

By.~
Deputy Clerk
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Filed:05/30/2019 13:59:58
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Oppelt, Linda

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS.
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV09-19-629

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is reassigned to the Honorable

Jay Gaskill, Administrative District Judge for the Second Judicial District, for the
reassignment to a District Judge from the Second Judicial District for all further
proceedings. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court Order for Assignment of Second
Judicial District Judges to the First Judicial District dated June 28, 2018, this
reassignment shall be considered an appointment by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l )(I)(iii).
DATED this

~~y of,,____..,...__

Cynthi

C. Meyer
A ministrative District Jud~,g,.,,_. st Judicial Disrict

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT: I

Page 41

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered as follows:
Jack Widener Relf - jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Gary Guerdrum Allen - garyallen@givenspursley.com
William Steven Wilson - prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Honorable Jay Gaskill - tdammon@nezperce.id.us

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Signed: 5/30/2019 02:00 PM

~ <2pP<.J1=

By

Deputy Clerk

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT: 2
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Filed:05/30/2019 15:42:43
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Oppelt, Linda

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

)

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT,

Case No. CV09-19-629

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

)
)
)
)

vs.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMiffiIONERS,

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE

)
)

Defendant.

_________ )
It is ORDERED that Judge Jeff M. Brudie, whose chambers are located in

Lewiston, Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled
matter.

.,._

DATED this 3Qiay of May, 2019.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete
and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was emailed to:
Jack Widener Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Gary Guerdrum Allen
garvallen@givenspursley.com
William Steven Wilson
proselfile@bonnercountyid.gov
Honorable Jeff M. Brudie
jkough@co.nezperce.id.us
on this _ _ day of May, 2019.
Signed: 5/30/2019 03:42 PM

DeputyOerk

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2
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Electronically Filed
5/30/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Angela Augustine, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14681357_1.docx [14624-2]

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.

Petitioners CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT
("Petitioners") hereby submit this Opposition to Respondent Bonner County Board of
Commissioners' ("Bonner County") Motion to Dismiss.

OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
Page 46

I.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant ("Citizens") brought this
case to challenge an administrative decision of Bonner County. Citizens timely filed and served
their Petition for Judicial Review, but a misreading of the filing requirements by the iCourt
system or clerk's office 1 prevented the Petition from being initially accepted. Citizens'
substantial compliance with the relevant rules and the interests of justice establish that this
Petition should not be dismissed, and Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2019, Bonner County issued an administrative decision upholding the
grant of a conditional use permit ("CUP") of the Linscott/Interstate gravel pit for an asphalt
batch plant (the "Decision"). But the CUP does not comply with the Bonner County Code in that
the asphalt plant would operate within a gravel pit that has been unlawfully enlarged, increased,
extended, and/or altered, and the ordinance under which it was approved was not lawfully
adopted under the requirements of LLUP A.
To address the improper CUP, Citizens sought judicial review of Bonner County's
Decision. Prior to filing, Citizens' counsel began correspondence with the County regarding
compilation of an administrative record. Declaration of Jack W. Relf ("Relf Dec.") at 2, ,r 4.
Once they had paid Bonner County the estimated fees for record and transcript preparation,
Citizens timely filed their Petition for Judicial Review on April 19, 2019 (the "Initial Filing").
Relf Dec. at 2, ,r 5. That initial filing was made through the iCourt system, under the name of
filing attorney Gary G. Allen. Relf Dec. at 2, ,r 6. A screen shot and emails evidencing the filing
date of the Initial Filing are attached to the Relf Dec. as Exhibit A. A copy of the Initial Filing

1

The evidence is conflicting in this regard: an iCourt notice indicates the rejection was generated by a staff member
of the clerk's office, but the relevant rules indicate the rejection was generated by the system itself.
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was emailed to counsel for the Bonner County, and was placed in the U.S. Mail on that same
day. Relf Dec. at 2, 17.
On Monday, April 22, 2019, Mr. Allen received an automatic notification from the iCourt
system that the Initial Filing had been rejected by the iCourt system for want of a civil cover
sheet. Relf Dec. at 2, 18. Other counsel on the case, Jack W. Relf and Mr. Allen's administrative
staff, did not receive the notice that the Initial Filing had been rejected, notwithstanding that they
had registered for service in the case. Relf Dec. at 2, 19. As described more fully below,
petitions for judicial review do not require a civil cover sheet. Out of an abundance of caution,
the office of Givens Pursley LLP attempted to correct the issue with iCourt, and an administrative
staff member prepared a new iCourt filing with a civil cover sheet, and consisting of precisely
the same petition that was in the Initial Filing and otherwise compliant with the Filing Rule, and
requested the filing date relate back to the date oflnitial Filing. Relf Dec. at 2-3, 1 10. That
corrected filing did not make it into the iCourt system. The administrative staff member believes
that she correctly submitted the refiling, but it was not entered into the system. It is presently
unknown whether the corrected filing was not submitted as a result of a glitch in the iCourt
system or as a result of an inadvertent "mis-click" by administrative staff. Relf Dec. at 3, 1 11;
Declaration of Stacy Wardein in Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss at 2, 113-4.
Counsel for Citizens believed the Initial Filing had been made to adhere to the request
from the iCourt system and proceeded to discuss the administrative record with Bonner County.
Relf Dec. at 3, 112. Bonner County needed more than the fourteen (14) days allowed by Rule 84
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to compile and prepare the record, and Citizens indicated
that they were willing to stipulate to an extension to grant Bonner County as much time as it
needed to prepare and compile the record. Relf Dec. at 3, 113. But when Bonner County looked
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into filing such a stipulation, it became aware that the court had not recognized the existence of
an active case brought by Citizens. Relf Dec. at 3, ,-r 14. Counsel for Bonner County called
counsel for Citizens and relayed that information on May 1, 2019, at which point Citizens
became aware that the Initial Filing had never been accepted into the iCourt system. Relf Dec. at
3,115.

Citizens attempted to resubmit the Initial Filing pursuant to the Rule on Electronic Filing
and Electronic Service ("Filing Rule") (e)(5)(A) and retain the filing date of the Initial Filing,
but the iCourt system would not allow a submission to retain the initial filing date. Relf Dec. at
3, ,-r 16. Consequently, on that same May 1, 2019 refiled the Petition for Judicial Review, and
informed Bonner County of the same around that time, generating the instant action. Relf Dec. at
4, ,-r 17. Bonner County was not listed as a service contact in iCourt, so a courtesy copy was
emailed to counsel for Bonner County. Relf Dec. at 3, ,-r 18. The Petition filed in this case is
precisely the same as was filed in the Initial Filing, a copy of which had been mailed and emailed
to Bonner County. Relf Dec. at 4, ,-r 18.
Bonner County then brought its Motion to Dismiss on May 16, 2019, and filed its
Memorandum and Affidavit of William S. Wilson in Support of the same on that same day.
However, despite being listed in the service contacts in the iCourt system for the case, counsel
for Citizens, Mr. Relf, did not receive a copy of the Motion, the Memorandum, or the Affidavit,
apparently due to Bonner County "unchecking" his name from service. Relf Dec. at 4, ,-r 19.
Additionally, Bonner County did not list itself as a service contact in the iCourt system when it
appeared in the case as is required by Idaho Supreme Court Rule of Electronic Filing and
Electronic Service.
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III.

ARGUMENT

As Bonner County correctly notes, this case is governed by the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act as well as Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it is also
governed by the e-Filing rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court. Under all of those
rules, Citizens complied with all relevant time limits.
1.

This case is not time-barred as Citizens timely filed their Petition.

A.

Citizen's Petition for Judicial review is timely under the relevant rules.

Citizens electronically filed their Petition through the iCourt system within the required
twenty-eight (28) days, by April 19, 2019. While Rule 84(n) states that such petitions need only
be "physically file[ d]" with the District Court to avoid a jurisdictional time bar, electronic
submission to the iCourt system undoubtedly meets this requirement. Attorneys "must
electronically file documents in courts where electronic filing has been mandated" such as the
First Judicial District Court for Bonner County. Filing Rule (b )(1 )(A). Therefore, Rule 84(n)
cannot be construed to require paper or "conventional" filing, because that would place Rule 84
in conflict with the Filing Rule. "The literal wording of a statute cannot be honored if it creates
unreasonable, absurd results." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894,
265 P.3d 502, 507 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).
Rule 84 does not require that an iCourt filing be accepted within the relevant time limits,
simply that it be filed. See I.R.C.P. 84. The iCourt system can take several days to accept or
reject a filing (see, e.g., Filing Rule (e)(3)(B)) and Rule 84 says nothing about acceptance or
rejection being jurisdictional, simply the physical filing. Citizens timely performed that filing
when they properly submitted the Initial Filing to the iCourt system. A physical filing, once

OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
Page 50

accomplished, is not undone because the clerk's office put it in the wrong place. Extending that
reasoning to the now-mandatory electronic filing, the physical act of submitting a filing to the
iCourt system, once accomplished, is not undone because the iCourt system and/or the clerk's
office erroneously rejected the filing. The date the document was physically filed remains the
same, and is with what the jurisdictional bar in Rule 84(n) concerns. "The electronic filing of a
document is accomplished when a filer submits a document electronically to the court and the
electronic filing system receives the document." Filing Rule (e)(1 )(A) (emphasis added).
Filing Rule (b )(7) indicates that a document not corrected as requested "will be deemed
to have not been filed." That provision does not mandate dismissal of this case for several
reasons. First, as discussed above, whether or not the clerk's office accepts or rejects a timely
filing has no bearing on the date the document was physically filed under Rule 84(n). The Filing
Rule governs when and how documents are "electronically filed" but do not supersede Rule
84(n)'s mandate regarding documents being "physically filed." Idaho Supreme Court Order in
re: Order Amending Rule of Electronic Filing and Service, March 26, 2018 (ordering that "the
terms of the attached [Filing Rule] as it relates to electronic filing, electronic service and the
electronic trial courts shall prevail" but remaining silent as to physical filing). So the Filing
Rule's deeming a document not having been electronically filed has no impact on whether it was
"physically filed" pursuant to Rule 84(n).
Further, and perhaps more importantly, Filing Rule (b )(7) is inapplicable here because the
Initial Filing could not have been "corrected" as requested because it was procedurally compliant
and there were no lawful corrections to it that needed to be made as discussed below in Section
III(l)(B). Because there was no lawful correction required the Initial Filing cannot have been
deemed not to have been filed.
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Further, it would not serve the interests of justice mandated by Rules 1(b) and 84(r) to
prohibit Citizens from proceeding with their timely filed action due to a quirk-which, as
explained below, is the fault of iCourt and/or the clerk's office-in a newly adopted electronic
filing system that still has bugs all of Idaho's legal professionals are working out together. This
Court should interpret the ambiguities in Rule 84 created by electronic filing system in favor of
cases being substantively heard rather than dismissed for a hiccup in the iCourt filing system,
especially where those cases were timely filed into the iCourt system. Citizens' Petition was
timely filed and should not be dismissed.
B.

The iCourt system improperly rejected Citizens' Initial Filing and improperly
prevented them from retaining the initial filing date.

Citizens' Initial Filing was rejected because it did not contain a civil cover sheet.
However Citizens' Petition is and was not required to be accompanied by a civil cover sheet,
meaning that it was improperly rejected by the iCourt system and/or an employee of the court
clerk's office reviewing it. Civil cover sheets, or case information sheets, are required in "civil
action[s]" by Rule 3(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. 3(a), (d). But Citizens'
Petition for Judicial Review is expressly not a "civil action" and therefore not required to be filed
with a case information sheet. "Indeed, [the Idaho Supreme Court] ha[ s] often held that an
administrative appeal does not constitute a 'civil action' as defined by I.R.C.P. 3(a)." Euclid
Ave. Tr. v. City ofBoise, 146 Idaho 306,309, 193 P.3d 853,856 (2008) (emphasis added)

(internal quotation omitted).
In Euclid Ave. Tr., a petitioner filed a "Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and
Request for Jury Trial." Id., 146 Idaho at 308, 193 P.3d at 855. Boise City moved to dismiss and
for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
considered whether truly civil claims (such as for damages and declaratory relief) could properly
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be brought in the same action as a petition for judicial review. Id. It noted that petitions for
judicial review are not "civil actions" and went on to distinguish the two and ultimately conclude
they could not be brought together in the same action due to their differences:
The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good
policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the other
is an original action. They are processed differently by our courts. Discovery is
rarely available in a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be conducted on
the record, absent specific authorization. LC. § 67-5276. The standards for
determining an outcome are specified by statute (LC. § 67-5279), whereas this is
not the case with actions seeking declaratory or monetary relief.

Euclid Ave. Tr., 146 Idaho at 309, 193 P.3d at 856.
Instead, administrative appeals such as this case are governed by Rule 84 and/or the
Idaho Appellate Rules. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(2) ("The procedure an standards ofreview applicable to
judicial review of state agency and local government actions must be as provided by statute. If
no stated procedure or standard of review is provided in the statute, then this rule provides the
procedure and standard ofreview by the district court."); I.R.C.P. 84(r) ("Any procedure for
judicial review not specified or covered by these rules must be in accordance with the
appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules to the extent not contrary to this Rule 84. This Rule
84 must be construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all petitions for
review .... "). Nothing in either Rule 84 or the Idaho Appellate Rules requires filing any sort of a
civil cover sheet or case information sheet. See generally I.R.C.P. 84, Idaho Appellate Rules.
Therefore, Citizens' Initial Filing was procedurally proper and was improperly rejected by the
iCourt system and/or an employee of the court clerk's office.
As the initial filing complied with all requirements, the Court lacked authority to reject it.
Filing Rule (b )6 ("Documents that do not comply with this rule, or the requirements of the

aforementioned Electronic Filing Guide, or court policy, may be returned to the filer for
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correction" (emphasis added)). The initial filing complied with all these requirements, and the
requirements of Rule 84, but was still rejected. The Court, court clerk, and iCourt system were
beyond their authority to do so. In these circumstances, the Court must simply deem the filing to
have been completed on April 19. This Court is bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure as
supplemented by the Filing Rule. LC. § 1-213 ("The Supreme Court shall prescribe, by general
rules,for all the courts of Idaho, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, the manner
of service, time for appearance, and the practice and procedure in all actions and proceedings."
(emphasis added)); Idaho Supreme Court Order in re: Order Amending Rule of Electronic Filing
and Service, March 26, 2018.
To the extent the Initial Filing was rejected due to a "technical" error, the Filing Rule
indicates that parties may obtain relief "if an error in the transmission of the document or other
technical problem prevents the electronic filing system from receiving a document." Filing Rule
(e)(5)(A). "Upon satisfactory proof of such an occurrence, the court shall permit the filing date
of the document to relate back to the date the filer first attempted to file the document to meet
filing requirements." Id. If in fact Citizens encountered such a technical error, they have
submitted proof sufficient to warrant this relief.
Citizens encountered an error on the part of the iCourt system and/or court clerk's office
that prevented their Initial Filing from being accepted by the iCourt system. When they
attempted to request that the filing date of the new submission relate back to the date of the
Initial Filing as provided by Filing Rule (e)(5)(A), the iCourt system would not allow them to do
so. This is more than satisfactory proof of technical issues with iCourt to permit this Court to
allow the filing date of Citizens' Petition to relate back to the date Citizens first filed the
document.
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Therefore, even if this Court disagrees with Citizens' arguments above that the Initial
Filing was timely in and of itself, it is required by the Filing Rule to permit the filing date of the
Petition to relate back to the date of the Initial Filing. Filing Rule (e)(5)(A) (noting that upon
proof "the court shall permit ... " (emphasis added)).

2.

Citizens timely served all required parties.
Citizens properly and lawfully served Bonner County multiple times and multiple ways,

and was not required to serve any other party. Citizens emailed and mailed a copy of the Petition
to Bonner County on April 19, 2019. While Bonner County did not receive its mailed copy until
April 22, 2019, service by mail is "complete upon mailing[.]" I.R.C.P. 5(b)(2)(C). That Citizens
did not mail another copy of the same petition to Bonner County upon re-filing does not rob it of
proper service of precisely the same petition, albeit without the Court's case number affixed
which is not required by statute or rule. Further, as a public entity, Bonner County was required
to designate itself as a Public Service Contact in the iCourt system, but it did not do so. See eFiling FAQs, Idaho Supreme Court I Tyler Technologies, https://icourt.idaho.gov/efile-faqs (last
visited May 29, 2019) ("A new feature has been added that will allow you to designate a 'Public
Service Contact' for county prosecutors and public defenders when they have failed to do so on
their own."). Citizens were unable to access this Public Service Contact feature because Bonner
County is not adequately listed. And Bonner County committed service errors of its own under
the iCourt system. Despite being listed as a service contact and being counsel for Citizens, Mr.
Relf was not served with any of the recent pleadings in this case. The timely service by mail, as
well as the actual notice received by Bonner County are sufficient to meet the service
requirements present in this case.
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Citizens were not required to serve anyone else, as the only parties to this action presently
are Citizens and Bonner County. While Bonner County asserts that Mr. Linscott and Interstate
were parties "[b ]y any objective standard[,]" the statutes and rules cited by the County bely that
assertion. LC. § 67-5201 defines parties as persons or entities named or admitted as a partyhere Citizens and Bonner County-as well as entities "properly seeking and entitled as of right
to be admitted as a party." Linscott and/or Interstate have not indicated any intention to seek to
be admitted as parties. The dispute as it now stands is between Bonner County, which issued a
CUP, and Citizens, who oppose that CUP. Other entities may have an interest in these
proceedings which would allow their intervention, but as they have not yet intervened, they are
not parties and were not required to be served.

3.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides Citizens alternate relief.
If this Court ultimately dismisses Citizens' Petition, they will move for relief under Rule

60(b). While Citizens maintain that the primary technical errors here were the fault of iCourt, the
Filing Rule addresses technical errors by counsel, and provides such errors are to be addressed
under Rule 60(b). Filing Rule (e)(5)(C). Should the Court disagree with Citizens' that their
Petition was timely and properly filed, Rule 60(b) provides that, on motion and just terms, a
court may provide a party relief from order or final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect, or for "any other reason that justifies relief." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l), (6).
Whether or not to grant relief under Rule 60(b) is in the discretion of this Court.
Avondale On Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 326, 658 P.2d 992, 997 (Ct. App. 1983). "A
district court must examine each case in the light of the unique facts and circumstances
presented." Id. To receive relief under Rule 60(b ), a party "must show that he has exercised due
diligence in the prosecution of his rights, such as a reasonably prudent person would exercise
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under similar conditions." Id. (citing Council Improvement Co., Inc. v. Draper, 16 Idaho 541,
102 P. 7 (1909); Savage v. Stokes, 54 Idaho 109, 28 P.2d 900 (1934); Ticknor v. McGinnis, 33
Idaho 308, 193 P. 850 (1920). This means that a party seeking relief must have acted with
reasonable prudence. Id.
A person with notice of an issue will not have acted with reasonable prudence where they
fail or neglect, with no sufficient excuse, to make effort to protect their rights and allow several
months to elapse without taking action. Crumley v. Minden, 80 Idaho 391,395,331 P.2d 275,
277 (1958). Citizens stand in stark contrast to the hypothetical imprudent person posited by the

Crumley Court. Rather than fail or neglect to act for months to protect their rights, Citizens
attempted to correct the alleged error in the Initial Filing, and would have, save for a failed
submittal to the iCourt system (whether this was an error of the iCourt system or the staff
person). Then, as soon as they became aware that the Initial Filing had not been accepted, they
immediately re-filed the same Petition, all the while working with Bonner County to continue to
secure the administrative transcript and appeal, and agreed to grant the County as much time as it
needed to complete those documents.
Citizens endeavored in good faith to bring their case and correct any small technical
deficiencies within the complex iCourt system. A possible mistake by administrative staff
coupled with an immediate attempt to correct the same are the sort of just terms contemplated by
Rule 60(b), especially when "tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases[.]"

Avondale On Hayden, Inc., 104 Idaho at 326, 658 P.2d at 997.
Because Citizens will seek relief under Rule 60(b) if their Petition is dismissed, they ask
this Court to exercise its inherent power to control its case as well as its discretion under Rule
1(b) to serve judicial economy and justice, and consider their Rule 60(b) arguments here.
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4.

Bonner County is not entitled to attorney fees.
Idaho Code § 12-11 7 ( 1) authorizes awards of attorney fees to the "prevailing party" in a

proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency and a person, when "the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Here, Citizens assert that Bonner County
should not be the prevailing party, but in any event, have acted with a solid basis in fact and law.
The technical errors in this case were primarily the fault of the iCourt system. The small
deviations from iCourt procedures on Citizens' part were attempting to address iCourt's
improper rejection of their Initial Filing and improper prohibition on allowing them to retain
their initial filing date. Further, errors in iCourt have occurred in the County's pleadings as well.
Determining timeliness here necessarily requires analyzing Rule 84 in a new light, and no
appellate court of which Citizens are aware has ever considered the scope of the term "physical"
filing in the iCourt and e-filing era. Citizens have a least a colorable claim that they timely filed,
and this novel issue precludes an award of fees against them. "Attorney fees are not warranted
where a novel legal question is presented." Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 916, 303 P.3d
587, 603 (2013).

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Citizens respectfully request this Court DENY Bonner
County's Motion to Dismiss their Petition.
DATED this 30th day of May, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on this 30th day of May, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Email: j essi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
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Electronically Filed
5/30/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Angela Augustine, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14681610_1.docx [14624-2]

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
DECLARATION OF JACK W. RELF IN
OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.

I, Jack W. Relf, having personal knowledge of the following and declare the following to be true
and correct:

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho and am over the age

of eighteen (18) and am otherwise competent to testify to the matters contained herein.
2.

I am one of the attorneys representing the Petitioners in this action.

3.

I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein.
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4.

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant ("Citizens"), seeking judicial

review of the Bonner County Board of Commissioner's ("Bonner County") March 25, 2019
administrative decision upholding the grant of a conditional use permit (the "Decision"), in the
days following the Decision and through counsel, reached out to members of staff of the Clerk's
office of Bonner County to request an estimate of costs for preparation of the administrative
record and transcripts associated with the Decision.
5.

Citizens paid Bonner County the estimated costs, as set forth by Bonner County,

associated with administrative record and transcript preparation prior to April 19, 2019, and
submitted their Petition for Judicial Review of the Decision into the iCourt system on April 19,
2019 (the "Initial Filing").
6.

The Initial Filing was submitted into the iCourt system under the name of filing

attorney Gary G. Allen. True and correct copies of emails evidencing the filing of the Initial
Filing are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
7.

On April 19, 2019, my office caused a copy of Citizens' Petition for Judicial

Review of the Decision to be mailed to Bonner County.
8.

On Monday, April 22, 2019, Mr. Allen received an automatic notification from

the iCourt system that the Initial Filing had been rejected by the iCourt system for want of a civil
cover sheet. A true and correct copy of that notification is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
9.

I was listed as counsel for Citizens in the iCourt system, but did not receive the

notice attached hereto as Exhibit B. No administrative staff of my office received the notice
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
10.

Out of an abundance of caution and within three (3) business days of the notice

attached hereto as Exhibit B, my office attempted to correct the issue with iCourt, and an
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administrative staff member prepared a new iCourt filing with a civil cover sheet, and consisting
of precisely the same petition that was in the Initial Filing and otherwise compliant with the rules
governing electronic filing, and requested the filing date relate back to the date of Initial Filing.
11.

The administrative staff member referred to above believes that she correctly

submitted the refiling, but it does not appear to have been submitted to the system. It is presently
unknown whether the corrected filing was not submitted as a result of a glitch in the iCourt
system or as a result of an inadvertent "mis-click" by administrative staff.
12.

I, believing that the Initial Filing had been made to adhere to the requests made by

the iCourt system, proceeded to continue to discuss the administrative record and transcript
preparation with counsel for Bonner County.
13.

Bonner County, or their agent assigned to prepare the administrative transcripts

and/or record, requested additional time beyond the fourteen (14) days provided to compile and
prepare the record, and I indicated that Citizens were willing to stipulate to an extension of time
to grant Bonner County the necessary time.
14.

I understand that counsel for Bonner County attempted to file a stipulation to

extend time, but became aware that the court had not recognized the existence of an active case
pending brought by Citizens.
15.

Counsel for Bonner County called me on May 1, 2019, and relayed that no active

case was pending, which represented the first time Citizens became aware that the resubmitted
filing of the Initial Filing had not been accepted by the iCourt system.
16.

On May 1, 2019, Citizens attempted to resubmit the Initial Filing pursuant to the

Rule on Electronic Filing and Electronic Service (e)(5)(A) and retain the filing date of the Initial
Filing, but the iCourt system would not allow a submission to retain the initial filing date.
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17.

Around the time of the filing on May 1, 2019, I called counsel for Bonner County

to indicate that Citizens were refiling their Petition for Judicial Review.
18.

Bonner County was not listed a service contact on iCourt, so a courtesy copy of

the Petition for Judicial Review filed on May 1, 2019, which was precisely the same as the
Petition submitted in the Initial Filing, was emailed to counsel for Bonner County.
19.

Despite being listed as a service contact in this case in the iCourt system, I did not

receive notice nor copies of Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss or the Memorandum or
Affidavit in support of the same.
20.

As of the date of this Declaration, Bonner County is still not listed as a service

contact in the iCourt system.
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho
that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Dated this 30th day of May, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on this 30th day of May, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Email: j essi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf

DECLARATION OF JACK W. RELF IN OPPOSITION
TO BONNER COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
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Jack W. Relf
efilingmail@tylerhost.net
Friday, April 19, 2019 3:37 PM
Gary G Allen
Filing Submitted for Case: 1703359; ; Envelope Number: 1703359

From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:

Filing Submitted

9 iCo rt

Envelope Number: 1703359
Case Number: 1703359
Case Style:

E-FIL

The filing below has been submitted to the clerk's office for review. Please allow 24 - 48 hours for
clerk office processing.

IDate/Time Submitted
I Filing
I

Type

IBonner County
I4/19/2019 2:36 PM PST
Appeal or Petition for Judicial Review

!Filing Description
I Type

of Filing

EFile

I

!Filed By
I Filing

Attorney

jGary Allen
Gary Allen

I

Fee Details
I

Your account is never charged until your filing is accepted. If you see any pending charges on your
account prior to acceptance, this is an authorization hold to ensure the funds are available so your
filing can be accepted without delay.
i

If the filing is canceled or rejected these funds will be released and will return to your account
according to your financial institution's policies (typically 3-10 business days).

I This envelope is pending review and fees may change.
Case Fee Information
Case Fees
Payment Service Fees
Appeal or Petition for Judicial Review
Summons Issued

$227.63
$221.00
$6.63
$0.00
$0.00

jTotal:$227.63 (The envelope still has pending filings and the fees are subject to change)

1
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Petition for Judicial Review.pdf
Lead Document Page
Count
I

IDownload

IFile Copy
I

Document

This link is active for 30 days.
For technical assistance, contact your service provider

•

•C·Ourt
I

.

E-F I LE

Service Provider: Tyler Technologies Odyssey File and Serve

Need Help?
, Visit: https://idaho.tylerhost.net/contacts.htm
Email: efiling.support@tylertech.com

Please do not reply to this email. It was automatically generated.

2
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Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,
Petitioners,

Case No.: - - - - - - -

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY ACTION

vs.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho

CATEGORY FEE: L.3
FEE AMOUNT: $221.00

Respondent.

Petitioners Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (the "Citizens") an
unincorporated Idaho non-profit association, by and through its attorneys of record Givens
Pursley LLP, and pursuant to Idaho Code sections 65-6501 through 67-6539 and 67-5270 through
67-5279 and Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby file this petition ("Petition")
seeking judicial review of an agency action by the Bonner County Board of Commissioners
("BOCC") or the "Board").
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1
14624_2; 14631692_2.doc
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1.

The name of the entity for whose action judicial review is sought is the Bonner

County Board of Commissioners (the Board).
2.

The District Court before which this Petition is taken is First Judicial District of

the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonner, and the Citizens have standing to bring this
action before this Court which has jurisdiction over this matter and before which venue is proper.
a.

The Citizens have standing to bring this action. The Citizens are a group
of concerned citizens of Bonner County who own real property in Bonner
County in the immediate vicinity of the site of a proposed asphalt plant
approved by the Board at the heart of this dispute. The Citizens are in
immediate danger of and/or have already incurred a distinct and palpable
injury in fact which is fairly traceable to the conduct of the Board in
approving a conditional use permit. Specifically, because of the conduct of
the County, Citizens' real property is in immediate danger of injury from
noise pollution, air pollution, increased traffic, and other injury, and those
risks have been or will be economically injurious to Citizens' real
property. Members of the Citizens include the following without
limitation, who all reside and own real property within approximately a
quarter-mile of the proposed asphalt plant:
i.

Daniel and Jonna Plante;

ii.

Larry and Sandra Smith;

iii.

Sharon and Tom Walton;

iv.

Don and Reanna Sharp

V.

Corrine and Mark Jones

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2
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Page 69

b.

vi.

Jerry and Carol Halstriter;

vii.

Bob and Phylis Staats

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 84 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code section 67-6521 (d) which
incorporates the judicial review process set forth in chapter 52, title 67 of
the Idaho Code. The Citizens are an entity aggrieved by a final decision
rendered by the Board.

c.

Citizens have exhausted their administrative remedies with the Board, as
they have exercised their rights to request reconsideration of the decision
underlying this matter, and there is no statute, rule, or regulation that
would allow for further reconsideration of the decision that is the subject
of this Petition.

d.

Venue is proper before this court pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5272
because the hearings that occurred in this matter were held in Bonner
County, the Final Decision issued by the Board was issued in Bonner
County and affects actions and property in Bonner County, and the real
property for which a conditional use pennit was sought and issued in this
case is located in Bonner County.

3.

The heading or case caption from the Board for which judicial review is sought is

BOCC Docket No. C1015-18, with a final order date of March 25, 2019.
4.

A brief procedural synopsis of the events which occurred in this matter is set forth

for the convenience of the Court, including identification of whether and how hearings or oral

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3
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presentations were recorded or reported, and the name and address of the person with possession
of such recordings.
a.

In 2018, Frank and Carol Linscott (the "Linscotts") applied to the Bonner
County Planning Department for a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") to use
the Linscott/Interstate gravel pit (the "Gravel Pit") for an asphalt batch
plant (the "Batch Plant").

b.

Despite failing to comply with the Bonner County Code ("BCC") and
with the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), the Bonner
County Planning Department approved project File No. Cl 015-18 on
November 15, 2018 following an oral hearing, 1 and issued a written
explanation of its approval on November 16, 2018 (the "P&Z Decision").

c.

Pursuant to the BCC, Citizens timely appealed the P&Z Decision to the
Board on December 11, 2018, indicating that the P&Z Decision was not
supported by substantial evidence, was contrary to state, local, and federal
law, was contrary to public policy, and was based upon incomplete and/or
inaccurate evidence.

d.

On January 11, 2019, the Board conducted a public hearing regarding the
appeal of the P&Z Decision, and on January 14, 2019, the Board issued a
written decision regarding the appeal of the P&Z Decision (the "Initial
Decision"), in which it considered the evidence presented and approved

the Linscotts' requested CUP. The January 11, 2019 hearing was recorded

1
The hearing before the Bonner County Planning Department was recorded electronically verbatim and
that recording is in the possession of the Bonner County Planning Department, 1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 208, Sandpoint, ID
83864.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4
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electronically verbatim and that recording is in the possession of the
Bonner County Board of Commissioners, c/o Jessi Webster, 1500 Hwy 2,
Ste. 308, Sandpoint, ID 83864.
e.

Citizens timely requested reconsideration of the Initial Decision, and
submitted its letter in support of reconsideration on March 15, 2019,
indicating that the CUP should be denied because: (1) the Gravel Pit is not
a lawful non-conforming use for the property in question; (2) even if it
were a lawful non-conforming use, the proposed Batch Plant would
unlawfully enlarge, increase, extend, and/or alter the Gravel Pit; and (3)
the ordinance under which the Batch Plant was approved was not lawfully
adopted under the requirements of LLUP A.

f.

The Board conducted a public hearing regarding Citizens' request for
reconsideration on March 22, 2019 and approved the Linscotts' CUP
request. The March 22, 2019 hearing was recorded electronically verbatim
and is in the possession of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners,
c/o Jessi Webster, 1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 308, Sandpoint, ID 83864.

g.

The Board issued a written decision explaining its approval of the
Linscotts' requested CUP and denying Citizens' request for
reconsideration on March 25, 2019 (the "Final Decision").

5.

Citizens presently intend to assert the following issues in their Petition, provided

that they may file a separate statement of issues within fourteen (14) days of filing this Petition
and may assert other issues as discovered:

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5
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a.

The Final Decision was incorrectly and illegally decided by the Board for
at least the following reasons:
i.

The requested CUP is improper because the Gravel Pit does
not comply with the non-conforming use regulations of the
BCC;

11.

The requested CUP is improper because the proposed
Batch Plant unlawfully enlarges, increases, extends, and/or
alters the Gravel Pit;

iii.

The requested CUP is improper because the ordinance
under which the Batch Plant was approved was not
lawfully adopted under the requirements of LLUPA.

b.

The Initial Decision was incorrectly and illegally decided by the Board for
at least the same reasons indicated in Paragraph 5(a).

c.

The P &Z Decision was improper for at least the same reasons indicated in
Paragraph 5(a), and for the reasons that it was not supported by substantial
evidence, was contrary to state, local, and federal law, was contrary to
public policy, and was based upon incomplete and/or inaccurate evidence.

d.
6.

Citizens reserve the right to augment and supplement the foregoing issues.

A transcript is requested, and pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5275(1), Citizens

request that the Board file a certified copy of the entire record of these proceedings as required
by law, including, but not limited to, all pleadings, filings, and written decisions before it or any
other agency or entity in this matter, all letters and other written correspondence, all exhibits
attached to any correspondence or pleading or filing, petitions, memoranda, staff reports, and

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 6
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other documents, together with transcripts of all hearings and meetings of the Board with regard
to consideration of the CUP at issue here.
7.

The undersigned attorney for Citizens hereby certifies that:
a.

Service of this Petition has been made upon the state agency rendering the
underlying decision (the Board) via iCourt and via email;

b.

On April 18, 2019, Citizens paid the clerk of the Board the estimated fee
of $1,950.00 (as indicated by the clerk of the Board), plus applicable fees,
for preparation of the transcripts that have been requested; and

c.

On April 18, 2019, Citizens paid the clerk of the Board the estimated fee
of $580.20 (as indicated by the clerk of the Board), plus applicable fees,
for preparation of the transcripts that have been requested.

8.

As a result of Respondent's actions, Citizens have had to retain counsel. For

services rendered, Citizens are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees and costs should they
prevail in this action pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 2019.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of April, 2019, I caused to be filed and served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
DOCUMENT FILED:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
215 South First A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

Fax: (888) 960-4885
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov

□
□
□
□

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

DOCUMENT SERVED:
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 308
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Fax: (208) 265-1460
Email: j essi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 8
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

Exhibit B
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From: efilingmail@tylerho st.net <efilingmail@tylerh ost.net>

Sent: Monday, April 22, 2019 11:35 AM
To: Gary G Allen <GaryAllen@givenspursley.com>
Subject: Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 1703359 in Case: 1703359, for filing Summons Issued

Filing Returned

r,iCo rt

Envelope Number: 1703359
Case Number: 1703359
Case Style:

E-FIL

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the
corrections outlined below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

:court

lI Bonner County

:Returned Reason

Missing Case Information Sheet, please copy envelope, add a Case
Information Sheet, and resubmit.

!
i

Returned Comments

Please correct error in envelope and resubmit.

I

:Case Number

1703359

;

:Case Style
1

!

j

I

Date/Time Submitted
Filing Type

4/19/2019 2:36 PM PST

ISummons Issued

,Filing Description
!

iActivity Requested
1

Filed By

;Filing Attorney

1

EFile
Gary Allen
Gary Allen

1
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Electronically Filed
5/30/2019 2:30 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Angela Augustine, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14662072_ 1.docx [ 14624-2]

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
DECLARATION OF ST ACY W ARDEIN
IN OPPOSITION TO BONNER
COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.

I, Stacy Wardein, having personal knowledge of the following and declare the following to be
true and correct:

1.

I am an administrative staff member of the law firm representing the Petitioners in

this action, and am over the age of eighteen (18) and am otherwise competent to testify to the
matters contained herein.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein.

DECLARATION OF STACY W ARDEIN IN OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
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3.

On Wednesday, April 24, 2019, I attempted to resubmit Petitioners' Petition for

Judicial review into the iCourt system to adhere to the request the iCourt system made, and
prepared a new iCourt filing with a civil cover sheet, and consisting of precisely the same petition
that was in the filing initially filed on April 19, 2019, as evidenced by Exhibit A to the Declaration
of Jack W. Relf in Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss. and requested the filing date
relate back to the date of initial filing, April 19, 2019.
4.

I believe that I correctly submitted the refiling, but it does not appear to have been

submitted to the system. It is presently unknown whether the corrected filing was not submitted as
a result of a glitch in the iCourt system or as a result of an inadvertent "mis-click" by me.
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that
the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

_..,
-➔

DECLARATION OF STACY W ARDEIN IN OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on this 30th day of May, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Email: j essi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf

DECLARATION OF STACY WARDEIN IN OPPOSITION TO BONNER COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
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Electronically Filed
6/12/201911:18AM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Charity Hadley, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First
Avenue Sandpoint,
Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Respondent Bonner County, Idaho
shall call on for hearing their Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Judge
Jeff Brudie, in the Courtroom of the above-entitled Court at the Bonner County
Courthouse, 215 South First Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho, or as soon thereafter

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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as Counsel may be heard. Judge Brudie shall appear by telephone by calling
(208) 265-2281 and, when prompted, enter 4990.
DATED this 12 th day of June, 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12 th day of June, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via Icourt electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorneys for the Petitioners
The Honorable Judge Brudie
District Judge
jbrudie@co. nezperce. id. us

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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Electronically Filed
6/13/201911:16AM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Charity Hadley, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First
Avenue Sandpoint,
Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF
HEARING

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Respondent Bonner County, Idaho
shall call on for hearing their Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Judge
Jeff Brudie, in the Courtroom of the above-entitled Court at the Bonner County
Courthouse, 215 South First Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho, on the 27th day of June,
2019, at the hour of 1:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as Counsel may be heard.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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Judge Brudie shall appear by telephone by calling (208) 265-2281 and, when
prompted, enter 4990.
DATED this 13 th day of June, 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 13 th day of June, 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley, LLP

Attorneys for the Petitioners
The Honorable Judge Brudie
District Judge
jbrudie@co. nezperce. id. us

Becky Klahs
Legal Assistant

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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Electronically Filed
6/14/2019 2:44 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Angela Augustine, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P .0. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14676321_1.ax (14624•2)

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTI/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincoiporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state ofldaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
PETITIONERS' STIPULATED
MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY

Petitioners,

v.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.
Petitioners Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant by and through its
undersigned counsel of record, moves this Court and stipulates with Bonner County Board of
Commissioners that counsel for Petitioner be allowed to telephonically attend the hearing on
Respondent Bonner County Board of Commissioners' Motion to Dismiss, scheduled for the 27th
day of June, 2019 at the hour of 1:00 p.m. Pacific Time. This Stipulated Motion is brought

PETITIONERS' STIPULATED MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY -1
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pursuant to Rules 7.2(a) and 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 48 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
Good cause appears to grant this Stipulated Motion, as Petitioner's counsel is located in
Boise, Idaho and allowing telephonic appearance would reduce the costs and burdens associated
with the significant travel that would otherwise be required.

DATED this

B

day of June, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Gary G. Allen

Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen

STIPULATED this

J#

day of June, 20 J9.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

PETITIONERS' STIPULATED MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY -2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Lf'

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on this J day of June, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:
First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Email: jessi.webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: bill.wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

ls/Jack W: Relf
JackW. Relf

PETITIONERS' STIPULATED MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY .3
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Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Filed:06/26/2019 08:53:06
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Oppelt, Linda

14676335_1.docx [14624-2]

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS'
STIPULATED MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALL Y

Petitioners,

v.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.

The Court having reviewed Petitioners' Stipulated Motion to Appear Telephonically, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners' counsel is allowed to appear telephonically
for the hearing on Respondent Bonner County Board of Commissioners' Motion to Dismiss
scheduled for the 27th day of June, 2019 at the hour of 1:00 p.m. Pacific Time, in the following
manner:

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY -1
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_

Counsel will call in to the hearing.

X.. The court will contact counsel at the time set for hearing at 208-388-1257.

/

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICAL L Y - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on Signed: 61261201908 :53 AM
correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Email: jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary G. Allen
Email: garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
Email: jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Clerk of the Court

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant
Petitioner,
vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Respondent.

Case No. CV09-19-0629
Court Minutes

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE: June 27, 2019
LOCATION: Court Room #3 -Lewiston

CLERK:JanetKough
HEARING TYPE: Motion to Dismiss

COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton
INTERPRETER:

Parties Present:
Parties:

Attorney:

Gary Allen

Attorney:

William Wilson

Hearing Start Time: 1 :02 PM
Journal Entries:
- Crt reviews file. Parties present by phone. Motion to Dismiss has been filed. Issue is e-filing
document date. Hearing is being recorded and reported.

10550
11824
13450
13903

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Wilson presents argument.
Allen presents argument.
Wilson presents rebuttal argument.
Allen comments on writing.

14344 Crt comments. Crt takes issue under advisement and will enter a written ruling.
Hearing End Time: 01 :44 PM

Exhibits:

1

COURT MINUTES
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Filed:07/26/2019 15:19:18
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rasor, Sandra

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT,
An unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the State of Idaho
Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
ts.

CASE NO. CV09- l 9-629

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Responden
___ _
___ ___

This matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion to dismiss. A telephonic hearing
was held on the matter on June 27, 2019. The Petitioners were represented by Gary Allen. The
Respondents were represented by Bonner County Deputy Prosecutor William Willson. The
Court having reviewed the motion and briefs of the parties, having heard arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised in this matter, hereby renders its decision.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2019, The Bonner County Board of Commissioners approved a conditional
use permit (CUP) for the installation of an asphalt plant in a pre-existing gravel pit located in
Sagle, Idaho. On April 19, 2019, the Petitioners attempted to file a petition for judicial review in
the Bonner County District Court. That same day, the Petitioners emailed Bonner County a
1
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'"courtesy copy" of the Petition which did not contain a case number. 1 On April 22, 2019, notice
was sent to counsel for the Petitioners that the petition had been rejected due to the lack of a civil
coversheet submitted with the petition.2 The Petitioners then attempted to resubmit the petition
with the cover sheet and requesting that its filing date relate back to April 19, 2019. This time
however, the petition failed to be entered into the system due to an unknown error. 3
Bonner County sought an extension of time to prepare an administrative record in the
matter but discovered that no active case existed when it attempted to file a stipulation to that
effect. Bonner County informed counsel for the Petitioners of this problem on May 1, 2019. The
Petitioners again attempted to submit the Petition but were informed that it would no longer
relate back to the April 19th filing date. The petition was therefore filed with a date of May 1,
2019. On May 6, 2019, the Petitioners sent another "courtesy copy" of the Petition to Bonner
County. 4 On May 16, 2019, Bonner County filed this motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS

Bonner County seeks dismissal of the petition asserting: 1) the Petition is time barred
and; 2) improper service.
1. Timeliness

Petitions seeking judicial review of an approval of a special use permit must be filed no
later than 28 days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances. LC. §676521 (I)( d).
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed by statute
and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic dismissal of the petition

1

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 2.
Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss, 3.
3 Declaration
ofJack W. Relf in Opposition to Bonner Count 's Motion to Dismiss, at 2-3.
4
Memorandum in Support, at 3.
2

2
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for judicial review on motion of any party, or on initiative of the district court.
I.R.C.P. 84(n)
Under Idaho's new electronic filing rules a document which has been filed incorrectly
may be corrected and submitted within three business days and preserve the original filing date.
ID R ELEC FILE SERV Rule 13(c).
Here, the Petitioners attempted to file their petition on April 19, 2019, within the 28 day
time frame. However, the petition was initially rejected for lack of a civil cover sheet. While the
Court is not convinced that this was a legitimate reason for rejecting the initial filing, the
5
Petitioners nevertheless cured the alleged defect and resubmitted the petition. Then, for reasons

unknown, the petition was never received and filed electronically. The Petitioners made multiple
attempts to timely file but were prevented by circumstances outside of their control. Therefore, in
the interest of justice Bonner County's motion is denied as to this claim.

2. Improper Service
Bonner County asserts that the Petitioners failed to provide adequate service of the
petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84 and therefore this matter should be dismissed. I.R.C.P. 84(n)
provides that:
Failure of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review
will not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action
or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal
of the petition for review.
While Bonner County asserts that the attempted service by the Petitioners was
insufficient, this Court does not find any of the alleged defects in service in this matter to be a
reasonable basis for granting Bonner County's motion. These defects are easily curable and

The Idaho Supreme Court has previously clarified that a Petition for Judicial Review is not civil actions. See
laughy v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867,877,243 P.3d 1055, 1065 (2010).

5

3
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Bonner County has not demonstrated any prejudice due to the deficiencies they have alleged.
6
Therefore, the State's motion is denied as to this claim.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bonner County's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Dated this ______.7_/_2!.-_<e-_+-4_/_,__,_ _

7

6

Bonner County has also requested attorney's fees but as they are not the prevailing party their request is denied.

4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was:
E-Mailed by the undersigned this _si_gn_ed_:?_12_612_01_9_03_:1_9P_M_ _ ' to:
William Wilson: prosefile(a)bonncrcountyid.gov
Gary Allen: garvallenr't1')givenspursley.com

By:

~I.~
Deputy

5
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2019 2:22 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone: (208) 263-7712
Fax: (208) 263-8211
iCourt: johnfinney@f inneylaw.net
ISB No. 5413

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Case No. CV09-19-0629

)

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, an
unincorporat ed non-profit
association organized under
the laws of the State of
Idaho,

)

)
)

MOTION TO INTERVENE (BY
SPECIAL APPEARANCE)

)

)
)

Petitioner,

IRCP 84 (r)
IAR 7.1

)

)
)

v.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent.

Category: I.1.
Fee: $136.00

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW, as Intervenors, FRANKE. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, husband and wife, by and through counsel, JOHN A.
FINNEY, of Finney Finney

&

Finney, P.A., and move to intervene

as Respondents in the above entitled matter, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 84(r) and I.A.R 7.1.

The movants are applicants and

owners of the real property which received the Conditional Use
Permit approval in Bonner County File No. Cl0lS-18, which is the
MOTION TO INTERVENE (BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE) - 1
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subject of this judicial review.

The movants are real parties

in interest to the appeal or proceeding, whose interests would
be affected by the outcome of the appeal or proceeding.
The Petitioner has failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 84(d),
which requires when the petition for judicial is filed, copies
must be served upon all parties to the proceeding before the
agency.

The Intervenors LINSCOTT are applicants and parties to

the proceedings on the conditional use application.
The Intervenors LINSCOTT reserve all claims and defenses,
specially appearing to bring this motion to intervene.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(r) and I.A.R. 32(f) the motion is
to be considered and disposed of without oral argument unless
otherwise ordered by the Court.
DATED this

£ day

of August, 2019.

HN A. FINNEY
Attorney for Intervenors
LINSCOTT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by iCourt file and serve, unless otherwise
day of August, 2019, and was addressed as
(5
indicated, this
follows:

r

Gary G. Allen
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
Boise, Idaho
iCourt Service Contacts:
garyallen@givenspu rsley.com
jackrelf@givenspur sely.com
MOTION TO INTERVENE (BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE) - 2
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William S. Wilson
Deputy Bonner County Prosecutor
Sandpoint, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: prosefile@bonnerco untyid.gov
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, P.S.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: eat@winstoncashatt .com
or via e-mail if not registered in the action
in the iCourt system

MOTION TO INTERVENE (BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE) - 3
Page 99

Electronically Filed
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First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling , Deputy Clerk

1
2
3
4

ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
eat@winstoncashatt.com

5
6

Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

10

11

12
13

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho,

14

15

Case No. CV09-19-0629

Petitioners,

NOTICE OF HEARING
(with oral argument)

vs.

16
17
18

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Res ondent.

19

20

TO:

21

AND TO:

22

THE CLERK OF THE COURT
ALL PARTIES

Please take notice that the undersigned will bring on for hearing Interstate Concrete & Asphalt

23
Company's Motion to Intervene.
24

25

26

The telephonic hearing is to be held on August 15, 2019 at 9:30 a.m. before Honorable Jeff
Brudie. Please dial 1-866-244-8528; Passcode 339785.

NOTICE OF HEARING
PAGE 1
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Coeur d' Alen Idaho 8381
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1

DATED this 1st day of August, 2019.

2
3

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISBN No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
Attorneys for Intervenor
Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

4

5
6

7
8
9
10

11

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; D sent
via facsimile; ~ iCourt / Email Transmission
on August 1, 2019, to:

12

13
14
15

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Bill.wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

16
17

18
19

20
21

Gary G. Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
j ackrelf@gi venspursley. com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
John A. Finney
johnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorneys for Linscott

22
23

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN

24

25

26
NOTICE OF HEARING
PAGE2
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2019 3:19 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling , Deputy Clerk

1
2
3
4

ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
eat@winstoncashatt.com

5
6

Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

10
11
12

13

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho,

14

15

Case No. CV09-19-0629

Petitioners,
vs.

(with oral argument)

16

17
18

MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,

FEE CATEGORY: I(l)
FEE: $136.00

Res ondent.

19

20
21

INTERSTATE CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY, ("Interstate") by and through its

22

counsel of record, Elizabeth A. Tellessen of Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, respectfully requests the court

23

grant its Motion to Intervene as a matter of right under I.A.R. 7.1 and I.R.C.P. 84.

24

1. Supporting Facts

25

Interstate, together with the landowners, Frank and Carol Linscott, made application to Bonner

26

County for a conditional use permit ( CUP) to allow Interstate to install and operate an asphalt batch

MOTION TO INTERVENE AND STATEMENT IN
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1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14

15
16

plant within the existing and active gravel pit. (Bonner Co. File No. C1015-18) Interstate was, and
remains, a party to all of the proceedings relating to the CUP-having made the application, presented
the evidence, and made all efforts to advance the application to obtain the CUP. On January 11, 2019,
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners (BOCC) approved the CUP, and affirmed its decision on
reconsideration February 12, 2019. Petitioners endeavor to have the BOCC decision set aside under I.C.
§67-5279, which would directly and materially affect Interstate's rights and interests in the CUP.
Although Petitioner's name acknowledges Interstate's direct interest in this matter, petitioner has
failed to name Interstate as a party, or serve it with the petition as required by I.R.C.P. 84(d).
Nevertheless, given the court's Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss, Interstate seeks to intervene as
a matter of right to protect its interest in the CUP.

2.

Relief Requested

The person(s) applying for a permit are proper parties to an appeal of the land use decision
approving the permit, as they have a protected property interest. Thus, Interstate, as an applicant is
entitled to intervene in this action as a matter of right under I.A.R. 7 .1. Accordingly, the court should
recognize Interstate as an intervenor-respondent, adorned with all the rights to participate and respond to
the petition, as if originally named as a party to these proceedings.

17
18

DATED this 1st day of August, 2019.

19
20

21
22

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

23
24

25
26
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?#~~ Wadal.t

A PROFESSKlNAL SERVICE GORPORATKlN
250 Nortlwraet Blitid .• Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene-. Idaho 83814
Phone: (208) 007 -21 OJ

1
2
3
4

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; D sent
via facsimile ; ; ~ iCourt / Email Transmission
on August 1, 2019, to:

5
6

7
8
9
10

11

12

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary G. Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
j ackrelf@gi venspursley. com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant

13
14

15
16
17

John A. Finney
johnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorneys for Linscott

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25

26
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Electronically Filed
8/2/2019 12:05 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
prosefile@bonnercountyid. gov

Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

NOTICE OF LODGING WITH
AGENCY

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a certified copy of the Agency Record

in the above-captioned matter is available for pick up at the Office of the Board
of County Commissioners of Bonner County, 1500 Highway 2, Suite 308,
Sandpoint, Idaho, 83864.
NOTICE OF LODGING WITH AGENCY - 1
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YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that a certified copy of the Transcripts in
the above-captioned matter is available for pick up at the Office of the Board of
County Commissioners of Bonner County, 1500 Highway 2, Suite 308,
Sandpoint, Idaho, 83864.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), that you have
fourteen (14) days from the date of mailing of this notice in which to file with the
Board of County Commissioners any objections to the Transcript or to the
Agency Record. The Transcript shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is
made within fourteen (14) days after the date of service of this notice. The Agency
Record shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is made within fourteen
(14) days after the date of service of this notice.
DATED this 2 nd day of August 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

NOTICE OF LODGING WITH AGENCY - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2 nd day of August 2019, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing via icourt File and Serve to the following:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
John Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Linscott
Elizabeth Tellesen
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Interstate Concrete and Asphalt

William S. Wilson

NOTICE OF LODGING WITH AGENCY - 3
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Electronically Filed
8/2/2019 12:05 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
prosefile@bonnercountyid. gov

Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

STIPULATION AND WAIVER OF
APPEARANCE

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent.
COMES NOW, Respondent Bonner County, Idaho, by and through William

S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby stipulates
to: (1) the Motion to Intervene submitted by the Linscotts; and (2) the Motion to
Intervene submitted by Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company. Bonner
STIPULATION AND WAIVER OF APPEARANCE- 1
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County further waives its right to appear and present oral argument at any
hearing regarding said motions.
DATED this 2 nd day of August 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

STIPULATION AND WAIVER OF APPEARANCE- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2 nd day of August 2019, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing via icourt File and Serve to the following:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
John Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Linscott
Elizabeth Tellesen
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Interstate Concrete and Asphalt

J3i&Wk)'//
William S. Wilson

STIPULATION AND WAIVER OF APPEARANCE- 3
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Electronically Filed
8/14/2019 3:10 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

Gary G. Allen, ISB No. 4366
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14773680_1.docx [14624-2]

Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,
Petitioners,

Case No. CV09-19-0629
JOINT RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO
INTERVENE FILED BY INTERSTATE
CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY
AND FRANKE. LINSCOTT AND
CAROL LINSCOTT

V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent.

Petitioners CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT
("Petitioners") hereby submit this Joint Response to the Motions to Intervene filed by Interstate

Concrete & Asphalt Company ("Interstate") and Frank E. and Carol Linscott ("Linscotts")
respectively, pursuant to Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 7 .1 and 32 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules.

JOINT RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO INTERVENE FILED BY INTERSTATE
CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY AND FRANKE. LINSCOTT AND CAROL
LINSCOTT-1
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Petitioners will be brief. They do not have a fundamental objection to intervention by
Interstate and the Linscotts, but are concerned with the prospect for duplicative or repetitive
briefing presented by allowing three precisely aligned parties to file separate briefing. Interstate
and the Linscotts both want the same thing as the Bonner County Board of Commissioners (the
"County")-for this Court to uphold the agency decision below. This is not a case with a complex
web of varying interests. Instead, the interests at play are binary, with Petitioners seeking reversal
of the underlying agency action and the County, Interstate, and the Linscotts all seeking the
opposite.
Petitioners therefore request that this Court exercise its inherent power to control the cases
before it and its discretion in considering petitions to intervene and require the County, Interstate,
and the Linscotts to coordinate with one another to avoid duplicative or repetitive briefing.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen

JOINT RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO INTERVENE FILED BY INTERSTATE
CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY AND FRANKE. LINSCOTT AND CAROL
LINSCOTT-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on this 14th day of August, 2019, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to be served electronically through the iCourt system, which
caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected
below:
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov

Courtesy Copies Emailed to:

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net

Elizabeth A. Tellessen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
eat@winstoncashatt.com

Attorney for Intervenors Linscott

Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf

JOINT RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO INTERVENE FILED BY INTERSTATE
CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY AND FRANKE. LINSCOTT AND CAROL
LINSCOTT-3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant
Petitioner,
vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Respondent.

Case No. CV09-19-0629

JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:August15,2019
LOCATION: in Courtroom #1 in Lewiston by
phone
COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton

Court Minutes

CLERK:JanetKough
HEARING TYPE: Motion to Intervene

INTERPRETER:
Parties Present:
Parties:
Attorney:

Gary Allen, Elizabeth Tellessen, John Finney

Attorney:

William Wilson -not present

Hearing Start Time: 9:32 AM
Journal Entries:
- Parties present by phone. Crt reviews file and motion to intervene. Crt has received motion
and response.
93409 Ms. Tellessen responds, premature to file only one issue until they know what the record
is going to be.
93525 Crt feels intervention is appropriate by Mr. Finney.
93547 Mr. Finney nothing to add. Intends to bring prelim motions, q if Crt wants to set for
hearing.
Crt submits motions and Crt will determine if hearing is appropriate. Crt will do oral argument in
Sandpoint, other prelim matters will be done by phone.
Mr. Finney county has provided transcript.
93723 Mr. Allen addresses issues of judicial efficiency, case about county's decision and
whether it was made lawfully, potential for mischief, all parties have same interest in case and
will be filing the same briefs, potential for piling on, do not want to respond to 3 briefs. Crt has
authority for consolidation or coordination of briefing. Parties have had months to intervene,
should not be given extra time to review transcripts. Does not object to time to settle the record.
Requests parties file one brief and have one set of arguments to respond to.
94159 Crt comments, some coordination is appropriate. Crt sets deadline for Mr. Allen's brief
and have another conf to schedule responses.
1
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94242 Crt q Mr. Allen re issues.
Mr. Allen no objections to record.
94304 Crt Ms. Tellessen's petition is granted on behalf of Interstate Concrete
94317 Crt will grant Mr. Finney's motion to intervene.
94332 Crt sets deadline for settling record on 8/30.
Mr. Allen relays there are 2 deadlines- deadline to object is tomorrow and county is on 8/30.
Crt q Mr. Finney.
Mr. Finney- if able to file with court and not county first. Until 8/30 for any objections are okay.
Crt agreement.
Ms. Tellessen any objections needs to be filed by 8/30.
Crt agrees.
Crt q Mr. Allen if his brief can be due 9/30.
Mr. Allen requests the 35 days which puts it into Oct.
Crt sets petitioner's brief due 10/8, sets sched conf on 10/11 at 9:00 to sched response date.
Counsel available.
Crt will send out order. Crt will be out of office until after 9/16.
Hearing End Time: 09:49 AM
Exhibits:

COURT MINUTES
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Filed:08/15/2019 13: 17: 15
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rasor, Sandra

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT,
An unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the State of Idaho

)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
V.
)
)
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
)
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
)
of the State of Idaho
)
)
Respondents.
)
______________)

CASE NO. CV09-19-629
SCHEDULING ORDER

Pursuant to agreement of counsel:
Petitioner's brief is due by October 8, 2019.
Telephone scheduling conference will take place on October 11, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. Parties are to
call 1-208-799-3003; Passcode 93067#.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER was:

E-Mailed by the undersigned this

Signed: 8/15/2019 01:17 PM

William Wilson: prosefile(a)bonnercountyid.gov
Gary Allen: garyallen(lf)givenspursley.com
Elizabeth Tellessen: eat@winstoncashatt.com
John Finney: johnfinneyr~1),finneylaw.net

By:~"~
Deputy
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Filed:08/19/2019 13:12:14
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rasor, Sandra

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone: (208) 263-7712
Fax: (208) 263-8211
iCourt: johnfinney@finneylaw.net
ISB No. 5413

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, an
unincorporated non-profit
association organized under
the laws of the State of
Idaho,
Petitioner,

)
)

V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

Case No. CV09-19-0629

)

ORDER FOR INTERVENTION

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The Motion To Intervene by FRANKE. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, husband and wife, as Intervenor Respondent, coming
before the Court, and for good cause shown;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT FRANKE. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, husband and wife, is intervened as a Respondent in the
above entitled matter.
DATED

Signed: 8/19/2019 01 :03 PM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing with the filing stamp thereon was served by e-mail to
the iCourt Service Contacts, unless otherwise indicated, this
Signed: 8/19/20 19 0 1: 12 PM
,
and was addressed as follows:
Gary G. Allen
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
Boise, Idaho
iCourt Service Contacts:
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursely.com
William S. Wilson
Deputy Bonner County Prosecutor
Sandpoint, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, P.S.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: eat@winstoncashatt.com
John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Sandpoint, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: johnfinney@finneylaw.net
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Electronically Filed
8/21/2019 7:38 AM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
prosefile@bonnercountyid. gov

Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

NOTICE OF FILING WITH
DISTRICT COURT

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

84(k), that the settled record and transcripts in the above-captioned matter have
been transmitted to the District Court concurrently with this notice.
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DATED this 21s1 day of August 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21s t day of August 2019, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing via icourt File and Serve to the following:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com

Attorney for the Petitioners
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Attorney for the Petitioners
John Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net

Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Linscott
Elizabeth Tellesen
eat@winstoncashatt.com

Attorney for Proposed Intervenors- Interstate Concrete and Asphalt
William S. Wilson
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Filed :08/23/2019 13:52:51
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Rasor, Sandra

ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
eat@winstoncashatt.com

5
6

Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

10

11

12
13

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho,

14

15

Case No. CV09-19-0629

Petitioners,

ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE

vs.

16
17
18

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Res ondent.

19

20
THIS MATTER having come before this Court on the Motion of Intervenor-Respondent

21
22

INTERSTATE CONCRETE & ASPHALT COMPANY ("Interstate"), by and through Elizabeth A.

23

Tellessen of Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, for an order granting Interstate's motion to intervene and the

24

Court finding Interstate to be a real party in interest, NOW THEREFORE,

25

26

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that INTERSTATE CONCRETE
& ASPHALT COMPANY is granted leave to intervene as a respondent in this matter.
ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE
PAGE 1
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1

DONE IN OPEN COURT this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2019.

2
3

~

4

~11. BR

5
6

A;

s;goed, 8123/2019 01,04 PM

IE, District Judge

Presented by:

7

WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
8
9
10

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
Attorneys for Intervenor-Respondent

11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22

23
24

25
26
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; D sent
via facsimile ; ; ~ iCourt / Email Transmission
on August~, 2019, to:

5
6

7
8
9
10

11

12

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary G. Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
j ackrelf@gi venspursley. com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant

13
14
15
16

John A. Finney
johnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorneys for Linscott
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
eat@winstoncashatt.com

17
18
19

~"~

CLERK OF THE COURT
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24
25
26
ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE
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Filed:08/30/2019 12:09:56
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Hendrickson, Joette

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
BONNER CO. CASE: CV09-19-0692
Citizens Against Linscott / Interstate Asphalt Plant
vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of August, 2019 I caused a true and correct
copy of the CD "How it's made" Part of the Agency Record filed with Bonner
County on 08/21/2019 to be served to:
Honorable Judge Brudie
PO Box 896
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

~
eputyCierk .
08-30-2019 cc: of Certificate of Mailing
Gary Allen - garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack Relf - jackrelf@givenspursley.com
William Wilson - prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Elizabeth Tellessen - eat@winstoncashatt.com
John Finney - johnfinney@finneylaw.net
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Electronically Filed
9/3/2019 9:53 AM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
prosefile@bonnercountyid. gov

Attorney for Respondent Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho

Case No. CV09-19-0629

NOTICE OF CLERICAL
CORRECTION

Petitioners,
V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent,
FRANK E. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, husband and wife; and
INTERSTATE CONCRETE &
ASPHALT COMPANY,

In tervenors.

COMES NOW, Respondent Bonner County, Idaho, by and through William

S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby provides
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notice that Bonner County unintentionally omitted four pages when converting
the Record from hardcopy to digital. To correct that error, the omitted pages are
attached hereto at Exhibit 1 and numbered for reference as 1022-A, 1022-B,
1022-C, and 1022-D.
DATED this 3 rd day of September 2019.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3 rd day of September 2019, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing via icourt File and Serve to the following:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
John Finney
johnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for the Linscotts
Elizabeth Tellessen
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney for Interstate Concrete and Asphalt

William S. Wilson

NOTICE OF CLERICAL CORRECTION - 2

Page 127

EXHIBIT 1

NOTICE OF CLERICAL CORRECTION - 3

Page 128

February 7, 2019
Page2

evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla." Cowan, 143
Idaho at 517.
The relevance and competency of the evidence in the record is viewed through the lens of the
particular factual situation that is before the Commissioners. In this regard, the Commissioners
"must make a factual inquiry to determine whether the requested [application] reflects the goals
of, and takes into account those factors in, the comprehensive plan in light of the present factual
situation surrounding the request." Taylor v. Board of County Com'rs, 124 Idaho 392, 398 (1993)
emphasis added. Moreover, the law does not require the conditional use permit conform exactly
to all aspects of the comprehensive plan. Id. at 397-398.
Numerous studies have evaluated the workings, emissions, and effects that asphalt plants have on
the environment and humans, some of which were admitted to the record, while others have been
cited in the request for reconsideration. Regardless of the study, the evidence establishes only that
other plants in other locations have been suspected of posing a hazard or danger. While some
individuals offered personal accounts of what they allege as a connection between prior temporary
plant operations and their personal health, they offered no expert testimony beyond speculation as
to the possibilities that might arise. Moreover, the fears surrounding the use and storage of
reclaimed asphalt pavement (RAP) are unsubstantiated. RAP is commonly used, has not been
identified as a hazardous material, and its storage is not presently regulated by the county, state or
federal governments.
The evidence that does relate to the present factual situation is ICA's proven track-record of
operating the precise plant near school children, elderly adults, and numerous citizens of Bonner
County. Moreover, ICA has adopted, and will continue to operate in accordance with, the best
available control technology ("BACT"). These practices have allowed ICA to operate successfully
in Sandpoint and near other neighborhoods in the region without any known hazard or danger.
There is no controversy without conflicting evidence. The Commissioners' responsibility is to
weigh the evidence before them and reach factual findings particular to this application. Although
the citizens argue about the quality and quantity of the evidence in the record, reasonable minds
could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder, and a court will not invalidate such findings. 1
Consequently, ICA urges the Commissioners to stand behind their findings and decision, and deny
the request for reconsideration.

3.
The Commissioners' appropriately decided the application satisfies the applicable
provisions of the Bonner County Comprehensive Plan and Revised Code.
The request for reconsideration argues that the Commissioners failed to consider the impacts of
the asphalt plant as directed by the comprehensive plan and code. However, the issues raised on
reconsideration were discussed at length during the hearing, as well as in the written materials
1

Upon review a court will only reverse factual findings that are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record." Taylor, 124 Idaho 396.
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submitted by ICA and the public. Further, the written decision includes the criteria and standards
reviewed and relevant to the determination, sets out the pertinent facts, and the rationale for the
decision. IC §67-6535.
The Commissioners' conclusion that the application satisfies the applicable law is not improper
simply because it is not in accord with the evidence or arguments advanced by the public. Further,
the decision is not improper because state agencies, such as Idaho Department of Transportation
and Idaho Department of Lands, did not request additional studies or conditions. Nor does
speculation regarding the possibility of a nuisance establish a basis to deny the decision. The
Commissioners addressed these issues as well as the alleged hazards and dangers raised by the
public during the hearing.
After due consideration and deliberation on the record, the Commissioners' adopted the staff's
thorough analysis, and concluded that the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and
code have been satisfied. The request for reconsideration does not bring to light evidence that was
overlooked, nor does it advance an argument that was not previously presented. The request merely
seeks to persuade the Commissioners to a different conclusion. This is not a justifiable basis for
reconsideration, and ICA submits the request should be denied.

4.
The County and Commissioners followed the prescribed procedures ensuring due
process was afforded to all in a fair and impartial hearing.
Due process requires that the government provide notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to
the deprivation of a constitutional right. "Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly, but it
is a flexible concept calling for procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation."
Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454. The process that is required for land use decisions includes: "(a) notice
of the proceedings; (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings; (c) specific written
findings of fact; and (d) an opportrmity to present and rebut evidence." Cowan, 143 Idaho at 510.
Courts view due process and the proceedings held as a whole, and those objecting to the process
must demonstrate "actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibilities
thereof." Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454. The request for reconsideration asserts that individuals were
not granted a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and that the Commissioners were impermissibly
biased.

In judging whether or not there has been a meaningful opportunity to be heard, courts evaluate
whether the adopted processes and procedures were followed, and whether members of the public
were granted an opportunity to submit evidence, both written and oral, to the record. See In re
Jerome County Board of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 310-311, 281 P.3d 1076 (2012). Since due
process is not applied through rigid standards there is no required amount of time for public
testimony. Although Idaho's Supreme Court has opined that two minutes per person may be
insufficient, it has not directed what amount of time is necessary. See, Jerome County~ 153 Idaho
at 312.
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The individuals complain they were deprived of due process because they were limited to three
minutes per person provided in BCRC 12-267(6). Consideration of the process as a whole reveals
the public had the opportunity to submit substantial written evidence together with two hours of
public testimony during the four-hour hearing. It is unlikely a court would find actual harm or
prejudice to the participating public, or violation of the public's or any individual's right to due
process.
Due process "entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal." Cowan, 143 Idaho at
514. Decision makers must judge "a particular controversy fairly and on the basis of its own
circumstances." Davisco Foods Int., Inc. v. Gooding County. 141 Idaho 784, 791, 118 P.3d 116
(2005). A decision maker will not be disqualified absent "a showing of actual bias ... " Cowan, 143
Idaho at 514.
The request for reconsideration points to the demeanor of the Commissioners' as evidence of their
bias, in particular Commissioner Bailey. Even if Commissioner Bailey's demeanor was
confrontational, the question is whether he impartially judged the issue. His prior statements
regarding an application that was denied under the then existing law does not preclude him from
impartially judging the issues in this matter. See Davisco, 141 Idaho at 791 [commissioner's
statements to the press regarding prior application were not evidence of impermissible bias]. And,
no evidence of actual bias has been presented.
The Commissioners and the County followed the procedures required by BCRC 12-267. All
members of the public that wished to present written evidence were afforded the opportunity to do
so. All members of the public that wished to present oral testimony and rebut the evidence
presented by the staff and applicant were permitted to do so. The request for reconsideration does
not identify a failure to follow a prescribed procedure, nor offer evidence of an impermissible bias
on behalf of the Commissioners, and it should be denied.

5. Whether the Linscott Pit is a non-conforming or permitted use is not germane to the
application or the decision in this matter.

The request for reconsideration incorrectly argues that the status of the Linscott Pit bears on this
decision. There is no genuine dispute that "[e]xpansion and enlargement of a nonconforming use
contrary to a properly enacted zoning ordinance is unlawful." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho
607, 610, 768 P.2d 1340 (1989) emphasis added However, where a use is permitted under the
applicable zoning ordinance, it is properly approved.
The cases and analysis advanced in the request for reconsideration are not applicable to the facts
at hand. Take for instance Baxter, where the defendant's real property had been rezoned causing
his 20-head cattle operation to become a non-conforming use. Baxter, 115 Idaho at 607. As time
passed the defendant elected to expand his operations to include a year-round feed lot. Under the
applicable zoning, a feed lot was not permitted. Thus, the defendant was only allowed to continue
the use that existed at the time the zoning was changed. Baxter and the rest of the cases cited in
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the request for reconsideration are distinct from the facts at hand because they address uses that
are not permitted under the applicable zoning.
In the present circumstances the asphalt plant is a conditionally permitted use in both the rural
residential and transitional zones. The comprehensive plan and the code only require that the plant
be situated on an active gravel mine. BCRC 12-336(22). There is no dispute the Linscott Pit is an
active gravel mine. The nature of its entitlement, non-conforming 2 , conditional, or otherwise, is
not an element of the applicable code, nor a basis for reconsideration. The arguments regarding
CUP C565-95 are nothing more than a distraction from the issues at hand. To that end, ICA
encourages the Commissioners to stand behind their decision approving Cl015-18.
6. Conclusion

Interstate Concrete and Asphalt appreciates the community's involvement in this process and
remains dedicated to being a good neighbor at the new location just as it has been at its existing
location. However, the request for reconsideration does not identify any evidence overlooked or
any arguments that were not presented at the hearing. Therefore, ICA requests the Commissioners
deny the request for reconsideration.

2

The decision does find that the Linscott Pit is a non-conforming use, and there is no indication that the
Commissioners relied on the prior CUP C565-95 in making their decision. Decision, pp. 3-4.
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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This case is a judicial review of the decision of the Board of County Commissioners for
Bonner County ("Board") to grant applicants Frank and Carol Linscott ("Linscotts") a conditional
use permit ("CUP") to relocate an existing asphalt batch plant ("Batch Plant") from downtown
Sandpoint to the existing gravel mining operation on a 139 acre site in Sagle, Idaho. Petitioner is
Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant, an unincorporated non-profit association
organized under the laws of the state of Idaho, whose members include several neighbors owning
property and living in the immediate vicinity of the proposed asphalt plant.
B.

Course of the Proceedings.

On August 8, 2018, Linscotts filed application C 1015-18 seeking a conditional use permit
to relocate an existing asphalt batch plant from its location in downtown Sandpoint, Idaho to
Linscotts' existing gravel mining operation on a 139-acre site in Sagle, Idaho. (R. at 1-15.) The
Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commission ("PZC") approved the conditional use permit
at a public hearing held on November 15, 2018. (R. at 1008-1016.) On December 11, 2018,
Petitioner appealed the PZC's approval to the Board. (R. at 1115-1121.) The Board held a public
hearing on January 11, 2019, and voted to grant the conditional use permit. (R. at 999-1007.) On
January 14, 2019, the Board issued its written decision granting the conditional use permit
("Decision"). Id. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision on January 24, 2019. (R. at

1025-1114.) On February 1, 2019, Bonner County Planning Director, Milton Ollerton,
recommended that the Board limit the reconsideration to a single issue: non-conforming land use.
(R. at 1021.) The Board held a March 22, 2019 public meeting to reconsider non-conforming land
use, and voted to approve the CUP application. (R. at 988-998.) The Board approved the CUP for
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the installation of an asphalt plant in a pre-existing gravel pit located in Sagle, Idaho on March 25,
2019. (Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss at 1.)
The Court has determined Petitioner timely filed the Petition. Opinion and Order dated July
26, 2019. (Id. at 4.)
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Property Overview.

Linscotts own an existing gravel mining operation (the "Gravel Pit") on a 139.3 acre site
m Sagle, Idaho (the "Property"). The Property is zoned Rural-5 and commercial and the
comprehensive plan land-use designation is rural residential and transition. (R. at 1008.)
2.

History of Permitting on the Property.

The Linscotts have never had a permit to operate a gravel pit on the Property. Frank
Linscott has owned a portion of the Property since March 3, 1972. (R. at 530.) Prior to 1981, it
appears no permit was required. See Bonner County Code ("BCC") 12-341.A.1. (establishing
permitting requirements after December 9, 1981). The Bonner County Zoning Ordinance (the
"Ordinance") established permitting requirements and grandfather rights effective December 9,

1981, BCC 12-341.A.1. At that time, the Gravel Pit occupied approximately 17 acres of the
Property. (R. at 354.) After March 1981, Mr. Linscott acquired additional land to expand the
Gravel Pit. (R. at 528.) At the time, gravel pit operations occurred only on the original parcel. (R.
at 495, 542.) The only use occurring on the newly acquired parcel was material storage. (R. at
496, 543.)
In making the current application, the Linscotts acknowledged that the use of the land for
the Gravel Pit is allowed solely through their grandfather rights. The Application states: "[t]he
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existing use is commercial aggregate mining and this request does not seek to change those
grandfathered rights." (R. at 5.)
In 1995, a conditional use permit was approved for the Gravel Pit that conditionally
permitted some level of expansion. (R. at 440.) However, certain conditions were never met and
the permit never came into effect. (R. at 440.) In connection with the current CUP application,
Planning Director Milton Ollerton stated that the 1995 conditional use permit which was never
issued was not related to the Batch Plant and played no role in the decision to approve the
Application. (R. at 445.)
In 2015, the Board of County Commissioners denied an application for a Comprehensive Plan
amendment and zone change for an asphalt plant in this location, finding that the proposed
comprehensive plan map amendment was not in accord with the Bonner County Comprehensive
Plan, specifically Public Services, Transportation and others listed in the report. (R. at 454-465.)
Thus, the property remained in rural and commercial zoning.
3.

Expansion of the Gravel Pit After 1981.

Aerial photographs show the Gravel Pit occupied approximately 17 acres in 1981, the time
at which protected grandfather rights were established.
1981

2017
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The 1981 image is an infrared image, to better show the area of disturbance. (R. at 494.) In
addition, the Applicant represented to the Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL") in its 1998
application that only 30 acres were disturbed at that time. (R. at 501, ,r 2.)
Today, the Gravel Pit occupies somewhere between 98 and 112 acres based on
correspondence from the IDL and numerous aerial photographs taken since 1981, such as this one:

(R. at 541.) This evidence demonstrates an expansion of somewhere between 230 percent and over
500 percent.
Further, The Gravel Pit has added additional land parcels since 1981. The Record shows
the Gravel Pit operations were limited to Parcel 3000A, the original parcel, at that time, as depicted
below:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 4
Page 141

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW- 5
Page 142

The only use occurring on Parcel 4202A was material storage, as shown in this image:

In addition, in 2001, the Linscotts acquired a portion of the McGoldrick property to the
west of the Gravel Pit, to resolve allegations that the Gravel Pit encroached on the McGoldrick
land. (Rat 506.)
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4.

Linscotts' Lack of Compliance.

IDL issued Linscotts a letter on February 15, 2019, noting that Linscotts' gravel pit
"continues to be in violation of the Idaho Surface Mining Act (Title 47, Chapter 15, Idaho Code),
and the Rules Governing Administration of the Reclamation Fund (IDAPA 20.03.03). (R. at 501504.) IDL listed six specific areas of Idaho Code that Linscotts had violated. (R. at 501-504.)
Specifically, Linscotts had violated:
a. Idaho Code§ 47-1506(a), requiring operators to submit a reclamation plan covering
areas to be mined prior to starting surface mining operations. In 1998, the approved
plan permitted 100 acres. IDL noted that, as of the date of the letter, approximately
12 acres of the current disturbance were outside of the approved mining area. (Id.)
b. Idaho Code§ 47-1506(a)(l)(vi), requiring operators to designate the area affected
during the operation's first year. The plan approved in 1998 listed only 30 acres
reportedly disturbed but a 1998 air photo showed over 67 acres disturbed. (Id.)
c. Idaho Code § 47-1512(b), requiring bonding to be submitted prior to affecting
additional lands, which had not happened once over the 20 year life of the mine.
(Id.)

d. Idaho Code § 4 7-1512(b) and 4 7-1512( e), requiring an operator to provide adequate
bonding as requested by IDL. (Id.)
e. Idaho Code § 47-1513(g), requiring persons who willfully and knowingly falsify
any records, plans, specifications or other data required by the board or who
willfully fails, neglects, or refuses to comply with any of the chapter's divisions be
guilty of a misdemeanor. (Id.)
f. IDAP A 20.03 .03.017.01 and .018 limit each mine and mine operator to 40 disturbed
acres for participation in the Bond Assurance Fund. (Id.)
County building permit records demonstrate Parcel 4202A, which includes significant
portions of the Gravel Pit, has added a large number of new or modified structures since 1981,
including building permits issued in 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1995. (R. at 508-537.) The 1985
building permit application requests permission to add two 40' x 40' warehouse buildings. (R. at
508-510.) In 1988, Linscotts applied to add a 15' x 80' addition to the property. (R. at 511-513.)
In 1989, Linscotts applied to add a pole building to the property. (R. at 514-516.) In 1990, they
applied to add another pole building, a 1600 square foot garage. (R. at 517-519.) In 1990, Linscotts
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submitted two applications for additional buildings. (R. at 520 to 525.) And in 1995, Linscotts
submitted two applications to add a 30' x 36' storage buildings. (R. at 526-527; 531-533; 537.)
Finally, the gravel pit currently encroaches on property to the north. (R. at 365-366.)
5.

The 2018 Ordinance Amendment.

On December 13, 2017, the County provided notice to the public that the PZC was
considering the following: "BCRC 12-336: Resource Based Code: Amend the uses allowed in the
Resource Code." (R. at 368.) On January 4, 2018, the PZC held a public hearing and, based on
that decision, the County again provided public notice to amend the Bonner County Revised Code
("BCRC") on March 14, 2018. (R. at 372.) The notice stated: "BCRC 12-336: Resource Based

Code: Amend the uses allowed to expand uses allowed in a gravel pit located in the industrial
zone." (R. at 372.) The PZC held a public hearing April 5, 2018. (R. at 373, 392.) At the April 5,
2018 PZC hearing, the PZC added "Batch Plant-asphalt and/or concrete" as a permitted use in the
industrial zone and as a conditional use in the farming, agriculture/forestry, and residential zones.
(R. at 379, 392.) The Staff Report for this meeting states: "525802608. A Batch Plant is only
permitted in the Industrial Zone with an active gravel pit. ... The reason batch plants are to be
included only with a gravel pit in an industrial zone is due to the impacts included in these
comments. Batch plants located outside of an industrial zone will require a conditional use permit
with standards addressing these concerns." (R. at 382-383.) On May 1, 2018, the Notice of Public
Hearings again stated that a public hearing would be held on May 23, 2018, (this time by the Board
of County Commissioners) to decide "BCRC 12-336: Resource Based Code. Amend the uses
allowed to expand uses allowed in a gravel pit located in the industrial zone." (R. at 405.) The
public hearing decision minutes for the May 23, 2018 hearing state that Bonner County proposed
to amend "BCRC 12-336: Resource Based Code. Amend the uses allowed to expand uses allowed
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in a gravel pit located in the industrial zone." (R. at 406.) The Board approved the amendment to
section 336 "as presented or amended in this hearing." (R. at 407.) While not noticed, the change
to 12-336 Resource Table included conditionally allowing batch plants in the farming,
agriculture/forestry, and residential zones by conditional use permit. (R. at 410.) The Resource
Table standards indicate that a batch plant "is conditionally permitted only with an active gravel
pit." (R. at 411.) The change to the Ordinance permitting batch plants in the farming,
agriculture/forestry, and residential zones by conditional use permit is referred to as the "2018
Amendment".
II.

ISSUES ON REVIEW

A.

Was the 2018 Amendment allowing an asphalt plant to be permitted within an
active gravel pit lawfully adopted?

B.

Did the Decision comply with the Ordinance?

C.

Is Petitioner entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal?
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Local Land Use Planning Act, LC. §§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA") authorizes an
affected person to seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, pursuant
to the standards provided in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, LC. § 67-5201 et seq.
("IDAPA"). In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 153 Idaho 298,307,281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012).
"Affected persons" means "one having a bona fide interest in real property which may be
adversely affected by: (i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a
subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or authorized
pursuant to this chapter." LC. § 67-6521(1)(a)(i).
Where a board of county commissioners makes a land use decision, it is treated as a
"government agency under IDAPA". In re Jerome Cnty Bd. of Comm 'rs 153 Idaho at 307, 281
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P.3d at 1085. On judicial review, the district court "exercises free review over questions regarding
whether the board has violated a statutory provision, which is a matter of law." Id., 153 Idaho at
308, 281 P.3d at 1086. A board's action may be set aside where:
[A] party contesting the zoning board's decision demonstrates that (1) the board
erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), and (2) the board's
action prejudiced its substantial rights. Id. Idaho code section 67-5279(3) provides
that a board's decision will only be overturned where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess
of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14, 343 P.3d 41, 43 (2015) (quoting LC. § 675279(3)).

IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Petitioner seeks its attorney's fees and costs on judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-11 7 as further discussed in Section V. I. infra.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Introduction.
This case is about whether the County properly issued a special use permit for the Batch

Plant. It did not for two reasons. First, the 2018 Amendment, authorizing the issuance of
conditional use permits for asphalt batch plants in the Rural 5 zone, is invalid, because the County
improperly adopted it without the required notice to the public. Second, even if the 2018
Amendment was valid, the Decision does not comply with the Ordinance in that it does not
consider the numerous ways the Gravel Pit violates the non-conforming use provisions of the
Ordinance. The paragraphs below discuss these issues in tum.
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B.

The 2018 Amendment was not lawfully adopted.
The Decision relied entirely on the validity of the 2018 Amendment that conditionally

allows asphalt plants in residential and farming zones if located within an active gravel pit.
Without this amendment, the County had no authority to consider the Application in this location.
In fact, the 2018 Amendment was not lawfully adopted, rendering the Decision invalid. See 917
Lusk, LLC, 158 Idaho at 14, 343 P.3d at 43 (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(3) to note that a zoning board

decision is made in error when it is made "in excess of the statutory authority of the agency").
Idaho Code §§ 67-6511 and 67-6509 require that a hearing notice on a land use ordinance
include "a summary of the plan to be discussed". The summary, by law, is to provide adequate
notice so the public will know what changes are being considered.
In this instance, neither the PZC nor the Board provided the public with proper notice. As
previously stated, notices provided to the public prior to the PZC and Board meetings indicated
the following amendment would be considered at the public meetings: "BCRC 12-336: Resource
Based Code: Amend the uses allowed to expand uses allowed in a gravel pit located in the
industrial zone." The 2018 Amendment went far beyond this, also allowing asphalt batch plants
in farming, agriculture/forestry, and residential zones by conditional permit. The notice therefore
failed to provide the required summary and likely also violated due process. Jerome Cty. By &
Through Bd. of Comm 'rs for Jerome Cty., State of Idaho v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 684, 799

P.2d 969, 972 (1990) (finding that a notice which fails to contain a summary of the plan does not
meet the requirements of I.C. § 67-6509); see also Taylor v. Canyon Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 147
Idaho 424,432,210 P.3d 532, 540 (2009) (finding that failing to adhere to the requirements ofl.C.
§ 67-6509 infringes due process rights).
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As a result, the 2018 Amendment is invalid as is every decision the Board has made based
upon it.
C.

The Decision does not comply with the Ordinance.

Even if the County properly adopted the 2018 Amendment, which it did not, the Decision
failed to follow the County's own ordinance and therefore is invalid. The linchpin of the County's
analysis is that it only had to find that the Batch Plant was proposed within an "active gravel pit"
to approve the Application. The County contends the legal status of the Gravel Pit is irrelevant (R.
at 995), and the Batch Plant's expansion of the nonconforming use of the Gravel Pit is similarly
irrelevant to the Decision. (R. at 995-96.) As discussed in the sections below, the County is wrong
on all counts.
1.

The County's determination is unlawful that the non-conforming use status of
the Gravel Pit is "not in question" in the Batch Plant Application.

While the County is given latitude in interpreting the Ordinance, the County's
interpretation must be rejected if "the ordinance in question has been unreasonably applied to the
property ... " and the County cannot rebut the evidence of unreasonable application. Sprenger,
Grubb & Associates v. Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 586, 903 P.2d 741, 751 (1995) [hereinafter
"Sprenger Grubb I"] (citations omitted).

In this case, the Decision applies the Ordinance in a blatantly unreasonable manner. First,
the Decision's claim that the determination of whether the Batch Plant would be within an active
gravel pit is "not in question" (R. at 995) is inconsistent with the plain language of the Ordinance.
BCC Section 12-130.A. states "[t]he planning director shall not issue a permit unless the intended
uses of the buildings and land conform in all respects with the provisions of this title." Thus, the
Batch Plant cannot be approved unless the Gravel Pit complies with the nonconforming use
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ordinance and the Batch Plant does not cause the Gravel Pit to be out of compliance with the
nonconforming use ordinance. Here, the Application fails both of these requirements.
Second, the claim that the Nonconforming Use status of the Gravel Pit is not at issue in the
Batch Plant Application is inconsistent with the Linscott's representations and the County's own
determinations prior to the reconsideration motion. On multiple occasions, the County explicitly
found that the Batch Plant was allowed because the Gravel Pit was a legal nonconforming use. 1 It
was only after Petitioner provided extensive evidence on reconsideration that the Gravel Pit is, in
fact, operating illegally, that the County changed its tune to say the nonconforming use provisions
were "separate". (R. at 241,

,r 6.)

The Court should not fall for this transparent, after-the-fact

attempt to cover-up the County's error.
Finally, the County's interpretation that the active gravel pit determination is separate from
the determination that Gravel Pit is lawful is unreasonable and absurd. Under the County's
interpretation, the applicant could dig an illegal gravel pit in which to site a batch plant and could
operate the batch plant lawfully, as long as the County turns a blind eye to the unlawful pit, as it
has here. This fails the reasonableness test outlined in Sprenger Grubb I 127 Idaho at 586, 903
P.2d at 751.

The Linscotts acknowledged this fact in their application, stating they did not seek to change
"those grandfathered rights" of the existing commercial aggregate mining use. R. at 5. The
Planning Department first acknowledged this fact in its 1997 letter noting that the gravel pit
operation continued under its grandfathered rights. The Planning Department also acknowledged
the non-conforming land use in its November 16, 2018 letter to Linscotts under Section F.
Standards Review when it noted that BCRC 12-336 conditionally permitted a batch plant in
association with an active gravel pit and stated: "[t]his condition is satisfied as the proposal will
occur within an active, legal nonconforming gravel pit." R. at 1010, italics for emphasis. The
Planning Department again referred to the Linscotts' property as an active, legal nonconforming
gravel pit in its letters dated January 14, 2019, (R. at 1002) and March 25, 2019. (R. at 991.)
1
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2.

The gravel pit is not a lawful nonconforming use.

The Ordinance provides express standards limiting the extension, expansion and alteration
of nonconforming uses. The Record contains overwhelming evidence the Gravel Pit failed to
comply with these standards. The Decision unlawfully ignores all of this evidence.
(a)

The Ordinance strictly limits the extension or expansion of nonconforming
uses.

Idaho Code Section 67-6535 provides:
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant to
this chapter shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth
in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, or other applicable ordinance or
regulation of the city or county.
Thus, the County was bound to follow the Ordinance in the Decision. BCC § 12-341.A
provides the general standard for nonconforming uses:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, a nonconforming use or structure may
be continued but may not be extended or altered. ... Exceptions:
1.

The accumulated expansion by up to ten percent (10%) of a commercial,
industrial or public use or structure in any zoning district that was
established prior to December 9, 1981, and that has been in use
continuously since December 9, 1981, is permitted, provided no additional
land area is being acquired for the expansion.

2.

The accumulated expansion of such use identified in subsection Al of this
section by more than ten percent (10%), but no more than fifty percent
(5 0%) is conditionally permitted, provided no additional land area is being
acquired for the expansion.

The BCC further clarifies the permitted nonconforming use oflands under Section 12-343:
Nonconforming uses of land may be continued so long as they remain otherwise
lawful, provided:
A.

No such nonconforming use shall be enlarged or increased, nor extended
to occupy a greater area of land than was occupied at the effective date of
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adoption or amendment of this section, except where otherwise noted in this
subchapter.
B.

No such nonconforming use shall be moved in whole or in part to any
portion of the lot or parcel other than that occupied by such use at the
effective date of adoption or amendment of this section.

In summary, for the gravel pit to be a legal, nonconforming use, it must:
1.
Have been in operation before December 9, 1981, and must have been continuously
in operation since then;
2.
The use must not have accumulated expansion of more than 10% without a
conditional use permit and must not have an accumulated expansion of more than 50% regardless
of additional permitting;
3.

No additional land may have been "acquired for the expansion";

4.

The operation must be "otherwise lawful";

5.
The use may not be "enlarged or increased to occupy a greater area of land than
was occupied at the effective date of adoption", except as otherwise allowed; and
6.
The use may not be "moved in whole or in part to any portion of the lot or parcel
other than that occupied by such use at the effective date ... "
(b)

The County Commissioners acknowledged the "valid arguments" the
Gravel Pit violates the Ordinance.

In their reconsideration deliberations, the County Commissioners acknowledged
the strength of the evidence that the Gravel Pit violated the nonconforming use requirements.
Commissioner Dan McDonald lauded the "great arguments" about the operation of the Gravel Pit.
Transcript of Recording of Public Hearing Before the Bonner Board of Commissioners,
Conditional Use Permit - Asphalt Batch Plant, File C1015-18 (March 22, 2019, 9:00 a.m.) (the
"March Hearing Transcript") at p. 64, 1. 5. Commissioner McDonald went further, citing the

"valid arguments with respect to the quarry". March Hearing Transcript at p. 64, 11. 6-7.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence in the record, the Commission determined it could
not consider that evidence, because the Commissioners believed the legal status of the Gravel Pit
was not pertinent to their decision. This is a reversible error.
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(c)

The gravel pit has expanded beyond the limits allowed by the Ordinance.

In 1981, when Linscotts' protected grandfather rights were established, approximately 17
acres of Parcel 3000A was disturbed and no acreage was disturbed on Parcel 4202A. (R. at 491499.) No evidence suggests the gravel pit has not been operating continuously each season since
that time. But, to remain lawful, the use of the gravel pit could not have expanded more than 10
percent without a conditional use permit (i.e. no more than 1. 7 additional disturbed acres) and no
more than a total of 25 .5 acres regardless of additional permitting. The only CUP found in the
record is that referenced by Bonner County in a November 21, 1997 letter noting that Interstate
Concrete and Asphalt had applied for and had approval for a CUP to expand the existing operation
which was not issued because required improvements were not completed. (R. at 440.) Any
expansion of the site occurred under Linscotts' grandfather rights, "that is, the acreage originally
developed with the quarry can continue to be quarried by Sandpoint Sand and Gravel." (R. at 440.)
Without evidence of additional permits, the gravel pit could not lawfully expand beyond 18.7
acres. Even if the applied for CUP had been granted, or any other CUP granted since 1981, the
gravel pit could not exceed 25 .5 acres and remain a legal, nonconforming use.
Linscotts' gravel pit has an accumulated expansion of more than 50 percent and is therefore
illegal. While Linscotts' 1998 Bond Assurance Fund ("BAF") application informed the IDL that
30 acres were disturbed (already an illegal enlargement of 13 acres), aerial photos that same year
show actual disturbance was an illegal expansion to over 67 acres. (R. at 501.) In 2004, aerial
imagery suggested an expansion ofup to 87.4 disturbed acres. (R. at 503.) In 2014, aerial imagery
suggested an expansion of up to 99.56 disturbed acres. (R. at 503.) On January 9, 2018, the
Linscotts' BAF acknowledgment form stated that the disturbed acres had expanded from 30 to 32
acres, the bill was paid at the 30 acre level and the acknowledgment form then increased the
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disturbed acres from 32 to 40. (R. at 501-502.) While Linscotts only reported 30 to 40 acres of
disturbance over the last 20 years (still an expansion over the original 1981 permitted amount), the
gravel pit has an actual disturbance area of between 97 and 112 acres. (R. at 501-504.) Per the
BCC, even with permitting, the gravel pit could not have expanded more than 50 percent (i.e. no
more than 25.5 acres) to remain legal. Even if one claimed the 1998 application's 30 acres of
disturbance occurred in 1981 when the grandfathered rights were established, which the record
does not support, Linscotts' gravel pit (even with permits) could not legally disturb (i.e. expand)
beyond 45 acres. At the time of the Board's decision, Linscotts' pit had expanded to between 97
and 112 acres and was not a legal, nonconforming use.
(d)

The gravel pit has improperly added additional parcels

Linscotts' property is not a legal, nonconforming use because it has added additional
parcels in violation of the nonconforming use ordinance. In 1981, the gravel pit operations were
limited to Parcel 3000A and Parcel 4202A was used solely for material storage. (R. at 542; see
also R. at 495-496, 354, 358.) Gravel extraction operations were later extended to Parcel 4202A.

Further, a warranty deed dated 2001 confirms that Linscotts acquired a portion of the McGoldrick
property to the west of the gravel pit to resolve allegations the gravel pit encroached on the
McGoldrick land. (R. at 506.) Because Linscotts accumulated additional land for the expansion,
the nonconforming use is not legal.
(e)

The gravel pit is not otherwise lawful.

Linscotts' property is not a legal, nonconforming use because the gravel pit is not otherwise
lawful pursuant to BCC § 12-343. Use of the gravel pit has violated IDL requirements, there are
possible illegal structures on the property, and the gravel pit trespasses on at least one neighboring
property. As set forth in the IDL letter noted above, Linscotts have misrepresented the gravel pit's
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disturbed footprint for over twenty years and, at the time of the Board's decision, had failed to
meet the financial requirements for reclamation. (R. at 501-504.) County building permit records
demonstrate that Parcel 4202A, which includes significant portions of the Gravel Pit, has added a
large number of new or modified structures since 1981, including building permits issued in 1985,
1988, 1989, 1990, and 1995. (R. at 508-537.) Any post-1981 structures that are part of the gravel
pit use have no nonconforming use rights because they were not in existence on December 9, 1981.
Therefore, they were required to comply fully with the County's zoning ordinance. While it is
unclear what uses many of these building serve and whether they are permitted in the rural or
commercial zones, to the extent that the buildings are of use in the gravel operation, they are not
allowed. (BCC § 12-336, Table 3-6 (gravel pit uses not allowed in commercial zone, require CUP
in rural zone). Finally, the gravel pit is not otherwise lawful because the gravel pit encroaches, at
least, on the property to the north. (R. at 628; see also 365-366.) Encroachment is both a civil
trespass and, potentially a criminal trespass as well. LC. §§ 6-202 and 18-7008. Each of these three
reasons, violations of IDL requirements, possible illegal structures, and trespass, makes the gravel
pit an unlawful, nonconforming land use rendering the Decision invalid.
(f)

The gravel pit has been enlarged or increased since its grandfather rights
were established.

The gravel pit is an unlawful, nonconforming land use because it has enlarged or increased
to occupy a greater area of land than was occupied at the effective date of adoption and is not
otherwise allowed. BCC 12-341.A. As noted, since 1981, the gravel pit has enlarged or increased
its area of land from the original approximately 17 acres to its current occupancy of between 98
and 112 acres. Additional discussion of the gravel pit's illegal enlargement and expansion is set
forth below.
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(g)

The gravel pit has been moved to a part of the parcel it did not occupy in
1981.

The gravel pit is an unlawful, nonconforming land use because its use has been moved in
whole or in part to any portion of the lot or parcel other than that occupied by such use on
December 9, 1981. BCC § 12-341.A. Linscotts have expanded their use of the land to between 98
and 112 acres (an increase of between 230 percent and 500 percent). This clearly indicates that the
use has moved, in whole or in part, to other portions of the lot or parcel other than the original 17
acres. Additionally, when Linscotts purchased the McGoldrick property because of its
encroachment, it again moved its use, in part, to another portion of the lot or parcel. And when
Linscotts added other buildings to the property, it again moved its use, in whole or in part, to other
portions of the lot or parcel. In each instance, it violated BCC § 12-341 and became an illegal,
nonconforming land use.
(h)

Baxter upholds restrictions on the expansion or enlargement of
nonconforming uses.

Baxter v. City of Preston,2 provides clear authority for the County to restrict the

enlargement, expansion, extension or alteration of a nonconforming use. In Baxter, the defendant
had two parcels of land with a grandfathered nonconforming use of his property (similar to
Linscotts) which allowed him to farm on one parcel of land and graze twenty head of cattle on the
other3 until the winter months. Id., 115 Idaho at 607-08, 768 P.2d at 1340-41. Defendant than
constructed what the Court considered to be, essentially, a feed lot allowing cattle to remain on the
property year round, accumulating manure. Id. The trial court granted plaintiffs request for an
injunction on the basis that the year round use was an expansion or extension of a nonconforming

2
3

115 Idaho 607, 768 P.2d 1340 (1989).
After the farmed parcel was harvested, the cattle would then graze on both parcels. Id.
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use in violation of the city of Preston's zoning ordinance and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
Id., 115 Idaho at 608-09, 611, 768 P.2d at 1341-2, 1344.

In Baxter, the Supreme Court focused "on the character of the expansion and enlargement
of the nonconforming use on a case by case basis." Id., 115 Idaho at 608, 768 P .2d at 1341. While
the defendant argued the nature of the operation had not changed because both a feedlot and
grazing cattle are an agricultural use, the Supreme Court declined to accept this reasoning. Id.
Instead,
[t]he dispositive factor .. .is not into which general classification a
use can be pigeonholed, but the character of the particular use.
Otherwise, a property owner in an "industrial" zone manufacturing
thumbtacks could thereafter produce automobiles solely on the basis
that both are industrial endeavors.
While the Court found that, as a general rule, intensification of a nonconforming use does
not render it unlawful, it drew a distinction between an increase in business 4 and the expansion
and enlargement of a nonconforming use. Id., 115 Idaho at 610, 768 P.2d at 1343. The Supreme
Court, referencing Cullen v. Building Inspector of North Attleborough, 234 N.E.2d 727 (Mass.
1968), noted that
... the owner of a dairy farm increased his herd tenfold, doubled the
amount of land used, erected new buildings and installed a new
system of milk production. The court held that although mere
increase in business is not per se proof of change of use, the
expansion of the dairy farm was so great in the aggregate that it
constituted an unlawful nonconforming use. Cullen, supra, 234 N.E.
2d at 730. We reach a similar result in this case. [Defendant] has

4

The Court found that the trial court properly considered the fact that accumulated manure had
"an immediate effect on the neighboring owner's comfort and utility of their residences and thus
contributed to an illegal change of use." Id., 115 Idaho at 610, 768 P.2d at 1343. Similarly, the
increase in noise, dust, etc. that an asphalt plant would add would also have an immediate effect
on the neighboring owners' comfort and utility of residences and should also be seen as an illegal
change of use.
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substantially enlarged and expanded the character of the property's
use in violation of the Preston zoning ordinance.

Baxter, 115 Idaho at 610, 768 P.2d at 1343.
Just as in the Cullen case cited by Idaho's Supreme Court, Linscotts have increased
the amount of excavated gravel, increased the amount of land used from between 230 percent and
500 percent, and erected new buildings on multiple occasions. As in Cullen and Baxter, Linscotts
have substantially enlarged and expanded the character of the property's use in violation of the
BCC.
The Supreme Court noted that the Preston ordinance, just like the Ordinance,
specifically prohibited the construction of additional structures to further a nonconforming use. In
that instance, the defendant had erected only a portable manger and replaced a loafing shed on the
property. Here, Linscotts have added buildings, additions, and storage sheds seven times. (R. 508527.) The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err when it ordered Corbridge to remove
the new structures. 5 Id. "The rule against enlargement or expansion also precludes the erection of
new buildings or structures for utilization of the non-conforming use, either in replacement of the
original buildings or in addition thereto." Id. (citing Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board ofAppeals,
429 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1980) (deeming construction of high radio antenna mast in place of obsolete

5

While Petitioner in this case is not asking the Court to order Linscotts to remove the illegally
expanded buildings on the property, the sheer amount of them, in light of the Baxter decision,
indicates that Linscotts have unlawfully enlarged and expanded their use of the property and the
Board violated statute by granting the CUP. It should also be noted that "[t]he owner of a
nonconforming use may lose the protected grandfather right if the use is enlarged or expanded in
violation of a valid zoning ordinance." Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342 (citing D.
Mandelker, LAND USE LAW 2d § 5.61 (1988)). For additional case law regarding how grandfather
rights can be lost if the use is enlarged or expanded in violation of zoning ordinances see also
Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 34, 244 P.3d 174, 178 (2010). This underscores the
extreme importance the courts place on property owners following land use law and the
consequences that can occur when a property owner with grandfathered nonconforming land use
rights, unlawfully enlarges or expands the use of the land.
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nonconforming fire watch tower an unlawful extension); Seekonk v. Anthony, 157 N.E.2d 651
(Mass. 1959) (finding the right to maintain nonconforming quarry did not include right to expand
by adding nonconforming blacktop facility)). It is clear that if erecting a portable manger and
replacing a loafing shed are unlawful expansions, adding permanent structures on multiple
occasions is also an unlawful expansion.
Finally, the Supreme Court found that where the cattle were now year round, feed
had to be hauled in, manure accumulated, and new structures were added to the property, the
character of the property had changed and the expansion and enlargement in the character of use
was substantial and violated the zoning ordinance. 6 Baxter, 115 Idaho at 610-11, 768 P.2d at 134344. It is clear that the Linscotts' increase in acreage disturbed and addition of multiple buildings
illegally expanded and enlarged the character of use to such an extent that they are in violation of
the BCC. The Board's decision to permit the CUP and allow an asphalt plant on the land, illegally
expands and enlarges the land's character still further and was a clear violation of statute.

3.

The addition of the Batch Plant unlawfully enlarges and expands the Gravel
Pit.

The Decision contends (1) that the Batch Plant has only a "physical relationship" with the
Gravel Pit and its uses are separate from and do not extend a nonconforming use, and (2) that the
use of the Gravel Pit, nonconforming or otherwise, has no bearing on the CUP request and would
not extend the non-conformity of the Gravel Pit. (R. at 995-996.)

6

For additional case law regarding uses that expanded improperly, see Seekonk, citing Building
Commr. Of Medford v. McGrath, 312 Mass. 461 (1942). "There was change in and enlargement
of the plant which made it 'different in kind in its effect upon the neighborhood.' See Inspector of
Bldgs. Of Burlington v. Murphy, 320 Mass. 207, 210 (1946), and cases there cited, especially
Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124, 128 (1944) (where a small local tailor shop was held
improperly expanded into a mechanized dry cleaning establishment employing seventeen people).
See Adamsky v. Mendes, 326 Mass. 603, 605 (1950); Everett v. Capitol Motor Transp. Co. Inc.
330 Mass. 417, 420-421 (1953) .... "
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In this respect, the Decision fails to address the fact that adding the Batch Plant to the
Gravel Pit unlawfully increases, alters, or enlarges the Gravel Pit. BCC § 12-341.A states that a
nonconforming use may not be "extended" or "altered" and§ 12-343.A does not allow the use to
be "enlarged" or "increased". Further, BCC § 12-340 notes the intent of the Title is "that
nonconformities shall not be enlarged upon, expanded or extended, nor be used as grounds for
adding other structures or uses prohibited elsewhere in the same district or zone". The addition of
a batch plant on land whose nonconforming permitted use has only been a gravel plant cannot be
interpreted in any other way other than an "extension", "alteration", "enlargement", or "increase"
of the Gravel Pit.

D.

The Decision prejudices substantial rights of Petitioner.
The Decision prejudices substantial rights of Petitioner by negatively impacting the use

and enjoyment, and the value, of the real property owned by members of Petitioner. 7 The members
of Petitioner are all citizens who live close enough to the proposed plant to be negatively impacted
by it, many of whom live immediately adjacent to it, or within a mile of it. (See, e.g., R. at 830
(member who lives 1,200 ft. from the site); R. at 658 (member who lives right next to site); R. at
779; R. at 857; R. at 979; R. at 1085-1088. 8)
A petitioner who opposes a governing board's decision to grant a permit must show they
are "in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a reduction in
the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or ownership of the land." Hawkins v.

7

When the party petitioning for judicial review is an organization, it is sufficient to show that the
real property of at least one of its members will be affected. If the plaintiff is an organization, it
must show that the real property of one of its members would be adversely affected. Coal. for
Agric. 's Future v. Canyon Cty., 160 Idaho 142, 147, 369 P.3d 920, 925 (2016).
8
The electronic signatures on these pages all correspond to the signors' respective addresses in
the vicinity of the site. Many of those addresses are within one mile of the proposed site (e.g. all
the addresses on Meadow Lane in Sagle, ID).
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Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011). Petitioner's
members are in such jeopardy here.
The proposed asphalt plant will negatively impact at least the following aspects of the
members' real property, which in immediate vicinity of the Batch Plant:
•

The value of Petitioner's real property. (See, e.g., R. at 1025 and referenced exhibits
(Exh 1, subtitle 5); R. at 1027; R. at 1060)).

•

The air quality on Petitioner's real property. The proposed plant will negatively
impact the members' real property by creating adverse air quality impacts and
odors. (R. at 1025 (Exh. 1, subtitle 7); R. at 1028; R. at 1046-1051.)

•

The ability to quietly enjoy the members' real property. The proposed plant will
create noise, vibrations, odors, and/or glare that will impact surrounding properties.
(R. at 1025; R. at 1052-1059.)

•

The water quality on the members' real property. The proposed plant will
jeopardize the water quality of the surrounding area. (R. at 1027, 1045.)

Based on any of the above, Petitioner has shown that the Decision puts the members in
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm.

E.

Petitioner has standing to bring this action.
Petitioner is an affected party based on the potential impacts to its members. As described

above, the proposed plant will negatively affect the real property of Petitioners' members in several
significant ways. As such, Petitioner has standing to initiate this proceeding. See Cowan v. Bd. of

Comm 'rs ofFremont City., 143 Idaho 501,509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006) (holding that the mere
existence of a "real or potential harm" is sufficient to convey standing and challenge a land use
decision). Petitioner is therefore entitled to pursue its claims.
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F.

Petitioner is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117 because the
Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

Petitioner is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-11 7 because the
Board issued the Decision without a reasonable basis in fact or law. In a proceeding where a
"political subdivision and a person" are adverse, the court "shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees, and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." LC. § 12-117(1). Idaho Code§
12-117(1) expressly applies to "any proceeding", including judicial review, where a political
subdivision and a person are adverse parties. Hauser Lake Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. City ofHauser,
162 Idaho 260, 263, 396 P.3d 689, 692 (2017); see also Cty. Residents Against Pollution from
Septage Slude (CRAPSS) v. Bonner Cty., 138 Idaho 585, 589, 67 P.3d 64, 68 (2003) (ordering

Bonner County to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees and costs in a judicial review
proceeding where Bonner County failed to follow its own ordinance and acted arbitrarily). The
County is a "political subdivision" for the application of Idaho Code § 12-117 and acts through
the Board. LC. § 12-117(5)(b); Hauser Lake, 162 Idaho at 264, 396 P.3d at 693 (quoting LC. §
31-602).
The requirements of Section 12-117 are met in this case. The adverse parties are a political
subdivision, the County, and Petitioner, who meets the definition of a person under Idaho Code §
12-117(6)(c). Id. ("Idaho Code section 12-117(5)(a) defines "person" as "any individual,
partnership, limited liability partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association or any
other private organization."). In the preceding sections, Petitioner has demonstrated that the
Decision must be set aside under Idaho Code § 67-5279 because the Board's grant of the
Conditional Use Permit was without a reasonable basis in fact and law. Specifically, the Decision
relies upon the unlawfully adopted ordinance, and blatantly ignores applicable sections of the
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County's own ordinance and interprets the Ordinance unreasonably. No reasonable basis in fact or
law supports the County's position, and therefore the Court is justified in awarding fees.
Petitioner has been forced to incur significant costs and fees to protect its property and the
use thereof because of the Board's improper Decision. Because the Board's Decision is without a
reasonable basis in law or fact, the Court should award Petitioner its reasonable attorney's fees
and costs in this proceeding under Idaho Code § 12-11 7 should Petitioner prevail.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court set the
Decision aside and award Petitioner its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this
proceeding.
DATED this 8th day of October, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Jack W. Relf

Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be filed electronically through the iCourt system, which caused the
following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected below:

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Email: bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company
John A. Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Intervenors Linscott

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen
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COMES NOW, Respondent Bonner County, Idaho, by and through William
S. Wilson, Bonner County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby submits its
Respondent's Brief.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Frank and Carol Linscott own a gravel pit in Sagle, Idaho. Working in
tandem with Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company ("Interstate"), the
Linscotts applied to the Bonner County Planning Department for a conditional
use permit ("CUP") allowing Interstate to relocate an asphalt batch plant to the
gravel pit from its current location within the city limits of Sandpoint, Idaho. (R.
at 1-8). On November 15, 2018, the Bonner County Planning and Zoning
Committee approved the CUP, finding that it was "in accord with the general and
specific objectives of the Bonner County Comprehensive Plan and Bonner
County Revised Code." (R. at 1008). After an appeal to the Bonner County Board
of Commissioners ("BOCC"), the BOCC held a hearing on January 11, 2019 and
also approved the application. (R. at 999).
Following the BOCC's approval, opponents of the CUP timely sought
reconsideration of the decision. (R. at 1025). The BOCC granted the request for
reconsideration and held an additional hearing on March 22, 2019 for the limited
purpose of discussing prior nonconforming use at the gravel pit. (R. at 988).
Upon the conclusion of that hearing, the BOCC reaffirmed its approval of the
CUP. Id. Petitioners then initiated this appeal.
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II.

FACTUAL HISTORY

The gravel pit in question sits on nearly one hundred forty ( 140) acres just
west of Highway 95 in Sagle, Idaho. (R. at 17). Interstate currently operates the
batch plant on Baldy Road in Sandpoint, where it has been in operation since
2004. Transcript of Recording of Public Hearing Before the Bonner County Board
of Commissioners, Conditional Use Permit - Asphalt Batch Plant, File C1015-18
January 11, 2019, 9:30 a.m. (hereinafter "January Transcript") at p. 43. The
requested CUP envisions moving the batch plant into the gravel pit, where it will
occupy less than 10 acres in the middle of the pit. Id. Prior to the current CUP,
Bonner County issued the Linscotts and Interstate temporary CUPs to produce
asphalt in the gravel pit six times in 1995, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2013,
respectively. (R. at 116). In addition, the County has approved and issued
building permits for various structures on the property five times. (R. at 508537).
Bonner County Revised Code

("BCRC")

§

12-336(4)

required the

application to address concerns with noise, light, glare, smoke, odor, dust,
particulate matter, vibrations and hours of operation. (R. at 116). At each level
of the administrative process, opponents argued that any number of those
potential concerns would adversely affect the neighborhood, but the BOCC relied
on contrary evidence when approving the CUP. In particular, the BOCC noted
the lack of complaints and/ or issues with the batch plant in its current location,
which is squarely in the middle of the city Sandpoint and therefore close to a
school, an elderly care facility, and high-density housing. January Transcript at
3IPage
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pp. 31, 42-44.

Representatives for the applicants also noted there were 422

parcels within a half-mile radius of the current location but only 44 within the
same distance of the proposed site. Id. at p. 4 7. Further, to address concerns
with pollution, the BOCC conditioned the issuance of the CUP on continuing
compliance with regulations

promulgated by the Idaho Department of

Environmental Quality. (R. at 1015).
After the BOCC's initial decision approving the CUP application, neighbors
requested reconsideration. Planning Director Milton Ollerton suggested that the
BOCC grant the request but limit the scope of the additional hearing to the status
of the gravel pit as a prior nonconforming use. (R. at 1021).
At the subsequent hearing, planning staff explained that BCRC § 12336(22) required only that the batch plant be placed in an "active" gravel pit.
Transcript of Recording of Public Hearing Before the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners, Conditional Use Permit - Asphalt Batch Plant, File Cl0lS-18
March 22, 2019, 9:00 a.m. (hereinafter "March Transcript") at pp. 4-12.
Moreover, staff argued that the gravel pit and the proposed asphalt batch plant
within it were two separate and distinct uses. Id. Staff further explained that
BCRC § 12-340 stated only that nonconformities could not be grounds for adding
additional prohibited uses. Id. (emphasis added) As such, staff suggested that
because the batch plant was conditionally permissible at the site in question
(and therefore not a prohibited use as defined in BCRC § 12-821), it was not
"subject to the regulations [for] full nonconforming uses." Id.
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Following the staff presentation, counsel for Bonner County noted there
was no current investigation into the legality of the gravel pit, let alone a courtaffirmed building or zoning violation. Id. at pp. 53-57. As such, counsel
expressed

concern

that

denying

the

CUP

application

based

on

an

unsubstantiated complaint would violate the Linscotts' due process rights to
contest that claim. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the BOCC reaffirmed its
original approval of the CUP application.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act, I.C. §§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA")
allows judicial review of the approval or denial of a land use application,
including such a decision issued by county government.

See generally In re

Jerome Cnty. Bd. Of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho 298 (2012). The procedural rules for
such an appeal are governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (Idaho
Code§§ 67-5270-79). I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d); Evans v. Bd. OfCom'rs of Cassia Cnty.
Idaho, 137 Idaho 428, 430-31 (2002). In addition, because such an appeal is
expressly authorized by statute, the proceedings must comply with Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 84 where applicable. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(l).
Only "affected persons" may challenge a final decision under LLUPA. Idaho
Code § 67-6521 defines an "affected person" as:
[O]ne having a bona fide interest in real property which may be
adversely affected by:
(i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application
for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other
similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this
chapter;
(ii) The approval of an ordinance first establishing a zoning
district upon annexation or the approval or denial of an
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application to change the zoning district applicable to specific
parcels or sites pursuant to section 67-6511, Idaho Code; or
(iii) An approval or denial of an application for conditional
rezoning pursuant to section 67-651 lA, Idaho Code.
The Court must uphold the underlying decision unless it finds the decision
was: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). In addition, to prevail,
an affected person must also demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. I.C. §
67-5279(4).
There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the action of a zoning
board. Angstam v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578 (Ct. App. 1996). Although
the interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law subject to judicial
review, "there is a strong presumption that the actions of [a political subdivision]
are valid when it has interpreted and applied its own zoning ordinances." Lusk
v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14 (2015). Likewise, the Court must uphold the
underlying decision if it supported by substantial and competent evidence, even
if conflicting evidence also exists. Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
151 Idaho 228, 231 (2011); Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty. Planning and Zoning,
150 Idaho 231, 235 (stating "this Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact and will defer
to the agency's findings unless they are clearly erroneous"); Neighbors for a
Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 126 (2007).
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IV.

ARGUMENT

a. Petitioners are barred from contesting an alleged procedural
defect in the passage of Bonner County Ordinance 557.
BCRC § 12-336 sets forth the standards for permitting a batch plant,
including the requirement that it need only be associated with an "active gravel
pit." That requirement, which became the topic of intense debate at the
administrative level of these proceedings, was added to the statute via Bonner
County Ordinance 557 on May 23, 2018. Petitioners now assert there was a
procedural error in the passage of that ordinance and, therefore, the BOCC's
subsequent reliance on it to approve the CUP was invalid. This argument is
flawed and cannot be the basis to invalidate the BOCC's decision in the present
case.
I.C. § 67-6521 only permits actions by an "affected person." The passage
of a county-wide zoning ordinance is a legislative act, not a quasi-judicial
"application for a subdivision, variance, special use permit [or] other similar
application." I.C. § 67-6521(1)(a)(i); See Burt v. City ofldaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,
67 (1983) (stating, "promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and
ordinances is legislative action"). Likewise, Ordinance 557 was an amendment
to an existing statute which did not specifically target individual sites but instead
changed permitting standards county-wide; i.e. it neither addressed a zoning
district newly acquired by annexation nor applied to specific parcels or sites. As
such, it was not one of the actions outlined in I.C. § 67-6521(1)(a)(ii). 1 Thus,

1

I.C § 67-6521(1)(a)(iii) is also inapplicable.
71Page
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Petitioners cannot challenge the passage of Ordinance 557 in this appeal
because I.C. § 67-6521 provides them no avenue to do so. 2
Even assuming arguendo Petitioners were "affected persons," they would
still be barred from challenging the passage of Ordinance 557. First, I.C. § 676535(2)(b) and BCRC § 12-263 both mandate that an affected person seek
reconsideration of a final decision within fourteen (14) days of the date the
decision was made. Further, BCRC § 12-263(A) states that "a failure to seek
reconsideration is also a failure to exhaust administrative remedies." I.C. § 676521 (1)( d) permits judicial appeal of a final decision only "after all remedies have
been exhausted under local ordinance." Thus, a failure to seek reconsideration
bars a would-be litigant from seeking judicial review. It is undisputed that
Petitioners failed to seek reconsideration at the time Ordinance 557 was adopted.
In addition, even if a party fully exhausts administrative remedies, it must
seek judicial review within twenty-eight (28) days of the date that occurs. Id. The
ordinance in question was adopted and published roughly six months before the
BOCC approved the Linscotts' CUP. Id. Thus, Petitioners cannot contest the
passage of Ordinance 557 for alleged procedural irregularities because they
failed to: (1) exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) appeal the BOCC's
decision adopting that ordinance in a timely manner.
Petitioners rely primarily on Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681
(1990), for the proposition that procedural error of the type currently alleged can

A challenge made pursuant to I.C. § 31-1506 would have been the appropriate remedy at the
time the ordinance was adopted.

2
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later become the basis to invalidate a zoning ordinance. Memorandum in
Support of Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review ("Petitioners' Brief') at 11.
However, their reliance is misplaced. In that case, the court invalidated an
ordinance roughly two years after its passage, siting a failure of the governing
body to properly notice the contents of the ordinance before adopting it. Jerome
County, 118 Idaho at 684. However, there is no indication that the arguments
now presented to the Court were ever raised or considered in that proceeding.
The court's ruling in that case is silent as to the impact of the reconsideration
and timing requirements for appeal outlined above. Indeed, the requirement to
seek reconsideration of a final decision would not be enacted until twenty-three
(23) years after Jerome County was decided. 2013 Idaho Laws Ch. 216 (S.B.
1138). Thus, the holding in Jerome County is antiquated and not controlling in
the present case.
This analysis is a verbose way of stating the obvious- Petitioners cannot
challenge the passage of an ordinance on purely procedural grounds long after
it was passed. 3 To allow otherwise would create absurd results. Every other final
decision which may be overturned via LLUPA appeal must commence within
twenty-eight (28) days of the date the decision is made. This one is no different.
If the Court adopts Petitioners' argument now, it could conceivably invalidate

statutes written decades ago, thereby throwing county land use administration
in to chaos. The Court should refuse to adopt such a radical theory.

This is not to say that the Court could not strike down an ordinance which substantively
conflicted with a state statute. However, in the present matter, Petitioners have not alleged a
substantive defect with Ordinance 557. Instead, they have focused entirely on procedural error.
3
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b. The legality of the gravel pit is beyond the scope of these
proceedings.
Petitioners stake their entire case on proving the Linscotts' gravel pit is
itself illegal, and by extension, any batch plant placed within it. This is a gigantic
red herring. With assistance from Planning staff and legal counsel, the BOCC
determined the legality of the gravel pit was beyond the scope of its review
because the applicable statute required only that the batch plant be placed in
an "active" gravel pit. March Transcript at pp. 62-68. Thus, because the Court is
obligated to defer to a governing body which reasonably interprets its own zoning
code, the Court must arrive at the same conclusion.
BCRC § 12-336 conditionally permits batch plants in the Rural-5 Zone
subject to the following conditions:
(4) Specified conditions with respect to emissions of noise, light,
glare, smoke, odor, dust, particulate matter, vibrations or hours of
operation may be prescribed differently from those required in a
given district, as to be compatible with other applicable State and
Federal standards.
(21) Batch plant operations shall be located outside of city impact
areas. The emissions control system(s) on such batch plants shall
be of "Best Available Control Technology" (BACT) as generally
accepted under relevant industry standards, within 5 years prior to
application.
(22) A batch plant is conditionally permitted only in association
with an active gravel pit.
(Emphasis added). Nowhere in the statute does it require a prerequisite
affirmation that the underlying gravel pit is legal. This reflects the foundational
principle that innocence is presumed, and guilt must be proven.
In spite of the plain meaning of BCRC § 12-336, Petitioners now contend
the CUP must be denied because a separate statute prohibits the County from
10
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issuing any permit "unless the in tended uses of the buildings and land conform
in all respects with the provisions of this title." Petitioners' Brief at 12 (citing
BCRC § 12-130(A)). Citing this provision, Petitioners seek to invalidate the CUP
because the gravel pit is allegedly illegal, and therefore (somehow) not "active."
In essence, Petitioners are attempting to shoehorn a civil enforcement action to
enjoin an alleged zoning violation into the judicial review of a CUP. The Court
should not take the bait.
When the Linscotts submitted their application for the CUP in dispute,
Bonner County had neither received a complaint regarding the gravel pit nor
opened an investigation into its operation, let alone commenced litigation to have
it declared illegal. In other words, the gravel pit was (and is) presumed legal. That
is the presumption afforded to all property owners in Bonner County, which can
only be overcome via an enforcement action taken pursuant to BCRC § 12130(B). That provision empowers the Bonner County Prosecutor's Office to
initiate criminal or civil proceedings to "enjoin violations of [the] title." However,
it is the County's burden to prove the existence of a violation before moving to
correct it, and such an action cannot even begin until the property owner has
received notice identifying the alleged violation, its location, and the actions
required to resolve it. Id. That is the process which Petitioners have ignored in
their haste to have the gravel pit deemed illegal.
To deny the Linscotts' current application on the basis that the gravel pit
is illegal would be a flagrant violation of their due process rights. The Linscotts
were not required to defend the legality of the gravel pit in the underlying
lllPage
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 177

administrative proceedings because that was not the appropriate venue to do so;
BCRC § 12-130(B) directs that process to a courtroom, not a boardroom. Thus,
the Linscotts did not offer affirmative defenses to rebut Petitioners' claims or
otherwise try to protect their interests. 4 That being the case, this Court cannot
deem the gravel pit illegal based on an administrative proceeding in which the
Linscotts were not required to address that issue.
In sum, there is a "strong presumption" that the County has correctly
interpreted and applied its own zoning ordinances. Lusk, 158 Idaho at 14. As
such, Petitioners bear the burden of proof to show the County applied a zoning
ordinance unreasonably. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey,
127 Idaho 576, 586 (1995).

Attempting to shoulder that burden, Petitioners

now urge the Court to adopt an interpretation of relevant statutes which would:
(1) place an affirmative burden on the Linscotts to prove their property is not
illegal without any prior notice they were required to do so; and (2) completely
circumvent the statutory framework for enforcing zoning violations in Bonner
County. On the other hand, the County simply applied the plain meaning of the
word "active" when determining that the underlying legality of the gravel pit was
not an appropriate inquiry for the BOCC to make. Faced with these two
alternatives, the Court's decision should be an easy one. Close calls must be

4

The County has approved six temporary CUPs (for exactly the same activity now before the
Court) and five building permits at the gravel pit over the last three decades, with the most recent
approval occurring in 2013. Candidly, this could estop Bonner County from asserting a zoning
violation at the site. However, no one knows if this argument would prevail because it has not
been tested in an enforcement proceeding (presumably on motion for summary judgment). This
is just one example of why denial of the CUP based on mere allegations of illegal conduct would
be silly and a glaring violation of the Linscotts' due process rights.
12
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made in favor of the County, and this call is not particularly close. The Court
should ratify the BOCC's decision granting the Linscotts' CUP and deny
Petitioners' appeal.

c. Placement of a batch plant in a gravel pit cannot constitute
expansion of a prior nonconforming use.
BCRC § 12-341 prohibits the extension or expansion of a prior
nonconforming use (with limited exceptions). Citing this provision, Petitioners
claim the Linscotts' CUP must be denied because placing a batch plant in a
"grandfathered" gavel pit is in illegal expansion of that use. Petitioners' Brief at
22. This argument requires additional analysis, as even if the Court recognizes
that it must presume the underlying use is legal in its current form, it could still
deny the CUP on the basis that placing the batch plant in the gravel pit would
be an impermissible expansion of that use.
Relying on the advice of staff, the BOCC rejected that argument in the
underlying proceedings. January Transcript at p. 24 (wherein staff stated "It's
also important to note that gravel pits are defined separately [from] batch plants.
They are allocated for differently in our resource-based use table, so this isn't an
extension or expansion of the existing use. This indicates that the proposal is in
compliance with Bonner County Revised Code [section] 12-3.4, which is our
nonconforming uses and structures code section.). As before, the Court should
affirm the BOCC's decision because Petitioners have failed to overcome the
"strong presumption" that the County correctly interpreted its own ordinance.
BCRC § 12-336 consists of a resource-based use table and related
standards which selectively apply to the various uses in the table. Importantly,
13
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batch plants (whether asphalt or concrete) are in their own category, separate
and apart from "mining, stone quarries, gravel pits, and stone mills." Id.
(emphasis added). Further, the two uses are permitted differently depending on
which zone they are in. For example, gravel pits are conditionally permitted in
the Recreation and Alpine Village zones, but batch plants are not. Id. This
distinction is clear and unambiguous evidence that the Bonner County Revised
Code deems the two uses separate and distinct. That being the case, one cannot
be the expansion of the other, and the BOCC adopted on this interpretation when
approving the Linscotts' CUP.
Petitioners completely ignore this distinction. Instead, they claim without
citation to authority that "the addition of a batch plant on land whose
nonconforming permitted use has only been a gravel plant cannot be interpreted
in any other way than an extension, alteration, enlargement or increase of the
Gravel Pit." Petitioners' Brief at 23 (internal quotations omitted). The analysis set
forth above squarely contradicts their claim. By claiming the two uses cannot be
distinguished without contesting the plain language of BCRC § 12-336,
Petitioners are essentially disputing the legislative decision to differentiate one
use from the other instead of challenging the BOCC's interpretation of its own
code. However, that cannot be the basis for overturning the BOCC's decision. As
such, they have utterly failed to attack the reasonableness of the BOCC's
interpretation of that statute.
As with Petitioners' other claims, they must overcome the "strong
presumption" that the BOCC correctly applied its own ordinance. Again, they fail
14
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to do so. BCRC § 12-336 makes a clear distinction between batch plants and
gravel pits. As such, it was eminently reasonable for the BOCC to conclude that
placing a batch plant in a gravel pit was not an impermissible expansion of a
prior nonconforming use, and the Court must defer to that interpretation.

d. Attorney's Fees
Idaho Code§ 12-117 states as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political
subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision
or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the non-prevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Bonner County deserves an award of reasonable attorney's fees in this matter
because Petitioners initiated this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
The preceding analysis demonstrates the Petitioners' repeated attempts to
discredit the County's interpretation of its own ordinances must fail. As such,
they pursued this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law and should be
obligated to reimburse the taxpayers of Bonner County, who are ultimately
responsible for the costs of the County's defense in this matter.

15
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V.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Respondent Bonner County respectfully requests that the

Court deny the Petition for Judicial Review and award Bonner County its
attorney's fees incurred herein.
DATED this 4th day of November 2019

8dtWk~
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 4th day of November 2019, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners
John Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Intervenors- Linscott
Elizabeth Tellessen
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1.

INTRODUCTION
A County's decision interpreting and applying its own zomng ordinance, is

presumed valid. A court on review defers to the county's decision, favoring its validity.
Bonner County granted a conditional use permit to Linscott and Interstate Concrete &
Asphalt Company ("Interstate"), to allow relocation of Interstate's asphalt batch plant
from downtown Sandpoint, to Linscott's active gravel pit. This Court properly affirms the
County's decision because there is no basis to conclude it was made arbitrarily or
capriciously, nor is it contrary to the law.
2.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A local zoning decision must be affirmed unless the petitioner is able to establish a

basis under LC. § 67-5279(3) for the court to set aside and remand the decision for
further proceedings. Id. Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) is plain:
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant
to this chapter shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set
forth in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate
ordinance or regulation of the city or county.
I.C. § 67-6501. In furtherance of this statutory mandate, Bonner County Revised Code
(BCRC), Title 12, Subchapter 2.2 establishes the express standards for approving a
conditional use permit (CUP). A CUP is properly approved where:
"there is adequate evidence showing that the proposal is in accordance
with the general and specific objectives of the comprehensive plan and
this title, and that the proposed use will neither create a hazard nor be
dangerous to persons on or adjacent to the property."
BCRC § 12-223.

1
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The County found Interstate and Linscott 1 had presented substantial evidence
establishing compliance with the County's Comprehensive Plan and applicable
provisions of its zoning code, and properly approved the CUP. Petitioner's arguments
regarding the non-conforming status of the pit, and alleging procedural inadequacies of
Ordinance 557 are beyond the scope of this Court's review; which, even if properly
asserted would not establish a basis to set aside the County's approval of the CUP.
3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Interstate presented substantial evidence to establish compliance with Bonner

County's Comprehensive Plan and express zoning code requirements for a conditional
use permit. The arguments presented by Petitioner in this appeal relate to issues beyond
the applicable terms of the code, and do not establish a basis to set aside the CUP.
3.1 The County's approval of the CUP is proper and based on the express
standards in the Comprehensive Plan and zoning code allowing the batch
plant as a conditional use in the R-5 zone.
Bonner County has long recognized in the goals and policies of its Comprehensive
Plan that natural resource based industries are appropriately permitted as conditional uses
in rural Bonner County. Comp. Plan, Ch. 5-3 and 6-2 (2005). The County's
Comprehensive Plan specifically directs that mining activities be permitted and
conditionally approved, recognizing that "the suitability of sites for mining activities are
generally based on where the resources are encountered." Comp. Plan, Land Use
Component, §5.3 (2005).

1

The Applicants and Intervenors in this appeal.

2
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Interstate has been an active member of the Bonner County community for more
than 26 years. (R. at 29; Tr. Jan. 11, 2019, pp. 32-35) Interstate, in conjunction with its
predecessors, have operated the Sandpoint asphalt batch plant since 1987. (Id. at 34)2
Interstate has operated the batch plant in Sandpoint within the environmental parameters
set and monitored by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). (Id. at pp.
115-116; and p. 210 11. 4-7) The difficulty with the Sandpoint batch plant is that it is
removed from the natural resources it requires to operate. This results in additional truck
traffic through town and the nearby school zone for delivery of raw materials and
finished product. (Tr. Jan. 11, 2019, p. 35, 11. 8-18; p. 36, 1. 1-8) Furthermore, it is
situated in a population center ill-suited for the resource based use. (R. 1186-1187)
The natural resources essential to operation of the asphalt plant are located at the
Linscott's pit. Approval of the CUP furthers the Comprehensive Plan's directive to locate
mining related activities where the resources are encountered. The Comprehensive Plan
protects the public health and welfare by directing "review of potential impacts from
dust, traffic, noise, blasting and use of water resources." Comp. Plan, Ch. 5-3. This
portion of the plan is codified in the zoning regulations as BCRC § 12-222(H), which
requires the County to consider the effects the proposal will have "such as noise, glare,
odors, fumes and vibrations on adjoining property." Furthermore, conditional uses are
properly approved where the use "will neither create a hazard nor be dangerous to
persons on or adjacent to the property." BCRC § 12-223.
The Applicant provided substantial evidence to dispel the allegation that noise,
glare, odors, fumes or vibrations would affect adjoining property, including Interstate's

2

Respondent misstates the Sandpoint batch plant has been in operation since 2004. Resp. Mem., p. 3.

3
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application narrative (R. 114-131); hydrogeological report (R. 171-212); odor analysis
(R.215-216); noise analysis (R. 213-214); as well as supporting environmental and health
studies (R. 29-113); and emission comparisons (R. 132-165). Petitioner's anecdotal,
albeit conflicting, evidence about the potential for air and water emissions from asphalt
production and batch plants was not sufficient to persuade the planning and zoning
commission or the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) the batch plant would
present a hazard or be dangerous to persons on adjacent property. (E.g. R. 755-774)
The BOCC found substantial evidence to support its findings, and it is not required
that this evidence be unchallenged or contradicted. Petitioner dedicates little more than a
page of its appeal brief to the argument that the alleged impacts of the batch plant will be
harmful. Pet'r Mem. Supp., pp. 24-25. All of the facts cited were submitted in support of
the request for reconsideration, not those presented at or prior to the hearing. But, even
assuming for sake of argument that each fact advanced by the public through the close of
the reconsideration hearing had been considered by the BOCC, it still would be
insufficient to establish a basis for this Court to invade the BOCC' s factual findings that
are indisputably supported by substantial evidence.
3.2 The County recognized the limitations on the scope of its authority and
declined to follow Petitioner's arguments regarding the pit's legal status.
The standards for approval of a conditional use permit are expressed in the Bonner
County Comprehensive Plan and zoning ordinance. LLUPA requires that:
The approval or denial of any application ... shall be based upon standards
and criteria ... set forth in express terms in land use ordinances in order
that permit applicants, interested residents and decision makers alike may
know the express standards that must be met in order to obtain a requested
permit or approval.

4

Page 191

I.C. §67-6535(1). Furthermore, LLUPA provides the BOCC with the authority to
condition the permit to control the duration of the development and to ensure that it is
maintained properly. LC. § 67-6512(d)(3-4).
The Commissioner's considered and appropriately recognized they were without
the authority to impose a standard requiring the Applicants to prove the pit's compliance
with applicable statutes and regulations. (Tr. Jan. 11, 2019, p. 197:16- 198:7; Tr. Mar. pp.
62:8-67:25) In the present circumstances the asphalt plant is a conditionally permitted use
in both the rural residential and transitional zones. BCRC § 12-336. The code only
requires that the batch plant be situated at an active gravel mine. BCRC § 12-336(22).
There is no dispute the Linscott Pit is an active gravel mine. The nature of its entitlement,
non-conforming, conditional, or otherwise, is not an element of the applicable code, nor a
basis for denial of the CUP.
Although the staffs report does acknowledge the non-conforming status of the pit
(R. 23 7) this statement is not a standard under which the CUP must be evaluated. This
was further explained by staff during the hearing:
•
•
•

The gravel pit was existing and is a documented non-conforming
use ...
Gravel pits are also defined as separate resource based uses ...
The proposal does not include the expansion or extension of the gravel
pit, but is a request to conditionally permit an asphalt batch plant
pursuant to BCRC § 12-336 ...

(R. 1181) While Petitioner presented conflicting evidence regarding the non-conforming
nature of the pit there is no express provision of the zoning ordinance that makes this fact
material, let alone determinative with respect to the CUP for the batch plant.
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Dissatisfied with the BOCC' s determination Petitioner requested reconsideration of
the pit's non-conforming status. (R. 1030-1035) On reconsideration the Commissioner's
deliberated, and aptly reasoned that the non-conforming status of the pit is not the subject
of the application. (Tr. Mar. pp. 62:8-67:25; R. 1123) The BOCC recognized that
evaluation of the legal status of the pit is subject to separate and distinct procedural and
due process requirements, which had not been triggered through review of the CUP
application. Id., and BCRC Subchapter 12-130 - Enforcement. Nevertheless, the BOCC
recognized that if the pit were to become inactive then the batch plant would no longer
meet the criteria and would also have to be discontinued. Id. The BOCC acted within its
authority by conditioning the CUP and operation of the batch plant on the fact that the pit
remain active. (R. 998, Cond. A-9)
3.3 Petitioner's argument regarding Ordinance 557 is untimely and
immaterial to the County's approval of the CUP.
The amendments to BCRC adopted May 23, 2018, under Bonner County Ordinance
557, were not presented to the County in any public comment or hearing prior to the final
decision. Moreover, this issue was not presented as a basis for reconsideration when such
was sought (R. 1025-1121); nor an issue on which reconsideration was granted. (R. 1021)
Petitioner alleged for the first time on March 15, 2019, days before the
reconsideration hearing, that notice regarding the amendments to BCRC § 12-336 was
insufficient. (R. 545) Petitioner developed and relied predominantly on this argument for
the first time in this appeal.
In this regard, among others, Petitioner has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies, and is not entitled to appeal. Furthermore, the County's decision to amend its
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zoning code through the legislative process is not subject to judicial review, and this issue
is untimely and improperly presented in this appeal.

4.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
4.1
Interstate requests the Court affirm the BOCC's approval of the CUP
because it is supported by substantial evidence and satisfies the applicable
provisions of the Bonner County Comprehensive Plan and Revised Code.
4.2
Interstate requests an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees on
appeal under IC § 12-121.

5.

LEGAL AUTHORITY
There is no dispute that the county's final land use decision must be affirmed unless

the petitioner has established and the court finds the decision is:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a)-(e). In addition, the petitioner must also demonstrate "actual harm or
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof..." LC. § 67-6535(3).
While Petitioner acknowledges these standards on review, its arguments on appeal do not
satisfy any of the standards.
Petitioner first argues that Ordinance 557 is invalid, and thus, approval of the CUP
was in excess of the BOCC's statutory authority. This argument fails because Petitioner
is not entitled to judicial review of Ordinance 557. See Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome
County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008). Second, the Petitioner's arguments over
the pit's legal status appear to be an effort to establish that the decision is arbitrary,
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capricious, or an abuse of discretion. This argument fails because it requires the Court to
impose a standard where none is expressed in the applicable code.
Further, Petitioner has not established it has standing to bring this appeal. The
evidence cited is of a general nature and does not establish a particularized injury.
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the BOCC's approval of the CUP and dismiss the
appeal, and grant Interstate its costs and fees on appeal.
5.1 The BOCC's decision is properly affirmed because it is supported by
substantial evidence.

The BOCC's decision to approve C1015-18 sets forth the factual analysis on
which its findings and conclusions rest. The factual findings are appropriate if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho
448, 456, 180 P .3d 487 (2008). There is no requirement that the evidence in the record be
uncontradicted or lead to a single conclusion, "it need only be of such sufficient quantity
and probative value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact
finder." Id., citing Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Freemont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148
P.3d 1247 (2006). "Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of
the evidence but more than a mere scintilla." Cowan, 143 Idaho at 517.
The relevance and competency of the evidence in the record is viewed through the
lens of the particular factual situation that is before the BOCC. In this regard, the
commissioners "must make a factual inquiry to determine whether the requested
[application] reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors in, the
comprehensive plan in light of the present factual situation surrounding the request."
Taylor v. Board of County Com'rs, 124 Idaho 392, 398 (1993) emphasis added.
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Moreover, the law does not require that the conditional use permit conform exactly to all
aspects of the comprehensive plan. Id. at 397-398.
The evidence in the record that relates to the present factual situation 1s
Interstate's proven track-record of operating the precise plant near school children,
elderly adults, and numerous citizens of Bonner County without incident. Moreover,
Interstate has adopted, and will continue to operate in accordance with, the best available
control technology ("BACT"). These practices have allowed Interstate to operate
successfully in Sandpoint and near other neighborhoods in the region without any known
hazard or danger. (Tr. Jan. 11, 2019, pp. 33:7-34: 19; 42:20-43:3)
Furthermore, the BOCC considered, and reconsidered the arguments and facts
relating to the status of the pit's operations. But, as the BOCC recognized, and as set
forth in the County's response brief, Linscott's and the pit's conformance with the
applicable law is presumed, unless after due process is provided, a violation is proven.
See Resp. Br., pp. 10-13.
The BOCC' s responsibility was to weigh the evidence before it and reach factual
findings particular to this application. The court may only reverse factual findings that are
"clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record." Taylor, 124 Idaho 396. Although the public argued about the quality and
quantity of the evidence in the record, reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion
as the BOCC, and a court must affirm such findings.
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5.2
The BOCC's decision is properly affirmed because the application
satisfies the applicable provisions of the Bonner County Comprehensive Plan
and Revised Code.
The BOCC' s written decision includes the criteria and standards reviewed and
applicable to approval of the CUP, sets out the pertinent facts, and the rationale for its
decision as required by LC. § 67-6535. Although a court reviews the interpretation of a
code as a matter of law, its analysis "begins with the literal language of the enactment."
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9 at 14 (2002),
citation omitted. Further, "[t]here is a strong presumption of validity favoring the actions
of a zoning authority when applying and interpreting its own zoning ordinances." Id. at
197. The BOCC found that the application satisfied the requirement that the batch plant
be located in an active gravel pit.
When faced with the issue of the pit's non-conformance, the BOCC followed the
well settled law of the state by not arbitrarily depriving Linscott of its rights to operate
the pit as a non-conforming use. "The right to continue a non-conforming use ... does not
depend upon the permission to continue such use ... , but instead is a constitutionally
protected right." See Gordon Paving Co. v. Blaine County Bd. Of County Com'rs, 98
Idaho 730, 732, 572 P.2d 164 (1977), citation omitted. As submitted in the County's
Response Brief (which will not be repeated here), a determination by the BOCC in these
proceedings of the pit's non-conforming status would be a violation of the Linscott' s
constitutional right to due process. An interpretation BCRC § 12-336(22) that requires
such a review is an absurd and unreasonably harsh result that cannot be adopted by this
Court. Friends of Farm, 137 Idaho at 197.
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After due consideration and deliberation on the record, the BOCC rendered its
decision, concluding that the requirement that the batch plant operate in an active gravel
pit is satisfied, and imposed a condition requiring the plant to cease operations if the pit
goes inactive for any reason. (R. 998, 999-1007) Petitioner unreasonably urges for the
Court to interpret "active gravel pit" as a requirement that the Applicant prove the nonconforming status prior to approval of the CUP. There is no support for this argument in
LLUPA, BCRC, or under the applicable rules of code interpretation. Petitioner has failed
to establish a basis to set aside the BOCC' s decision, and the appeal is properly
dismissed.

5.3
The Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the question whether
there was a lack of due process afforded prior to adoption of Ordinance 557.
The legislative acts of a local government are not subject to judicial review
"unless expressly authorized by statute." LR.C.P. 84(a)(l). Petitioner relies on the
combination of LC. §§ 67-6521 and 67-5279 to establish a basis for the Court to review
adoption of Ordinance 557. However, LC. § 67-6521 only allows an affected person to
appeal a permit authorizing development, not a county's legislative acts. Furthermore, the
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAP A) does not independently apply to decisions of
a local governing body. Giltner Dairy, 145 Idaho at 632. Accordingly, neither LLUPA
nor IAPA establish a basis for judicial review of Ordinance 557, and there is no legal or
factual basis to justify Petitioner's effort to bootstrap the review to this appeal.
Even if Petitioner could establish standing and a legal basis for the Court to
review Ordinance 557, its attack on due process would fail. Due process requires that the
government provide notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a
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constitutional right. "Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly, but it is a flexible
concept calling for procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation."
Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454. Courts view due process and the proceedings held as a whole,
and those objecting to the process must demonstrate "actual harm or violation of
fundamental rights, not the mere possibilities thereof." Id. Petitioner asserts without
specificity, that notice of the 2018 code amendments was insufficient and deprived the
Petitioner of an opportunity to be heard.
In judging whether or not there has been a meaningful opportunity to be heard, a
court evaluates whether the adopted processes and procedures were followed, and
whether members of the public were granted an opportunity to submit evidence, both
written and oral, to the record. See In re Jerome County Board of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298,
310-311, 281 P.3d 1076 (2012). It is evident that the process employed by the County
gave the public ample notice and opportunity to be heard on the various amendments
adopted in 2018. (R. 392-403) Thus, even if the Court had jurisdiction to review
Ordinance 557, there still would not be a basis to set aside approval of the CUP, and it
must be affirmed.
5.4
Linscott Pit's non-conforming status is not ripe for review nor
germane to the application or the decision in this matter.

The Bonner County Revised Code does not require the Applicants or the County
to first establish the status of the Linscott Pit prior to issuance of the CUP. The pit's
status could be reviewed by the County under BCRC Subchapter 1.3, but such review has
not been initiated, let alone decided. Nevertheless, Petitioner incorrectly argues the batch
plant is an extension of a non-conforming use. There is no genuine dispute that
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"[ e]xpansion and enlargement of a nonconforming use contrary to a properly enacted
zoning ordinance is unlawful." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 610, 768 P.2d
1340 (1989) emphasis added. However, where a use is permitted outright under the
applicable zoning ordinance, it is properly approved without regard to any nonconfirming use standard.
The cases and analysis advanced in Petitioner's brief are not applicable to the
facts at hand. Take for instance Baxter, where the defendant's real property had been
rezoned causing his 20-head cattle operation to become a non-conforming use. Baxter,
115 Idaho at 607. As time passed the defendant elected to expand his operations to
include a year-round feed lot. Under the applicable zoning, a feed lot was not permitted.
Thus, the defendant was only allowed to continue the use that existed at the time the
zoning was changed. Baxter and the rest of the cases cited in the request for
reconsideration are distinct from the facts at hand because they address uses that are not
permitted under the applicable zoning.
In the present circumstances the asphalt plant is a conditionally permitted use in
both the rural residential and transitional zones. The Comprehensive Plan and the code
only require that the plant be situated on an active gravel mine. BCRC § 12-336(22).
There is no dispute the Linscott' s pit qualifies as an active gravel mine. The nature of its
entitlement is not an element of the applicable code, nor is the batch plant an extension of
the pit's use, it is a separate and distinct use, expressly allowed under the code. Petitioner
has failed to establish a basis to set aside approval of the CUP, and it is properly affirmed
by the Court.
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5.5
Petitioner has not established it has standing, nor provided evidence
of an actual harm or violation of a fundamental right.
Petitioner, as an unincorporated nonprofit association, is an entity "distinct from
its members and managers." IC §30-27-105 (2015). The cases cited by Petition in support
of its argument for standing predate the adoption ofIC §30-27-105, and are no longer the
authority on the issue. Accordingly, Petitioner does not have standing to pursue this
appeal. It did not participate in the open record hearings, request reconsideration, and is
not an "affected person." See IC §67-6521.
Furthermore, it is not sufficient for a petitioner to allege the possibility of harm or
the invasion of a fundamental right of one of its members. LC. § 67-6535(3), emphasis

added. The evidence cited by Petitioner in support of its appeal is of a general nature, not
particular to any individual member or his/her property. Nor is there evidence of an
actual harm, only speculation as to the possibility of harm. Pet'r Mem. Supp., pp. 24-25.
Moreover, the cited evidence was submitted in regard to the request for reconsideration,
and was not before the BOCC. Id.
For instance, members of the public argued that their property values would
decline due to the proximity of the batch plant. The evidence relied upon is general in
nature and taken from unidentified "studies." (R. 1060) There is no direct evidence of any
member's present property value, nor any comparison of the values of properties within
the vicinity of the existing Sandpoint batch plant and those sited away from the batch
plant. Petitioner's allegations regarding air quality, noise, vibrations, odor, and glare
suffer from the same deficiencies and should be disregarded. As a final matter, the
allegation that there is a threat to water quality was proven false through testimony of
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Interstate's hydrogeologist and not rebutted by the Water District, or any evidence
presented by the public.
Consequently, Petitioner does not have standing and its blanket allegation
regarding "potential impacts to its members" is not sufficient to meet the standard set
forth in LC. § 67-6535(3), and the appeal is properly dismissed for lack of standing.
5.6

Interstate requests an award of costs and reasonable fees on appeal.

An intervenor may be awarded fees as a prevailing party. 11& City of McCall v.
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006); Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman
Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 686, 249 P.3d 868, 879 (2011), overruled by City of
Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). Interstate requests fees be
awarded to it under LC. § 12-121. In order to support its appeal Petitioner requests the
Court ignore two well founded principals of law: ( 1) legislative action of the County is
not subject to judicial review; and (2) the County and this Court are precluded from
invading Linscott's constitutional right to continue the non-conforming use absent due
process.
Petitioner's pursuit of this appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or law
substantially jeopardized Interstate's interest in the CUP. Interstate should be considered
among the prevailing parties in this appeal, and awarded its costs and reasonable
attorney's fees.
6.

CONCLUSION
Approval of the CUP is based on factual findings that are supported by substantial

evidence and consistent with the applicable provisions of the Bonner County Revised
Code. Petitioner has failed to establish a basis to set aside the approval under LC. § 67-
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5279, and lacks standing to pursue this appeal. Accordingly, Interstate requests the Court
affirm the County's decision and dismiss the appeal, with costs and fees to Interstate as a
prevailing party.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2019.

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt
Company
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; D sent
via facsimile; ; [8::1 iCourt / Email Transmission
on November 7, 2019, to:

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov
William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary G. Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
John A. Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw .net
Attorneys for Linscott

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN
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Electronically Filed
11/7/2019 2:54 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Charlene Krames, Deputy Clerk

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone: (208) 263-7712
Fax: (208) 263-8211
iCourt: johnfinney@finneylaw.net
ISB No. 5413

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, an
unincorporated non-profit
association organized under
the laws of the State of
Idaho,

)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho

Respondent.

Case No. CV09-19-0629

)

INTERVENOR LINSCOTTS
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW, the Intervenors FRANKE. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, husband and wife,

(herein "LINSCOTTS") by and through

counsel, JOHN A. FINNEY, of Finney Finney

&

Finney, P.A., and

submit this Intervenor Linscotts Respondents' Brief as a
Respondent in this judicial review and in support of the Bonner
County Commissioner's decision approving the Conditional Use
Permit approval in Bonner County File No. C1015-18, as follows:
INTERVENOR LINSCOTT$ RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 1
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I .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case

This is a petition for judicial ~rom the approval by the
Bonner County Board of Commissioner s of the Intervenor
LINSCOTTS'

(and Intervenor INTERSTATE CONCRETE AND ASPHALT'S)

conditional use permit application.

The Intervenor LINSCOTTS

are applicants and the owners of the real property which
received the Conditional Use Permit approval in Bonner County
File No. C1015-18, which is the subject of this judicial review.
The LINSCOTTS own several contiguous parcels of real
property in the Sagle area of Bonner County, Idaho.
LINSCOTTS make many uses of their real property.

The

The LINSCOTTS

reside upon their real property, operate a sand and gravel pit
business, and own several structures which are leased out for
commercial use.
The Intervenor INTERSTATE CONCRETE

&

ASPHALT COMPANY

(herein "INTERSTATE" ) leases real property from LINSCOTTS and
obtains material from LINSCOTTS for some of its operations.
INTERSTATE, pursuant to several Bonner County issued special use
permits, has temporarily operated an asphalt plant upon the
LINSCOTTS real property at various times.

INTERSTATE desired to

permanently relocate its asphalt batch plant from within the
City of Sandpoint to the LINSCOTTS' real property, which has
been operated for the commercial extraction of sand and gravel
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from the pit for numerous decades.

The LINSCOTTS ' operations

commenced prior to any Bonner County zoning ordinance s.
LINSCOTTS and INTERSTATE filed a Condition al Use Permit
Applicatio n (R. p. 1-16) for approval, with condition s, to
relocate INTERSTAT E'S batch plant from within the City of
Sandpoint to the LINSCOTTS ' sand and gravel pit real property.
The Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/I NTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT (herein "CITIZENS AGAINST") purports to be "an
unincorpo rated non-profi t associatio n organized under the laws
of the State of Idaho, whose members include several neighbors
owning property and living in the immediate vicinity of the
proposed asphalt plant."

The Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST entity

does not own any real property in the vicinity of the proposed
asphalt plant.

The Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST entity was first

identified at some point after the applicatio n was made for and
the proceedin gs had commenced on the condition al use permit, but
no manager has been identified of record and there is no filing
with Idaho Secretary of State which is able to be identified .

B.

Course Of Proceedin gs

The Condition al Use Permit Applicatio n was filed August 8,
2018 and was processed by the Bonner County Planning Departmen t
(R. p. 1-16).

The Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commissio n

approved the Condition al Use Permit Applicatio n on November 15,
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2018.

The approval decision letter was issued by the Planning

Department on November 16, 2018 (R. p. 1008-1016).
The Planning and Zoning Commission decision was appealed to
the Bonner County Board of County Commissioner s by a letter(s)
dated and received December 11, 2018 by the Bonner County
Planning Department (R. p. 1115-1121).

The letter was

purportedly signed by various persons without identifying any
specific land ownership status.
The Bonner County Board of County Commissioner s upon the
appeal, approved the Conditional Use Permit Application on
January 11, 2019.

The approval decision letter was issued by

the Planning Department on January 14, 2019 (R. p. 999-1007).
The Board of County Commissioner s decision was made the
subject of a purported request for reconsiderat ion by a letter
dated and received January 24, 2019 by the Bonner County
Planning Department (R. p. 1025 - 1114).

The letter is not

actually signed by anyone and does not specifically identify the
actual person(s) with standing seeking reconsiderat ion.

None

the less, Bonner County proceeding with a limited proceeding on
reconsiderat ion.
The Bonner County Board of County Commissioner s upon the
reconsiderat ion, upheld the approval of the Conditional Use
Permit Application on March 22, 2019.

The reconsiderati on

decision letter was issued by the Planning Department on March
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25, 2019 (R. p. 988-99 8).
On Friday April 19, 2019, at 2:36 p.m. PST, user
garyall en@giv enspur sley.co m, by Envelo pe No. 170335 9 submit ted a
docume nt identi fied as a Petitio n For Judici al Review on behalf
of CITIZEN S AGAINS T, which was rejecte d on Monday April 22, 2019
with directi ons for copyin g the envelo pe, correc ting, and
resubm itting to retain the origin al filing date.

Said rejecti on

notice was emaile d by the system to the user
garyall en@giv enspur sleuy.c om (iCour t filing system ).
On May 1, 2019, at 12:03 p.m. PST, user
garyall en@giv enspur sley.co m, by iCourt Envelo pe No. 171634 3
(withou t copyin g or submit ting for attemp ted relatio n back to
the prior attemp ted filing date, and withou t submit ting a basis
to be excuse d therefr om) submit ted a Petitio n For Judici al
Review on behalf of CITIZEN S AGAINST, which was accept ed on May
1, 2019 at 1:36 p.m. PST, and thereby filed on May 1, 2019
(iCour t filing system ).

C.

Statem ent Of Facts

The LINSCOTTS own severa l contigu ous parcel s of real
proper ty in the Sagle area of Bonner County , Idaho.

Those

parcel s includ e Bonner County Parcel No. RP56N0 2W1042 02A,
consis ting of approx imately 139.3 acres.

Most of that parcel is

zoned as Rural 5 (R-5) and a portion of the proper ty adjace nt to
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U.S. Highw ay 95 is zoned Comm ercial (C)
233-2 44, 1156- 1182) .

(R. p. 1-16, 245-2 54,

The prope rty has been owned by the

Linsc ott famil y since 1953 and title was acqui red by
FRANK and
CAROL LINSCOTT in 1981 from Frank 's fathe r Norma n Linsc
ott
(Warr anty Deed Instru ment No. 23962 4 recor ded March
12, 1981
recor ds of Bonn er Coun ty, Idaho and Corre ction To Warra
nty Deed
Instru ment No. 25537 5 recor ded May 20, 1982, recor ds
of Bonne r
Coun ty, Idaho )

(R. p. 16).

The porti on of the real prope rty

subje ct to the appli catio n to opera te an asph alt batch
plant is
withi n the Rural zone used for sand and grave l pit extra
ction by
LINSC OTTS.

The comm ercial ly zoned porti on of the real prope rty

adjac ent to U.S. Highw ay 95 has numer ous build ings const
ructe d
there on which are lease d to third party comm ercial tenan
ts, and
are not used in the grave l pit opera tion.
To the north of the real prope rty which is the subje
ct of
the Cond itiona l Use Perm it Appl icatio n, LINSCOTTS own
Bonne r
Count y Parce l No. RP56N 02Wl0 3000A , cons isting of appro
ximat ely
74.61 acres , which is zoned as Rural 5 (R-5) .

FRANK LINSCOTT

(and his forme r spous e) acqui red the prope rty in 1965
(Warr anty
Deed Instru ment No. 10429 3 recor ded Decem ber 21, 1965,
recor ds
of Bonne r Coun ty, Idaho ).

The LINSCOTTS resid e on the easte rn

porti on of the real prope rty and use the prope rty for
sand and
grave l extra ction .

This parce l is not a subje ct of the

Cond itiona l Use Perm it Appl icatio n at issue in this
proce eding .
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The LINSCOTTS (and Frank Linscott's father Norman) have
continuously conducted sand and gravel extraction on the real
property subject to the Conditional Use Permit Application since
1953.

The LINSCOTTS have continuously conducted sand and gravel

extraction on the real property located north of the real
property subject to the Conditional Use Permit Application since
1965.

The LINSCOTTS conducted sand and gravel extraction from

both parcels since prior to Bonner County adopting a zoning
ordinance.

The assertions in the Petitioner's alleged Statement

of Facts in the sections identified as "History of Permitting on
the Property", "Expansion of the Gravel Pit After 1981",
"Linscott's Lack of Compliance" set forth on pages 2-8 in the
Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner's Petition For Judicial
Review (herein "Petitioner' s Memorandum") are based upon
speculation, conjecture, guesses, misinterpret ation, and/or
misrepresent ation, and most importantly, are all irrelevant to
the Conditional Use Permit Application and proceeding.

The

assertions arise from attorney Gary Allen's March 15, 2019
letter (starting at R. p. 538, but out of order in the record)
with volumes of attachments submitted to Bonner County just a
few days prior to the March 22, 2019 reconsiderati on hearing.
Those assertions are irrelevant to the Conditional Use Permit
Application and approval at issue herein.
For the reasons set forth below, the factual record
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regarding all the specifics for the decades of operations by
Intervenor LINSCOTTS has not been developed.

The record clearly

establishes that the Intervenor LINSCOTTS operate "an active
pit" as required by Bonner County Revised Code within which to
site an asphalt batch plant pursuant to conditional use permit.
INTERSTATE has operated an asphalt batch plant upon the
LINSCOTT real property which is subject to the Conditional Use
Permit Application periodically , pursuant to approved Special
Use Permits (R. p. 1-16).

INTERSTATE is seeking approval to

permanently locate an asphalt batch plant in the existing and
active LINSCOTT gravel pit.
The December 11, 2018 appeal letter (R. p. 1115-1121) is
not executed by anyone identified or duly appointed as Manager
of Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST, an entity pursuant to Idaho law.
The January 24, 2019 reconsiderati on letter (R. p. 10251114) is not signed by anyone.

It is does not identify anyone

duly appointed as Manager of Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST, an
entity pursuant to Idaho law.

On March 15, 2019, attorney Gary

Allen submitted a letter on "behalf of Citizens Against
Linscott/Int erstate Asphalt Plant."

The letter does not

identify any manager of Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST.
The CITIZENS AGAINST entity does not own any real property
in the vicinity of the proposed asphalt plant.
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Intervenors LINSCOTTS assert as additiona1 issues on
appea1, as fo11ows:
A.

Is the Petitioner entity an affected person?

B.

Does the Petitioner entity have standing?

C.

Did the Petitioner time1y seek judicia1 review?

D.

Did the Petitioner time1y e1ectronica11y fi1e the
petition for judicia1 review?

E.

Is there jurisdiction to grant re1ief when the
Petitioner didn't time1y serve the LINSCOTTS?

F.

If re1evant to the inquiry, does the doctrine of
diminishing assets app1y to the LINSCOTTS grave1 pit?

G.

Has the Petitioner shown any prejudice to a substantia1
right?

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST did not seek an award of
attorney fees against the Intervenor LINSCOTTS.

In addition,

the Petitioner is not entit1ed to recover any attorney fees
against the Intervenor LINSCOTTS.
The Intervenor LINSCOTTS, based upon existing Idaho case
1aw, are not ab1e to seek an award of attorney fees in this
matter against the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST for acting
without a reasonab1e basis in fact or 1aw pursuant to Idaho Code
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§ 12-117 or for acting frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation pursuant to§ 12-121.

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code§

67-6521 ACTIONS BY AFFECTED PERSONS, provides in relevant part,
as follows:
(1) (a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean
one having a bona fide interest in real property which may
be adversely affected by:
(i)
The approval, denial or failure to act
upon an application for a subdivision, variance,
special
use
permit
and
such
other
similar
applications required or authorized pursuant to this
chapter;

***
(d)
[***] An affected person aggrieved by a final
decision concerning matters identified in section 676521(1) (a), Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days
after all remedies have been exhausted under local
ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52,
title 67, Idaho Code.
Also, the Local Land Use Planning Act, in Idaho Code§ 676535 APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF ANY APPLICATION TO BE BASED UPON
EXPRESS STANDARDS AND TO BE IN WRITING, provides as follows:

(1)
The approval or denial of any application
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter shall be
based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth
in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other
appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county.
Such approval standards and criteria shall be set forth in
express terms in land use ordinances in order that permit
applicants, interested residents and decision makers alike
may know the express standards that must be met in order
to obtain a requested permit or approval. Whenever the
nature of any decision standard or criterion allows, the
decision
shall
identify
aspects
of
compliance
or
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noncomplianc e
with
relevant
approval
standards
and
criteria in the written decision.
(2)
The approval or denial of any application
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter shall be
in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that
explains the criteria and standards considered relevant,
states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions of the comprehensiv e plan, relevant
ordinance
and
statutory
provisions,
pertinent
constitution al
principles
and
factual
information
contained in the record.
(a)
Failure to identify the nature of compliance or
noncomplianc e with express approval standards or failure
to explain compliance or noncomplianc e with relevant
decision criteria shall be grounds for invalidation of an
approved permit or site-specifi c authorizatio n, or denial
of same, on appeal.
(b) Any
applicant
or
affected
person
seeking
judicial review of compliance with the provisions of this
section must first seek reconsiderat ion of the final
decision within fourteen (14) days. Such written request
must identify specific deficiencies in the decision for
which reconsiderat ion is sought. Upon reconsiderat ion, the
decision may be affirmed, reversed or modified after
compliance with applicable procedural standards. A written
decision shall be provided to the applicant or affected
person within sixty (60) days of receipt of the request
for reconsiderat ion or the request is deemed denied. A
decision shall not be deemed final for purposes of
judicial review unless the process required in this
subsection has been followed. The twenty-eight (28) day
time frame for seeking judicial review is tolled until the
date of the written decision regarding reconsiderat ion or
the expiration of the sixty (60) day reconsiderat ion
period, whichever occurs first.
(3)
It is
the intent of the legislature that
decisions made pursuant to this chapter should be founded
upon sound reason and practical application of recognized
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts
of the state are directed to consider the proceedings as a
whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and
resultant decisions in light of practical consideratio ns
with
an
emphasis
on
fundamental
fairness
and the
essentials of reasoned decision making. Only those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility
thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a
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decisio n. Every final decisio n render ed concer ning a sitespecif ic land use reques t shall provid e or be accomp anied
by notice to the applic ant regard ing the applic ant's right
to reques t a
regula tory taking analys is pursua nt to
sectio n 67-800 3,
Idaho Code.
An applic ant denied an
applic ation or aggrie ved by a final decisio n concer ning
matter s identi fied in section 67-652 1 (1) (a), Idaho Code,
may, within twenty -eight (28) days after all remedi es have
been exhaus ted under local ordina nce, seek judici al review
under the proced ures provid ed by chapte r 52, title 67,
Idaho Code. An appeal shall be from the final decisio n and
not
limite d
to
issues
raised
in
the
reques t for
recons iderati on.
The Idaho Admin istrativ e Proced ure Act, in I.e.§ 67-5273
TIME FOR FILING PETITIO N FOR REVIEW, provid es in releva nt part
as follow s:

***

(3) A petitio n for judici al review of a final agency
action other than a rule or order must be filed within
twenty -eight (28) days of the agency action , except as
provid ed by other provis ion of law. The time for filing a
petitio n for review shall be extend ed during the penden cy
of
the
petitio ner's
timely
attemp ts
to
exhaus t
admin istrativ e remedi es, if the attemp ts are clearly not
frivolo us or repeti tious. A cross- petitio n for judici al
review may be filed within fourtee n (14) days after a
party is served with a copy of the notice of the petitio n
for judici al review .
For a timely filed petitio n for judici al review , by an
affecte d person (one having a bona fide intere st in real
proper ty which may be advers ely affecte d by the decisi on),
Idaho Code§ 67-5279 SCOPE OF REVIEW - TYPE OF RELIEF provid es
in releva nt part, as follow s:
(1) The court shall not substi tute its judgme nt for
that of the agency as to the weight of the eviden ce on
questio ns of fact.

***
(3)

When the agency was require d by the provis ions of
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this chapter or by other provision s of law to issue an
order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the
court finds that the agency's findings, inference s,
conclusio ns, or decisions are: (a) in violation of
constitut ional or statutory provision s; (b) in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure ; (d) not supported by substanti al
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary ,
capriciou s, or an abuse of discretion . If the agency action
is not affirmed, i t shall be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedin gs as necessary.
(4) Notwithst anding the provision s of subsection s (2)
and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed
unless substanti al rights of the appellant have been
prejudice d.
As set forth in Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd.
of County Com'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698 (2002) the standard for a
reviewing Court is stated as follows:
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that
of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented .
Id.; IDAHO CODE§ 67-5279(1) (2001). Rather, this Court
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous . Price v. Payette County Board of County
Commissio ners, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998). There
is a strong presumpti on of favoring the validity of the
actions of zoning boards, which includes the applicatio n
and interpret ation of their own zoning ordinance s. Rural
Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board of Commissio ners, 133 Idaho
833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999). The Board's zoning decision may
be overturne d only where it: (a) violates statutory or
constitut ional provision s; (b) exceeds the agency's
statutory authority ; (c) was made upon unlawful procedure ;
(d) is not supported by substanti al evidence in the record
as a whole; or (e) is arbitrary , capriciou s, or an abuse of
discretion .
Price v. Payette County Board of County
Commissio ners, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998); IDAHO
CODE§ 67-5279(3 ) (2001).
In addition, the Board's zoning
decision must be upheld if substanti al rights of the
appellant have not been prejudice d. Payette River Prop.
Owners Ass'n v: Board of Commissio ners, 132 Idaho 551, 976
P. 2d 477 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 67-5279 (4) (2001) .
Idaho Code§ 67-5279 (1),

(3), and (4) as recited and set
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forth above apply to this action, in addition to the strong
presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretatio n of
their own zoning ordinances.

With that presumption, the

Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST, an entity, must show that the
Respondent BONNER COUNTY's approval of the conditional use
permit prejudiced the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST's substantial
rights (based upon a bona fide interest in real property as
required by Idaho Code§ 67-6521) as required by Idaho Code§
67-5279(4) and that the Respondent BONNER COUNTY's actions fall
within the standards set forth in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) (a)
through (e).

V. ARGUMENT
A.

THE PETITIONER IS NOT AN AFFECTED PERSON AND LACKS
STANDING TO BRING THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW

In 2015, Idaho adopted entity status for unincorporat ed
nonprofit associations .

Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 27

contains the Idaho Uniform Unincorporat ed Nonprofit Association
Act, which was added in 2015 to the Corporations Title 30 as
part of the Idaho Uniform Business Organization s Code
reorganizatio n and replacement of the then various statutory
provisions in effect.

The new code provisions regarding

unincorporat ed nonprofit associations moved the statutory
framework from that of partnership to that of an entity.
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The

record reflects that the Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST was created
in response to the condition al use permit applicatio n in this
matter, which was after the new code came into effect.
Idaho Code§ 30-27-102 Definition s provides "(a) In this
chapter: ...

(5)

'Unincorp orated nonprofit associati on' means

an unincorpo rated· organizat ion consistin g of two (2) or more
members joined under an agreement that is oral, in a record, or
implied from conduct for one (1) or more common, nonprofit
purposes. [ ... }" and provides certain exclusion s not relevant
here.

Idaho Code§ 30-27-105 (a) provides that "[a]n

unincorpo rated associatio n is an entity distinct from its
members and managers. " (emphasis added).

The provision s of

Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 27 adopted in 2015 are a "NEW
PART" of Idaho Code, enacted in S.L. 2015 Ch. 243, Sec. 53, p.

897.

The prior provision s of the Uniform Unincorpo rated

Nonprofit Associati on Act contained in Idaho Code Title 53,
Chapter 7 were repealed in S.L. 2015 Ch. 251, Sec. 4, p. 1047.
The prior provision s applicabl e to unincorpo rated
nonprofit associati ons were based upon a partnersh ip basis,
rather than entity basis.

The prior provision s statutori ly

provided for "associat ional" standing based upon a claim held
by a member(s) of a nonprofit unincorpo rated associatio n
(former I.C. § 53-707).

The 2015 statutory enactment s repealed

and wholly replaced those provision s with the entity form,
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including as applicable to standing.

The association itself

under the new statutory scheme must have standing independent
from its member(s), and cannot assert the claims of a member.
The other statutory provisions of Title 30, Chapter 27
which came into effect in 2015 make it clear that a non-profit
association is not merely its members or managers, but is
separate and distinct.

The association is an entity, with its

own independent powers and purpose.

The association may own

and transfer real property, and has liability independent of
any liability of its members or managers.

The association may

sue or be sued in its own name and judgment is rendered in
favor of, or agai-nst, the entity, not its members or managers.
Service of process upon an association, does not subject its
members or managers to the action, and an action does not abate
due to a change in members or managers.

Members of an

association, are not an agent for the association based upon
being a member . .As with other forms of entities in Idaho, an
unincorporated association is a separate and distinct entity.

An unincorporated non-profit association must have its own nonprofit purpose and must have its own non-profit standing to
pursue a petition for judicial review or an action in the
Courts of the State of Idaho.
The Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST does not itself own any
real property in Bonner County, Idaho.
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The Petitioner CITIZENS

AGAINST is not an "affected person" as defined by I.C. § 676521(1) (a) as i t does not have a bona fide interest in real
property which may be adversely affected by the approval of the
condition al use permit.

Standing focuses upon the party

seeking relief and not on the issues that the party wants to
have adjudicat ed.

Standing requires particula rized harm or

injury, not general to members of the public.

The Petitione r

CITIZENS AGAINST does not have any standing to bring this
judicial review.

See Boundary Backpacke rs et al. v. Boundary

County, 128 Idaho 371 (1996) (unincorp orated associatio n lacked
standing, individua l plaintiff himself had standing) ; Fort Hall
Water Users Ass'n v. United States, 129 Idaho 39
(1996) (associati on lacked standing under statute which required
ownership ); Selkirk-P riest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Batt, 128 Idaho 831 (1996) (standing requires injury in fact that
is not suffered alike by all citizens) ; Compare In re Jerome
County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298 (Idaho 2012) (finding
"associat ional" standing based upon member's ownership of real
estate, issued under the prior statute and its standing
provision , before replaceme nt in 2015 regarding entity status
independe nt from members).
Here, i t is irrelevan t if any of the members (or even any
identifia ble managers) have an interest in real property, as
the entity associati on is separate and distinct from its
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members and managers pursuant to the 2015 statutory enactments.
The prior statutory provision providing for standing of the
association based upon claims held by its members has been
repealed and replaced in 2015.

Standing must be established

for the named Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST, which in this matter
is only the association.

None of the property owner members

are a petitioner in this action (compared to the typical
practice to name the complaining members as parties themselves
to an action).

B.

THE PETITIONER DID NOT TIMELY SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW

1.

The Petition Was Not Filed Within 28 Days

Three statutory provisions apply to the timeliness of
seeking judicial review of the Bonner County Board of County
Commissioner s decision upon the Conditional Use Permit
Application at issue in this action, specifically I.e.§ 676521(d), I.C. § 67-6535(2) (b), and I.C. § 67-5273, which are set
forth above.

The Local Land Use Planning Act contains I.e.§

67-6521(d) and I.C. § 67-6535(2) (b), and the Idaho
Administrati ve Procedure Act contains I.C. § 67-5273.

Each

contain the 28 day statute of limitations for filing a petition
for judicial review, but the language regarding reconsiderati on
or exhausting administrativ e remedies is worded slightly
different in each.

When the statutory provisions are read in
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concert and in light of the applicable case law, it is clear
that the 28 day period is only stayed or tolled by any attempts
to exhaust administrative remedies.

Attempts to exhaust

administrative remedies do not start anew a 28 day appeal
period.
Idaho Code I.e.§ 67-6521(1) (d) provides that an affected
person "may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies
have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review
as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code."

The reference

is to the filing provisions of I.C. 67-5273 which provides that
the petition "must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of
the agency action, except as provided by other provision of
law.

The time for filing a petition for review shall be

extended during the pendency of the petitioner's timely
attempts to exhaust administrative remedies, if the attempts
are clearly not frivolous or repetitious."
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2) (b) provides that "The twenty-eight
(28) day time frame for seeking judicial review is tolled until
the date of the written decision regarding reconsideration or
the expiration of the sixty (60) day reconsideration period,
whichever occurs first."
Idaho Code I.e.§ 67-6521(1) (d) was analyzed in Arthur v.
Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,

(Idaho.Ct.App. 2000) to

determine whether a motion for reconsideration tolled the period
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for judicial review.

It is clear from the language and the

statutory interpretatio n by the Court that the 28 day period
commences to run from the decision letter date of the Board of
County Commissioner s' decision on the application and that any
exhausting of administrativ e remedies tolls (or stays) the 28
day period.

The exhausting of administrativ e remedies does not

reset or restart a new 28 day period.

This means that during

the time between the seeking of reconsiderati on and the decision
on reconsiderat ion, the 28 days does not continue to run, and is
tolled.

The 28 days thence continues to run from the decision

on reconsiderat ion (or from 60 days of inaction on the
reconsiderat ion).

The remaining number of days within which to

file a petition for judicial review is 28 days from that point,
less the number of day which passed prior to the request for
reconsiderat ion.
In this matter, the Board of County Commissione r's decision
on the appeal was issued in the January 14, 2019 letter.

The

request for reconsiderat ion was made on and received by the
Bonner County Planning Department on January 24, 2019, which was
the 10 th day of the 28 day appeal statute of limitations.

The

Board of County Commissione r's decision on the reconsiderati on
was issued in the March 25, 2019 letter, which is the day the 28
appeal period continues to run from.

In this matter, the

Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST only had 18 days remaining within
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which to file its petition for judicial review, which ran on
Friday, April 12, 2019.

The appeal period is only tolled; it is

not terminated by seeking administrativ e remedies and i t does
not run anew from the decision on reconsiderati on.
The earliest attempt by Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST to file
a petition for judicial review was Friday, April 19, 2019, after
the 28 days (as tolled) had expired.

As set forth below, the

actual petition for judicial review was not filed until May 1,
2019, and i t did not relate back to April 19, 2019.

If the

April 19, 2019 attempted filing would have been accepted, it was
untimely.

The May 1, 2019 filing date which was accepted, is

likewise, untimely.

2.

The Petition Filing Does Not Relate Back

The Idaho Court electronic filing system in the District
Court operated under the Rule - Electronic Filing And Electronic
Service, pursuant to the In Re: Order Amending Rule On
Electronic Filing And Service, effective April 30, 2018 (which
was ·replaced by the Idaho Rules For Electronic Filing And
Service, effective July 1, 2019).

During this time period, the

Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST attempted to file a petition for
judicial review on April 19, 2019.
The Rule, part (e)l.A. and B. provide that a document is
not filed until accepted.

The Rule, part (e)4.A. provides that

if a document is not accepted, the system shall notify the filer
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explaining the rejection and request correction and resubmission
by the filer.

The Rule, part (e)4.B. provides for the required

mandatory steps that must be undertaken to resubmit within 3
business days.
As shown by Court's system, on Friday April 19, 2019, at
2:36 p.m. PST, user garyallen@gi venspursley.c om, by Envelope No.
1703359 submitted a document identified as a Petition For
Judicial Review on behalf of CITIZENS AGAINST.

The Clerk of

Court rejected the submittal on Monday April 22, 2019 with
directions for copying the envelope, correcting, and
resubmitting to retain the original filing date, pursuant to the
rule in effect.

Said rejection notice, pursuant to the rule,

was emailed by the system to the filer, user
garyallen@gi venspursley.c om (iCourt filing system).

The

Petitioner's counsel acknowledged receipt of the rejection
notice to the filer user per the Rule.
The submittals by Petitioner in its justification for
failing to follow the 3 day copy and resubmit provision of the
rule do not set forth any grounds to grant relief from the Rule.
Further, the submittals do not support any relief under the
Rule, part (e)S. A., B., or C.

The asserted facts of

unexplained and even undescribed technical problems are wholly
deficient and do not give rise to relief from the Rule.

There

is no showing of any actual steps taken to attempt to file or
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refile after April 19, 2019.
On May 1, 2019, at 12:03 p.m. PST, user
garyallen@ givenspurs ley.com, by iCourt Envelope No. 1716343
submitted a Petition For Judicial Review on behalf of CITIZENS
AGAINST, which was accepted on May 1, 2019 at 1:36 p.m. PST, and
thereby filed on May 1, 2019 (iCourt filing system).

Said

filing is clearly beyond any 28 day period (whether pursuant to
the tolling provision s for exhaustin g administr ative remedies or
28 days running anew from the decision on reconside ration on
March 24, 2019).

C.

THE PETITIONE R FAILED TO SERVE LINSCOTTS (PARTIES TO
THE PROCEEDING) AND THERE IS NO JURISDICTI ON FOR
RELIEF AFFECTING THE LINSCOTTS

As shown of record herein, the Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST
has not (even yet) attempted to serve a copy of the petition for
judicial review on LINSCOTTS (or INTERSTAT E).

Idaho Rule of

Civil Procedure 84(d). Serving the Petition provides that "When
the petition for judicial review is filed, the petitione r must
serve copies

upon the agency whose action will be reviewed

and all other parties to the proceedin g before the agency (if
there were parties to the proceedin g).

Proof of service on the

agency and all parties must be filed with the court as required
by Rule S(e) ." (emphasis added).

The word must is mandatory .

The service is easily accomplis hed, but there has not been
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any attempt to comply, even following the Responden t BONNER
COUNTY raising the issue and the Court indicating that the
defect could be easily cured.

Service is jurisdicti onal and

required to obtain jurisdicti on to grant relief which effects a
party.

The LINSCOTTS are the landowner applicant s granted the

condition al use permit and are parties to the proceedin gs on the
condition al use permit applicatio n.

While failure to take

timely steps in the process for judicial review is not
jurisdicti onal, service is jurisdicti onal, and timelines s would
certainly be unreasona ble after filing a brief in support of
judicial review.

There has been no timely action by the

Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST to serve the LINSCOTTS (who are
Interveno rs who raised the issue by special appearanc e).

The

Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST has had more than sufficien t notice
that service is required and that lack of service was an issue.
As there has been no service, no relief may be granted to
Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST which affects the Interveno r
LINSCOTTS and their real property which received condition al use
permit approval.

D.

THE PETITIONE R DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
ORDINANCE AMENDMENT IN THIS PROCEEDING

The Petitione r CITIZENS AGAINST's first argument is that
the Responden t BONNER COUNTY failed to properly adopt a 2018
Ordinance Amendment authorizin g in Bonner County Revised Code§
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12-336 Resource Based Use Table, "Table 3-6, Batch Plant asphalt and/or concrete" as a conditional use in the Forest (F),
Agricultural /Forestry (A/F), and Rural (R) zones and as a
permitted use in the Industrial (I) zone, and the provision
regarding conditional use which provides in note that "22. A
Batch Plant is conditionall y permitted only within an active
gravel pit."
This proceeding is a judicial review of a site specific
quasi-judici al decision by the Respondent BONNER COUNTY,
pursuant to the specific standing provisions of Idaho Code§ 676521 and§ 67-5279, set forth above.

Idaho Code§ 67-6521 does

not provide standing to the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST (if the
Court otherwise finds the entity has standing) to challenge in
this action a legislative decision regarding amendment of the
zoning code pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-6511 (and the procedure
of Idaho Code§ 67-6509).
In addition, as set forth below, the Petitioner CITIZENS
AGAINST cannot identify any injury to a substantive right

regarding the zoning ordinance amendment.

The Petitioner is in

the same position as the rest of the public in regards to
legislative acts by the Respondent BONNER COUNTY in adopting
ordinances.
In addition, the Intervenor LINSCOTTS join in and support
the arguments made that Bonner County provided proper notice and
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proceedings for the adoption and passage of the amendments by
ordinance.

E.

THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT STANDARDS WERE PROPERLY
APPLIED BY BONNER COUNTY IN APPROVING THE CUP

The Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST's second argument is that
the Respondent BONNER COUNTY failed to properly act pursuant to
the Bonner County Revised Code provisions as amended by the 2018
Ordinance Amendment.

The plain language of Bonner County

Revised Code being challenged by the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST
is the Resource Use Table note requirement that "22. A Batch
Plant is conditionall y permitted only within an active gravel
pit."
The rules of statutory construction have been applied by
Idaho Court's in review of the meaning and interpretatio n of
ordinance provisions adopted by local government.

As summarized

in Boswell v. Steele, 348 P.3d 497, 506 (Idaho.App.C t. 2015).
Such interpretatio n must begin with the literal words of
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as
a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well
established that where statutory language is unambiguous,
legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not
be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature. Id. Only where a
statute is capable of more than one conflicting
construction is i t said to be ambiguous and invoke the
rules of statutory construction . L & W Supply Corp. v.
Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101
(2002). If i t is necessary for this Court to interpret a
statute because an ambiguity exists, then this Court will
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attempt to ascertain legislative intent and, in construing
the statute, may examine the language used, the
reasonablene ss of the proposed interpretatio ns, and the
policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State
Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595
(2000). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous,
construction s / that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored. See Jasso v. Camas County, 151
Idaho 790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).
In addition, as set forth above, there is a strong
presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretatio n of
their own zoning ordinances.

Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board

of Commissioner s, 133 Idaho 833 (1999).
Here, the literal words of the Bonner County Revised Code
provision at issue must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning.
pit."

The provision requires "an active gravel

That language and those words are unambiguous and not

subject to conflicting interpretatio n.

There has been more than

a sufficient showing that the Intervenor LINSCOTTS' real
property is "an active gravel pit."

It is irrelevant and

immaterial to any consideration of those words if the pit has
been referred to as a grandfathere d pit or a legal,
nonconformin g pit, or by some other designation.

The words

control and the only requisite showing is that i t is "an active
gravel pit."

The analysis ends there.

There has not been any record developed as to any status of
the Intervenor LINSCOTTS' gravel pit other than that i t is
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active.

That is all that is required by the Bonner County

Revised Code provisio ns.

That is all that has been submitte d in

support of the applica tion.

For the sake of argumen t, if this

Court finds that the plain and unambigu ous language of the
Bonner County Revised Code provisio n necessi tates somethin g
further, a remand to develop the record as to the aspects of the
pit relevan t under the provisio n would be appropr iate, rather
than an outrigh t reversa l of the approva l of the CUP
applica tion.

Due process would require such a procedu re.

In this instance , the Petition er CITIZENS AGAINST seeks to
rely upon its biased interpre tation and assertio ns based upon
incompl ete records and informa tion i t has generate d, created,
and/or misinte rpreted, which are also irreleva nt to this matter.
The real property in which the batch plant is being located
has continuo usly been operated as a gravel pit for several
decades, commenc ing long before any Bonner County zoning
ordinanc es.

The Petition er CITIZENS AGAINST seeks to argue some

limitati on on the rights of the Interven ors LINSCOTTS to
continue to operate the pit.

The Petition er CITIZENS AGAINST

seek to assert an acreage limitati ons from an aerial photo in
1981 using ordinanc e language regardin g expansio n from an
ordinanc e adopted in 2008 (rather than acreage from 2008).

The

Petition er CITIZENS AGAINST seek to compare a feed lot program
to the operatio n of a gravel pit.
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A gravel pit by its very nature is based upon the
extraction of the resource which does not replenish or regrow.
A gravel pit operation removes the available gravel.
the property is to remove all the gravel.

The use of

A gravel pit is not

reasonably subjected to only being able to remove gravel from a
limited area within the pit, because the gravel, once removed,
does not replenish or regenerate itself (compared to timber
removal or other crop removal, which grow back, for example).
Although not adopted expressly in any case identified in
Idaho, most state Courts have adopted the "doctrine of
diminishing assets" as applicable to gravel pits or other mining
activities upon real property when faced with later enacted
zoning ordinances.

The doctrine was described and applied by

the Supreme Court of Washington in i t decision in City of
University Place v. McGuire, 30 P.3d 453 (Wash. 2001) a copy of
which is attached.

To summarize, under the doctrine, an owner's

pre-existing (legal nonconforming ) mining use extends to the
boundaries of the parcel of land, and is a right vested in the
land, despite subsequent zoning limitations asserted.

This is

because the general principle that a nonconformin g use will be
restricted to its original site does not match the realities of
extractive use such as mining.
If the use of the Intervenor LINSCOTTS' pit is a proper
issue for consideratio n under the ordinance for the placement of
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a batch plant (which as argued above, i t is not), a proper
record needs developed as to the actual and continued use of the
property.

Opponents' unsubstantia ted opinions as to the use of

the property is not an appropriate method of consideration .
Opponents' self-serving and unverified accusations lack proper
foundation and indices of accuracy and reliability.

F.

THE PETITIONER HAS NO CLAIM REGARDING THE OPERATION OF
THE LINSCOTTS' PIT

As shown of record herein, the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST
has made several assertions and arguments regarding the
Intervenor LINSCOTTS operation of the pit.

There are no

provisions in the applicable Bonner County Revised Code relevant
to this conditional use permit application which require the
Intervenor LINSCOTTS to make any showing other that the batch
plant will be located within an active gravel pit.

The only

thing that the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST in their volumes of
documents and assertions can clearly show is that the Intervenor
LINSCOTTS operate an active gravel pit.
The process by Respondent BONNER COUNTY on the application
for a conditional use permit and this petition for judicial
review are not the appropriate forum for a claimed challenge by
neighbors or the Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST, to the Intervenor
LINSCOTTS' operations of their gravel pit.

The approval or

denial of the conditional use permit application does not have
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any bearin g on the Interve nor LINSCOTTS continu ed operati ons of
their gravel pit.

There are no pendin g action s or procee dings

regard ing any of the alleged or fabrica ted "wrong s" regardi ng
the Interve nor LINSCO TTS, or the continu ed operat ion of the pit.
The argume nts and asserti ons in this matter are irrelev ant and
should be disrega rded.

G.

THE PETITIO NER HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY PREJUD ICE TO ITS
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS

As shown of record herein , the Petitio ner CITIZEN S AGAINST
does not own any real proper ty and is asserti ng issues and
claims not within the purview of the condit ional use permit
applic ation and jurisd iction of a petitio n for judici al review.
In additio n, any issues and claims asserte d are all of a
specul ative nature and not based upon actual identi fied
prejud ice to a substa ntial right (of either the entity
associ ation, or its member s identi fied).
The require d showin g that substa ntial rights have been
prejud iced pursua nt to Idaho Code§ 67-527 9(4) was thoroug hly
review ed by the Idaho Suprem e Court in Hawkin s v. Bonnev ille
County Bd. of Com'rs , 151 Idaho 228, 232 (2011), as follow s:
The distri ct court primar ily rested its decisio n to
dismis s Hawkin s' petitio n on the ground s that he had not
asserte d any prejud ice to a substa ntial right. Hawkin s
argues that the Board prejud iced his substa ntial rights in
three genera l ways: (1) the Board, as a matter of law,
misapp lied its varian ce policie s by finding that the Meyers
had a grandf athered right to continu e not comply ing with
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the frontage ordinance ; (2) new housing on the Meyers' land
will generate more traffic across his property, potential ly
exceeding the scope of any easements there and increasing
the risk that his cattle will escape through an open gate;
and (3) emergency vehicles may not be able to reach the
Meyers' property in case of a fire.
The Board responds
that the decision to grant the variances merely allows the
Meyers to continue using the property for dwelling sites as
they always have, and since this does not generate any new
risks or burdens for Hawkins' property, his substanti al
rights have not been prejudice d.
Regardles s of whether the Board erred by granting
variances to the Meyers, Hawkins cannot prevail on his
petition for review unless he shows that the variances
prejudice his substanti al rights.
"The party challengin g
the decision of the Board must not only demonstra te that
the Board erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3)
but must also show that its substanti al rights have been
prejudice d." Kirk-Hugh es Dev., LLC v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557, 237 P.3d 652, 654
(2010) (citing I .C. § 67-5279 (4)).
The petitione r must show both an error under§ 675279(3) and prejudice under§ 67-5279(4 ), but nothing in
the IAPA requires the courts to address these two
requireme nts in any particula r order. This Court may
therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on the
grounds that the petitione r has not shown prejudice to a
substanti al right.
See Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty.
Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235-36, 245 P.3d 983,
987-88 (2010) (upholding a condition al-use permit because
the petitione r failed to challenge the district court's
adverse ruling regarding substanti al rights); Kirk-Hugh es
Dev., 149 Idaho at 558, 237 P.3d at 655 (same).
In other
words, the Court may forego analyzing whether the governing
board erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3) if
the petitione r cannot show that his or her substanti al
rights were violated.
We start by addressin g Hawkins' first argument, which
is that the Board violated his substanti al rights by
substantiv ely misapplyi ng its ordinance s in granting
variances to the Meyers. This Court has not yet attempted
to articulat e any universal rules to govern whether a
petitione r's substanti al rights are being violated under
I.C. § 67-5279(4 ). This, in part, is due to the fact that
each procedura l irregular ity, legal error, and
discretion ary decision is different and can affect the
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petitioner in varying ways. Compare Evans v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 428, 433, 50 P.3d 443, 448 (2002)
(finding no prejudice to substantial rights when a county
board visited a proposed use site without notice), with
Comer v. Cnty. of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 439, 942 P.2d
557, 563 (1997) (vacating a county board's decision when i t
made a site visit without notice).
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties
involved in a land-use decision have a substantial right to
a reasonably fair decision-mak ing process. Governing
boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but
also their interested opponents. Both should expect
proceedings that are free from procedural defects that
might reasonably have affected the final outcome. See
Noble v. Kootenai Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d
1034, 1039-40 (2010) (holding that, even though the county
board disallowed the public from participatin g in a site
visit, doing so did not likely affect the decision); Eacret
v. Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494, 501
(2004) (vacating a county board's decision due to a
commissione r's likely bias). This includes the right for
all interested parties to have a meaningful opportunity to
present evidence to the governing board on salient factual
issues. Cnty. Residents Against Pollution from Septage
Sludge v. Bonner Cnty., 138 Idaho 585, 588-89, 67 P.3d 64,
67-68 (2003); Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002).
These cases align with the overarching due-process
principle that everyone with a statutory interest in the
outcome of a decision is entitled to meaningful notice and
a fair hearing before an impartial decision-mak er. Eacret,
139 Idaho at 787, 86 P.3d at 501; see also Eddins v. City
of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010) ("
[D]ue process rights are substantial rights.").
Accordingly, the Legislature has provided that people who
are affected by land-use proceedings for the most part have
a statutory right to notice and for a chance to participate
in a hearing. E.g. I.e.§ 67-6512(2) (requiring public
notice and hearing for special-use permits); id.§ 67-6515
(planned-uni t developments ); id.§ 67-6516 (variances).
Of course, assuming that a decision is procedurally
fair, applicants for a permit also have a substantial right
in having the governing board properly adjudicate their
applications by applying correct legal standards. Lane
Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175
P.3d 776, 780 (2007); cf. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't
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of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003)
(remanding because the agency misstated the relevant legal
standard and denied an applicatio n to transfer water
rights). Landowner applicant s, however, also have a
substanti al right to develop their own property. Terrazas
v. Blaine Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 198,
207 P.3d 169, 174 (2009).
On the other hand, when a petitione r opposes a
governing board's decision to grant a permit authorizin g
developme nt, as Hawkins has, the petitione r must still
show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his
or her substanti al rights.
I.C. § 67-5279(4 ). Since a
party opposing a landowner 's request for a developme nt
permit has no substanti al right in seeing someone else's
applicatio n adjudicat ed correctly , he or she must therefore
show something more. The petitione r opposing a permit must
be in jeopardy of suffering substanti al harm if the project
goes forward, such as a reduction in the opponent' s land
value or interferen ce with his or her use or ownership of
the land.
See Price v. Payette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs,
131 Idaho 426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998) (vacating a
board decision because i t could impact property value or
the petitione rs' use and enjoyment of their land).
It
would be instructiv e to look to law relating to property
rights, nuisance, and trespass when determinin g if a
substanti al right is at stake in a case such as this.
Thus, regarding Hawkins' first argument, i t is not
enough that Hawkins may be able to show that the County
substantiv ely misapplie d its own ordinance . The Board does
not prejudice Hawkins' substanti al rights merely by
incorrect ly adjudicat ing someone else's applicatio n for a
variance.
Hawkins next argument is that allowing the Meyers to
rebuild the homes on their propertie s will overburde n the
spur road and interfere with Hawkins' ranching activities .
To determine if this would violate Hawkins' substanti al
rights, we begin by evaluating what the Board has allowed
the Meyers to do by granting their variance request. A
variance is:
a modificat ion of the bulk and placement requireme nts
of the ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width,
depth, front yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks,
parking space, height of buildings , or other ordinance
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure
or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the
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size of lots.
I.C. § 67-6516. A variance, in short, merely allows the
landowner to.avoid the "strict letter" of the zoning
ordinance's physical specification s. BCZBO § 1-511(2). When
i t issued the variances in this case, the Board permitted
the Meyers to build dwellings on their properties without
complying with the frontage ordinance.
We acknowledge that i t is possible for the Meyers to
begin using the spur road more often now that they have
variances allowing them to construct new houses. Hawkins,
however, cannot show prejudice to a substantial right
because no court has adjudicated the easement rights the
Meyers might have in the spur road.
People have been
living on the Meyers' land for decades and relying on the
road to reach their homes. There may be an easement across
Hawkins' land benefiting the Meyers' parcels. The fact
that the homes have been uninhabited for several years does
not necessarily terminate an easement, as nonuse alone does
not amount to abandonment- there must be an unequivocal and
intentional act to abandon. Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho
691, 698, 8 P.3d 1234, 1241 (2000), overruled on other
grounds by Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743
(2010). Further, there was evidence produced before the
Board that the spur road may actually be a public right-ofway, in which case Hawkins would have certainly suffered no
harm.
The extent of the Meyers' easement interests are
critical to determining whether the Board prejudiced
Hawkins' substantial rights, but the issue is not before
this Court. This suit is not a civil action, but a
petition for judicial review under the IAPA. Because this
is a petition for judicial review, the parties have neither
litigated the nature of the Meyers' easement rights, nor
would this be the proper setting to do so.
Instead, the
only matter at issue is the propriety of granting variances
to the Meyers.
The Board did not, and indeed could not,
grant the Meyers permission to enter Hawkins' land to use
the spur road or otherwise define the scope of the Meyers'
easement rights.
The Board has no authority to adjudicate
easements.
Hawkins last argues that new dwellings on the Meyers'
land would be a fire hazard to his property because
emergency vehicles may not be able to reach the Meyers'
land. He contends that he, as a neighboring landowner, is
within a specific class of people the frontage ordinance
was intended to benefit. The frontage ordinance
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undou btedly was intend ed to ensure that reside nces are
acces sible from public highw ays. Allow ing the Meyer s to
const ruct new homes , howev er, will not change the numbe r of
struct ures on the land adjoin ing Hawki ns' prope rty. If
anyth ing, demol ishing unatte nded house s and replac ing them
with new homes built to moder n safety codes will reduce the
chance of fire.
Hawki ns has theref ore not shown any
prejud ice to a subst antial right. Witho ut such a showin g,
this Court must affirm the distr ict court 's order
dismi ssing the petiti on for review . I.C. § 67-52 79(4).
The Petiti oner CITIZENS AGAIN ST's argum ent regard ing
prejud ice to a subst antial right is on portio ns of page 23 and
24 of the Memor andum In Suppo rt Of Petiti oner' s Petiti on For
Judic ial Review .

The Petiti oner CITIZE NS AGAINST asser ts

negat ive impac ts to aspec ts of its membe rs real prope rty (not
any real prope rty owned by the entity CITIZE NS AGAINST) based
upon self-s ervin g, conclu sory assert ions.

The assert ions of

impac t to value , air quali ty, quiet enjoym ent, and water
quali ty, were each addre ssed and rebutt ed in the procee ding
and
found to not be prejud iced.

Even accep ting that a "nega tive

impac t" resul ts from the grant of the CUP, that is not the same
as prejud icing a subst antial right.

The assert ions of negati ve

impac ts do not rise to the level of prejud icing a subst antial
right.
The Hawki ns case is contr olling and the Petiti oner CITIZE NS
AGAINST did not make a showin g of prejud ice to a subst antial
right.

Mere allega tions are insuf ficien t.

The Petiti oner

CITIZE NS AGAINST has failed to "show somet hing more" as requir
ed
by the Hawki ns case.

The Petiti oner is not in jeopar dy of
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suffering substantial harm by the operation of a batch plant
pursuant to the conditional use permit with the conditions
attached to it.

There has been no actual showing of a reduction

in the Petitioner's member's land value or interference with the
Petitioner's member's use or ownership of their land.
The Petitioner has failed to make a showing pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4) that there is any prejudice to a
I

substantial right and the decision approving the conditional use
permit should be affirmed.

H.

THE DECISION IS IN WRITING, UPON EXPRESS STANDARDS,
AND UPON A REASONED STATEMENT

Idaho Code§ 67-6535 requires consideration of the
conditional use permit application in this instance to be based
upon express standards and criteria and for a decision to be a
reasoned decision and in writing.

Idaho Code§ 67-6535(3) is

instructive in providing (emphasis added) that:
It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made
pursuant to this chapter should be founded upon sound
reason and practical application of recognized principles
of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the
state are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole
and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant
decisions in light of practical considerations with an
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of
reasoned decision making. Only those whose challenge to a
decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of
fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof,
shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision.
Every final decision rendered concerning a site-specific
land use request shall provide or be accompanied by
notice to the applicant regarding the applicant's righ~
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to request a regulatory taking analysis pursuant to
section 67-8003, Idaho Code.
The above provisions are in line with the Idaho Code 675279(4) requirement that there must be a showing of prejudice to
a substantial right.

As set forth above, the Petitioner

CITIZENS AGAINST has failed to make such a showing.

In

addition, these provisions are consistent with the strong
presumption in favor of the validity of the action taken and the
interpretation made.

I.

THERE IS A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF FAVORING THE VALIDITY
OF THE BOARD'S DECISION IN THE APPLICATION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE COUNTY'S ZONING ORDINANCE

As set forth above in the Hawkins case and in Neighbors for
Preservation of Big

&

Little Creek Cmty. v. Board of County

Comm'rs, 358 P.3d 67, 71 (2015), "There is a strong presumption
that [a] zoning board's actions were valid and that it has
correctly interpreted its own zoning ordinances." (Citing
Hawkins).

There has been no showing by the Petitioner to

overcome the strong presumption.

The Respondent BONNER COUNTY

correctly determined that the Intervenor LINSCOTTS (applicants land owner) and INTERSTATE (lessee) made the requisite show for
approval of the conditional use permit.
Idaho Code§ 67-6512 provides for zoning ordinance
provisions for "special or conditional use permits."

Bonner

County Revised Code, specifically Chapter 2.2 provides for the
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Conditiona1 Use Permits.

The Respondent BONNER COUNTY in the

procedure for and the substantive decision upon the
app1ication, based on the record, conformed to the
requirements , in approving the app1ication.
The Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST has fai1ed to set forth
arguments within the scope of this judicia1 review and upon the
record and proceedings to make a showing pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 67-5279(3) that the approva1 of the conditiona1 use permit
was:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in vio1ation of constitution a1 or statutory
provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon un1awfu1 procedure;
not supported by substantia1 evidence on the record
as a who1e; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The app1icab1e procedure for the processing the conditiona1 use
permit approva1 and the decision approving the conditiona1 use
permit shou1d be affirmed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The approva1 by the Respondent BONNER COUNTY of the
Intervenor LINSCOTTS' Conditiona1 Use Permit app1ication should
be affirmed.

The Petitioner CITIZENS AGAINST 1acks standing,

fai1ed to time1y fi1e for judicia1 review, fai1ed to time1y
serve the app1icant/1an downer, has fai1ed to make the showings
required by Idaho Code§ 67-5279 (1),
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(3), and (4), and has

failed to overcome the strong presumption of favoring the
validity of the actions of zoning boards, which includes the
application and interpretatio n of their own zoning ordinances.
The Petitioner has failed to show prejudice to substantial
rights.

A consideratio n of the proceedings as a whole,

evaluated in light of practical consideratio ns, with an
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of
reasoned decision making, results in the conditional use
permit approval being affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7'fr'-day of November, 2019.

I==

j HNA. FINNEY
Attorney for
LINSCOTTS
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CITY OF UNIVERSITY PLACE, a municipal corporation, organized under the laws of the
State of Washington, Respondent,

v.
Brian P. McGUIRE, a single man, Petitioner.
No. 70356-6.
Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.
September 6, 2001.
Argued May 22, 2001.
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[144 Wn.2d 643] Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, William Theodore Lynn, Margaret Yvonne
Archer, Tacoma, for Petitioner.
Timothy X. Sullivan, University Place, Keating, Bucklin, McCormack, Michael Charles Walter,
Seattle, for Respondent.
CHAMBERS, J.
Developer Brian McGuire seeks to grade a 1.4-acre knoll as fill for a nearby development.
The City of University Place has refused permission. McGuire argues he has a valid
nonconforming use right to mine the knoll, as it is historically part of a site owned and operated by
his predecessor in interest. University Place argues that the nonconforming use either never
accrued to the knoll
Page 455
or, in the alternative, has been abandoned. McGuire urges this Court to adopt the doctrine of
diminishing asset, which extends the boundaries of the nonconforming mining use to the entire
parcel intended to be mined at the time the zoning ordinance was promulgated. We concur with
the overwhelming number of jurisdictions considering the question and conclude the diminishing
asset doctrine is applicable to mining operations. We also conclude University Place has failed to
establish the hearing examiner erred in deciding the nonconforming use had not been abandoned.
We reverse the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The knoll at issue is a 1.4-acre parcel that was once a part [144 Wn.2d 644] of 80 acres of
property owned by the Holroyd Land Company (Holroyd). Since the 1940s, Holroyd has been
gradually and continually mining various portions of this 80 acres of land for sand and gravel.
Pierce County, and later University Place, enacted zoning ordinances that restricted or prohibited
mining, but Holroyd continued to mine as a valid nonconforming use. In 1991, Holroyd sold a
portion of the property to McGuire who has been gradually developing the former Holroyd property
for residential and commercial uses. McGuire seeks to reclaim one former mine in part by grading
the adjacent 1.4-acre knoll to use as fill. University Place denied permission. Since McGuire
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grounds his right to grade the 1.4 acres upon the property's prior nonconforming use as a mine,
we turn to the property's mining history.
Originally Holroyd operated the mine unfettered by zoning ordinances. In 1944, Pierce
County adopted a zoning ordinance covering the Holroyd site that permitted continued
nonconforming uses subject to an abandonment provision. [ 11
In 1955, Pierce County amended Resolution 1650 to permit the operation of "[q]uarries, sand
and gravel pits" in "1-G GENERAL USE DISTRICT[S] ... [o]n sites approved by special permit." In
1956, a Pierce County Commissioner stated at a public hearing that Holroyd could continue to
operate the mines, presumably applying the nonconforming use doctrine. This zoning scheme was
amended in 1957 allowing "[q]uarries, sand and gravel pits" to operate in Holroyd's area only with
special permits. It does not appear Holroyd ever sought a special permit. Holroyd mined the parcel
continuously during this period and until sale, in small portions, occasionally seeking permits from
the Department [144 Wn.2d 645] of Natural Resources (DNR).
In 1970, Washington State enacted the surface mining act (SMA), chapter 78.44 RCW.
Under the SMA, mine owners must obtain surface mining permits from the DNR. The SMA
requires mine owners to file a reclamation plan outlining how the property will be brought to
beneficial use after mining ceases Before a permit will be issued. RCW 78.44.081. While the land
need not be level, steep slopes are discouraged. RCW 78.44.141(4). Mine owners must establish
that they can lawfully mine so, at Holroyd's request, Pierce County informed DNR that Holroyd's
mines were legal nonconforming uses previously established when the zoning ordinance was
promulgated. Holroyd only sporadically sought permits for the various mining projects engaged on
the property and by 1972 had expanded his mines outside the permitted area.
Holroyd did indicate an intent to mine the entire 80 acres in some of the permit applications
by including the property in an attached map. However, the legal description of the area he sought
to mine did not always reference the 1.4-acre knoll at issue today.
In 1973, Bridgeport Way and Anderson Pierce Road were realigned to cut off the
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knoll from the rest of the 80 acres. The 1.4 acres was essentially an island boarded by paved
roads. The 1.4 acres was not mined Before the road was moved and no one has attempted to
mine the 1.4 acres until McGuire sought to level the hill on the parcel for fill.
In 1991, the DNR ordered Holroyd to cease mining outside of the area covered by permits.
Holroyd acknowledged this order, and agreed not to mine outside of the permitted area without
permission. The 1.4-acre knoll was outside the permitted area. In May 1991, Holroyd sold the
property, which is now within the city limits of University Place, to McGuire.
University Place has prohibited all new mining activities. University Place Municipal Code
(UPMC) 18.44.020. Nonconforming uses are allowed to continue, and may be [144 Wn.2d 646]
changed by permit. UPMC 19. 75.070. If the nonconforming use is abandoned for more than one
year, the right is extinguished, unless extended by a hearing examiner. UPMC 19.35.130(0), (J).
McGuire is a property developer, not a miner. He testified his intention was to develop the
property, not to mine it. He purchased the property adjacent to the 1.4 acres contingent upon
University Place approving a shopping center and two residential subdivisions. These
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developments were approved. The required January 1993 Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS) noted McGuire planned to level a hill on the 1.4 acres to provide fill material for the
shopping center. McGuire estimates the 1.4 acres will provide 2,600 cubic yards of fill material.
The 1.4 acres is a treed knoll that provides a buffer from roads and commercial development to
residents. Many residents protested the destruction of the knoll's use as a buffer zone. University
Place denied McGuire's application for a site development permit to remove fill material from the
1.4 acres on the following grounds: (1) the land was zoned residential and mining was
nonpermitted use; (2) mining the site would be an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming
use; and (3) McGuire did not have a DNR reclamation permit to mine the 1.4 acres.
McGuire appealed the denial to a hearing examiner. The hearing examiner reversed the city's
denial of the permit and allowed McGuire to go forward with his construction plan. University Place
appealed to the Pierce County Superior Court. The trial court upheld the hearing examiner, but
granted a stay pending appeal. University Place prevailed Before the Court of Appeals, which
assumed without deciding the diminishing asset doctrine was the law in Washington, but found
Holroyd had abandoned any right to continue a nonconforming use by not indicating objectively an
intention to mine the 1.4 acres. City of Univ. Place v. McGuire, 102 Wash.App. 658, 9 P.3d 918
(2000). McGuire sought review in this Court, which was granted.
[144 Wn.2d 647]ANALYSIS
Review is governed by the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW. To prevail
University Place must establish either the hearing examiner made a mistake of law, that there was
2
insufficient evidence to support the decision, or that the decision was clearly erroneous. [ 1Errors
of law are reviewed de nova. Girton v. City of Seattle, 97 Wash.App. 360, 363, 983 P.2d 1135
(1999), review denied, 140 Wash.2d 1007, 999 P.2d 1259 (2000). Whether the hearing examiner
correctly applied the diminishing asset doctrine to the 1.4 acres will be reviewed to determine if it
was clearly erroneous. Schofield v. Spokane County, 96 Wash.App. 581, 586, 980 P.2d 277
(1999). The decision as a whole will be reviewed for substantial evidence supporting the hearing
examiner's decision. Substantial evidence is " 'a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fairminded person of the truth or correctness of the order.' " City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget
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Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998) (quoting Callecod
v. State Patrol, 84 Wash.App. 663, 673, 929 P.2d 510 (1997)).
[T]he initial burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use is on the land user making the
assertion. However, once a nonconforming use is established, the burden shifts to the party
claiming abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use to prove such. "Whether
abandonment has occurred is a question of fact as to which the municipality has the burden of
proof." This burden of proof is not an easy one.
Van Sant v. City of Everett, .69 Wash.App. 641, 647-48, 849 P.2d 1276 (1993) (citations omitted);
see also 1 Robert M. Anderson, [144 Wn.2d 648] American Law of Zoning§ 6.09 {3d ed.1986). In
short, McGuire bears the burden of establishing a lawful or vested nonconforming use covering
the 1.4 acres under some theory; the burden then shifts to University Place to show the use has
been abandoned.
Page 248

Nonconforming Use
Local governments have the power to promulgate zoning schemes, consistent with the
United States Constitution. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8
L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). "If [the] ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers,
the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional."

Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592, 82 S.Ct. 987. The zoning ordinance must merely be reasonable in light
of the menace faced, the availability and effectiveness of less drastic alternatives, and the loss
faced by the property owner. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-95, 82 S.Ct. 987.
"A nonconforming use is a use which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning
ordinance, and which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance, although it does not
comply with the zoning restrictions applicable to the district in which it is situated." Rhod-A-Zalea &
35th, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 136 Wash.2d 1, 6, 959 P.2d 1024 (1998) (citing 1 Robert M.
Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 6.01 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th ed.1996)). "The policy of
zoning legislation is to phase out a nonconforming use." Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash.2d
312, 323, 501 P.2d 594 (1972). Lawful nonconforming uses are allowed to continue for some
period of time, though the local government may regulate or even terminate the nonconforming
use, subject to constitutional limits. Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wash.2d at 8, 959 P .2d 1024.
Nonconforming uses are not favored, and may be extinguished, either after a period of nonuse or
a reasonable amortization period allowing the owner to recoup [144 Wn.2d 649] on investment. [3]

Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wash.2d at 7, 959 P.2d 1024; see also Choi v. City of Fife, 60 Wash.App.
458, 803 P .2d 1330 (no intent to abandon necessary if zoning scheme allows termination of
nonconforming use rights after use has been unintenti~nally vacated, rather than intentionally
abandoned), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1034, 813 P.2d 583 (1991 ). Under Washington
common law, nonconforming uses may be intensified, but not expanded. See, e.g., Keller v. City
of Bellingham, 92 Wash.2d 726, 731-32, 600 P.2d 1276 (1979).
The hearing examiner concluded Holroyd had a legal nonconforming use right to mine gravel
on his entire acreage. To reach that conclusion, he employed the doctrine of diminishing asset,
concluding it was in accord with Washington law. Accordingly, we turn to the diminishing asset
doctrine to determine if this was error.
Diminishing Asset
Whether Washington State recognizes the doctrine of diminishing asset is a question of first
impression, and will be reviewed de nova. The term likely derives from the amortization calculation
used by accountants to determine the worth of an asset at a particular time whose value will be
exhausted by us--for example, a mine, which
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has a finite useable term as a mine. See generally Edwin Hood et al., Valuation of Closely Held
Business Interests, 65 UMKC L.Rev. 399, 420 (1997). It is especially applicable to mining
operations:
[C]ourts have observed that the very nature of the excavating business contemplates the use of
land as a whole, not a use limited to a portion of the land already excavated. Such a diminishingasset enterprise is "using" all of the land contained in a particular asset; as a ptactical matter it
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must begin digging at one spot and continue from there to the boundary of its land. The entire tract
of [144 Wn.2d 650] a diminishing-assets operation must be regarded as a "lot" within the meaning
of an ordinance which permits a nonconforming use to continue on "such lot," for to hold otherwise
would be to deny the excavator his use.
1 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning§ 6.52, at 604-05 (3d ed.1986) (footnotes
omitted). Most courts that have considered the proper scope of a legal nonconforming mining
activity have adopted the diminishing asset doctrine to protect the owner's expectation for the use
of the land which otherwise would be severely disrupted by a later enacted zoning system. It can
be seen as either an exception to the general principle that a nonconforming use will be restricted
to its original site or as a substantive adaptation of the nonconforming use doctrine to recognize
the realities of extractive industries. The Supreme Court of California observed:
The very nature and use of an extractive business contemplates the continuance of such use of
the entire parcel of land as a whole, without limitation or restriction to the immediate area
excavated at the time the ordinance was passed. A mineral extractive operation is susceptible of
use and has value only in the place where the resources are found, and once the minerals are
extracted it cannot again be used for that purpose. "Quarry property is generally a one-use
property. The rock must be quarried at the site where it exists, or not at all. An absolute
prohibition, therefore, practically amounts to a taking of the property since it denies the owner the
right to engage in the only business for which the land is fitted."

Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 12 Cal.4th 533, 907 P.2d 1324, 1336-37, 48
Cal.Rptr.2d 778 (1996) (quoting Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.App.2d 577, 582, 269 P.2d 81
(1954)).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois held a lawful nonconforming use of land as a mine
could be extended to the boundaries of that parcel of land:
We think that in cases of a diminishing asset the enterprise is "using" all that land which contains
the particular asset and [144 Wn.2d 651] which constitutes an integral part of the operation,
notwithstanding the fact that a particular portion may not yet be under actual excavation. It is in the
very nature of such business that reserve areas be maintained which are left vacant or devoted to
incidental uses until they are needed. Obviously it cannot operate over an entire tract at once.
Du Page County v. Elmhurst Chicago Stone Co., 18 111.2d 479,484, 165 N.E.2d 310, 313 (1960). [
4]
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We agree with the overwhelming number of jurisdictions considering the issue. The proper
scope of a lawful nonconforming use in an exhaustible resource is the whole parcel of land owned
and intended to be used by the owner at the time the zoning ordinance was promulgated. We
therefore adopt the doctrine of diminishing asset to determine the lawful scope of the
nonconforming use in mining operations. We note that potential damage to zoning schemes may
be ameliorated through reasonable amortization periods. We also conclude that Holroyd had a
legal nonconforming use and had a right to mine gravel from the entire acreage, based on the
hearing examiner's findings. Holroyd's right vested in his successor, McGuire. The hearing [144
Wn.2d 652] examiner properly found the entire parcel of land could be mined under the
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5
diminishing asset doctrine. [ ] We conclude that the nonconforming use attached to the entire
parcel owned by Holroyd including the 1.4 acres. The next issue is whether the nonconforming
use has been abandoned. In University Place, if a nonconforming use is "discontinued for more
than one year, the use of the property and structure shall be deemed abandoned and shall
conform to a use permitted in the zone classification in which it is located." UPMC 19.35.130(J)(1 ).
Nonconforming uses are treated like vested property rights, and may not be voided easily. Van
Sant, 69 Wash.App. at 649, 849 P.2d 1276. University Place must establish" '(a) [a]n intention to

abandon; and (b) an overt act, or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner does
not claim or retain any interest in the right to the nonconforming use.'" Id. at 648, 849 P.2d 1276
(quoting BA Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.192 (3d ed.1986) ). This is a question
of fact. Van Sant, 69 Wash.App. at 648, 849 P.2d 1276. Since the hearing examiner found the use
had not been abandoned, University Place bears the burden of showing either "land use decision
is not supported by evidence that is substantial" or the "decision is a clearly erroneous application
of the law to the facts.'' RCW 36.70C.130(c), (d).
We conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing examiner's decision, and
University Place has not demonstrated he misapplied the law of diminishing asset doctrine to the
facts of this case. Evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to McGuire, as "the party
who prevailed in the highest forum that exercised fact-finding authority, a process that necessarily
entails acceptance of the factfinder's views regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given reasonable but competing inferences." State ex rel. Lige & Wm. B. Dickson Co. [144
Wn.2d 653] v. County of Pierce, 65 Wash.App. 614, 618, 829 P.2d 217 (1992). Review is
deferential. Schofield, 96 Wash .App. at 586, 980 P .2d 277.
The fact the parcel was never mined does not reverse the presumption the hearing examiner
correctly decided it was appropriate to mine now as it was part of the original plan for the property.
The fact it was geographically isolated from the main parcel was caused by a government action,
the rerouting of a road, and does not speak to the intention of Holroyd at all. The fact the site was
not included in some of the permits is evidence of intent to abandon. However, the hearing
examiner could have included that this was an inadvertent omission. Finally, the fact the property
6
was sold without mention of mining is potentially evidence of abandonment, but not conclusive. [ ]
There is no act or
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omission that, as a matter of law, is proof of abandonment. See generally 1 Robert M. Anderson,
American Law of Zoning § 6.65 {3d ed.1986).

l

CONCLUSION
We adopt the doctrine of diminishing asset as applied to nonconforming mining operations.
We conclude that the City of University Place has not established the nonconforming use was
abandoned. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order affirming the
order of the hearing examiner.
SMITH, A.C.J., MADSEN, JOHNSON, SANDERS, IRELAND, BRIDGE, OWENS, JJ., and
KURTZ, J. Pro Tern., concur.
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Notes:
[ 1] Resolution 1650 said in relevant part:
1. The lawful use of ... land ... existing at the time of the passage of the resolution establishing any
zoning district, although such use does not conform to the provisions therein, may be continued,
but if such non-conforming use is discontinued for a period of one year, any future use of said ...
land ... shall be in conformity with the provisions of said established use district, unless the use,
thereof, is issued a permit by the Pierce County Commissioners.
Pierce County Zoning Resolution 1650, § 7 (1944 ).
2
[ ] To prevail, University Place must establish one of the following:
(b) The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, after allowing for such
deference as is due the construction of a law by a local jurisdiction with expertise [or];
(c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of
the whole record Before the court; [or]
( d) The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts[.]
RCW 36.70C.130(b)-(d ).
3
[ ] This case does not involve an amortization schedule requiring nonconforming use property
owners to end their use in a reasonable period of time. Such a schedule has been approved in
Washington State. See Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wash.2d at 7, 959 P.2d 1024; accord Teuscher v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 154 Conn. 650, 228 A.2d 518, 522-23 (1967).
4
[ ] See also Stephan & Sons, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 685 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1984); Town
of Wolfeboro v. Smith, 131 N.H. 449, 556 A.2d 755 (1989) (nonconforming use right extends to all
areas manifested an intention to excavate); Moore v. Bridgewater Township, 69 N.J.Super. 1, 173
A.2d 430, 437 (1961) (lawful nonconforming use of diminishing asset extends to the boundaries of
original tract); Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278, 434 N.Y.S.2d 150,414 N.E.2d
651, 654-55 (1980) (holding restricting nonconforming use to the original quarry site the equivalent
of denying the use of the property and thus improper); R.K. Kibblehouse Quarries v. Marlborough

Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 630, 630 A.2d 937, 943 (1993) (finding
constitutional right to continue nonconforming use under due process clause but limiting
expansion to "reasonable restrictions on the extension of a nonconforming use"); Gibbons & Reed
Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329,431 P.2d 559 (1967); Smart v. Dane County Bd. of
Adjustments, 177 Wis.2d 445, 501 N.W.2d 782 (1993); cf. Freda/ v. Forster, 9 Mich.App. 215, 156
N.W.2d 606 (1967) (must balance right to use property as planned against danger to zoning
schemes; land being used can be expanded, but land may not be reserved in anticipation of actual
use); but see Town of Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71 N.E.2d 235 (1947) (limiting lawful
nonconforming loam removal to original site, but expressly not ruling on whether a mine could be
expanded beyond original site); Wende v. Bd. of Adjustment, 27 S.W.3d 162 (Tex.Ct.App.200 0)
(recognizing other states 'nearly unanimous' in adopting diminishing asset doctrine; expressly
reserving judgment as to whether doctrine applies in Texas), review granted April 26, 2001
5
[ ] This case does not afford an opportunity to explore whether a local government could explicitly
not allow the use of the diminishing asset doctrine to define the scope of a nonconforming use.
6
[ ] See, e.g., Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings (Apr. 30, 1999) at 26 (McGuire's attorney
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argued: "He's trying to grade the property. What he doesn't want to have to comply with are city
ordinances that say he has to preserve the trees at the top of the hill. He can't very well preserve
the trees and mine the gravel. That's really what this case is about, in essence.").
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant ("Citizens" or "Petitioner")
submits this reply brief in support of its October 10, 2019 Petition for Judicial Review (the
"Petition") and in reply to the three response briefs filed respectively by Respondent Bonner
County Board of Commissioners (the "County") on November 4, 2019 (the "County's Response"),
Intervenors Frank and Carol Linscott ("Linscotts") on November 7, 2019 (the "Linscotts'
Response"), and Intervenor Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company ("Interstate") on November
7, 2019 ("Interstate's Response"). The County's Response, the Linscotts' Response, and
Interstate's Response are referred to collectively as the "Response Briefs", and the County, the
Linscotts, and Interstate are referred to collectively as "Respondents."
To reduce the burden on the Court, Citizens submit this single briefreplying to each of the
Response Briefs and incorporates the arguments set forth herein in reply to each of the Response
Briefs individually. The detailed statement of the factual and procedural history of this case is set
forth in Citizens' Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review, filed
October 10, 2019 ("Citizens' Opening Brief') at pgs. 6-9 and is incorporated herein by reference. 1
The issues before the Court boil down to whether it was proper for the County to grant
Linscott a CUP for an asphalt plant (the Batch Plant) without considering the legality of the Gravel
Pit in which it would be located. As set forth in Citizens' Opening Brief, it was unlawful because
the Amendment to the Ordinance is unlawful and because it fails to comply with the Ordinance by
not considering the numerous ways the Gravel Pit violates the non-conforming use provisions of
the Ordinance. The Respondents now raise both procedural arguments that the Citizens' arguments

1

Unless otherwise indicated, defined terms used in this brief have the same meanings as in Citizens' Opening Brief,
which is hereby incorporated by reference.
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are not properly before the Court and substantive arguments that the Decision and CUP were
proper. Nothing in the Response Briefs changes the analysis that the Decision should be set aside.
II.

A.

ARGUMENT

Citizens are properly before this Court and have standing to challenge the Decision.
Both Linscotts and Interstate challenge Citizens' standing to bring this Judicial Review.

Linscotts' Response at 14, section V.A.; Interstate's Response at 14-15. The Linscotts then go one
step further to re-assert arguments already disposed ofby this Court that the Citizens did not timely
seek judicial review and that the Citizens fatally failed to serve the Linscotts with the initial
Petition. In fact, Citizens are a proper party before this Court with standing to Challenge the
Decision, and-as already decided by this Court-timely filed their Petition and served it upon all
necessary parties.
1.

The Citizens have standing to challenge the Decision.

In challenging the standing of the Citizens, the Linscotts and Interstate ignore clear and
unchallenged authority. Their arguments lack any legal foundation.
As a preliminary matter, the Linscotts repeatedly make assertions related to the purpose of
statutory provisions without citing any legal support for such opinions. For example, the Linscotts
baldly assert that the "new code provisions regarding unincorporated nonprofit associations moved
the statutory framework from that of partnership to that of an entity." Linscotts' Response at 14.
It cites nothing to support its proclamation oflegislative intent. Linscotts' Response at 14. It further

states that the "2015 statutory enactments repealed and wholly replaced those provisions with the
entity form, including as applicable to standing[,]" yet the new and current statute says nothing at
all about standing. See LC. § 30-27-101 et seq. The Court should ignore every legal assertion in
the Response Briefs that is not supported by authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229
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P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) ("We will not consider an issue not supported by argument and authority
in the opening brief."2 (internal quotation omitted)).
The Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") provides Citizens standing to maintain this
lawsuit. Under LLUP A, a party has standing to seek judicial review if the party is an "affected
person aggrieved by a final decision .... " Neighbors for Pres. of Big & Little Creek Cmty. v. Bd.
ofCnty. Comm 'rs of Payette Cnty., 159 Idaho 182,187,358 P.3d 67, 72 (2015) (citing LC.§ 67-

6521 ). An "affected person" in tum, is a person having a "bona fide interest in real property which
may be adversely affected by: (i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon a[] .... special use
permit and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter" like the
CUP at issue here. LC. § 67-6521(1)(a). Citizens have standing under LLUPA because, as an
entity, it has a bona fide interest in real property that may be adversely affected by the County's
erroneously issued CUP and the Decision upholding it.
(a)

Citizens, as an entity, has a bona fide interest in the real property owned by
its members.

The standing of unincorporated nonprofit associations, like Citizens, is determined using
principles of associational standing, which means that Citizens have standing because one or more
of its members would have individual standing. Both the Linscotts and Interstate argue that the
passage of Idaho Code section 30-27-105 somehow robs Citizens of their associational standing
because Citizens is treated as an entity distinct from its members. They are wrong. Just as nonprofit
corporations-entities distinct from their members that sue and are sued in their own namesbenefit from associational standing, so too do unincorporated nonprofit associations like Citizens.

2

This analysis is applicable here because this proceeding is governed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. I.R.C.P. 84(p)
(noting that briefs and memoranda must be in the form and arrangement provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules). And
while the court in Bach case described an opening brief, the Appellate Rules contain the same requirement that
response briefs be supported by authority so the reasoning applies equally. I.A.R. 35(b)(6).
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The Linscotts and Interstate fail to cite case law for their unsubstantiated assertion, but clear Idaho
precedent defeats their position.
Standing is a judicial doctrine, and "Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based federal
justiciability standard" which encompasses the doctrine of associational standing. Zeyen v.
Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25,451 P.3d 25, 32-33 (Idaho 2019) (noting incorporation of

federal standing standards); Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053,
1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing associational standing). Under the associational standing doctrine,
"prudential standing exists for nonprofit corporations to file actions based on injuries associated
with their members." Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc., 368 F.3d at 1059.
For this reason, in Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus (127 Idaho 239,
899 P.2d 949 (1995)), the Idaho Supreme Court determined that "principles of associational
standing" applied to the environmental groups who were parties to the appeal. 127 Idaho at 241,
899 P.2d at 951. That meant that the question of standing depended "on whether either the
environmental groups or the members of the environmental groups" had a sufficient interest. Id.,
127 Idaho at 242, 899 P.2d at 952 (emphases added). Those groups were fully incorporated
nonprofit associations, governed by the now-repealed Idaho Code section§ 30-3-1 et seq. Id., 127
Idaho at 239, 899 P.2d at 949 (noting in the caption that Selkirk-Priest Basin Association, Inc., and
the Idaho Environmental Council were both Idaho non-profit corporations). 3

3
To the extent further evidence of their status is needed, Citizens request the Court take judicial notice of the records
of the Idaho Secretary of State pursuant to I.R.E. 201 which indicate the groups' statuses as incorporated entities.
Those records can be found by searching for the entities in question on the Idaho Secretary of State's business search
tool at https :// sosbiz. idaho .gov/search/business.
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The same conclusion was reached in In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs (153 Idaho 298,
308,281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012))-where the Idaho Supreme Court applied associational standing
principles to incorporated nonprofit corporations, entities distinct from their members. 4
What the passage of the new nonprofit association law did was say what the nonprofit
corporation laws have said all along: the nonprofit entity is distinct from its members and can sue
and be sued in its own name. Associational standing principles have always applied to nonprofit
corporations, and continue to apply to unincorporated nonprofit associations under the new statute.
(b)

Citizens' bona fide interest in real property may be adversely affected by
the CUP and Decision, conferring standing to maintain this action.

Interstate alleges that Citizens lack standing because they have only alleged the possibility
of harm or the invasion of a fundamental right of its members. Interstate's Response at 14. In
support of its assertion, Interstate relies upon Idaho Code section 67-6535(3), which provides that
"[ o]nly those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental
rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision[.]"
This is a misstatement of the law and Interstate has either not read the controlling authority
or has ignored the parts thereof that do not support its position. The Idaho Supreme Court has
directly considered the precise language quoted by Interstate in the context of a standing challenge
and determined that the quoted language "cannot be construed as a standing requirement." Evans
v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). 5 The Court went on to dictate that "[t]he
existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision." Id.

4

The Linscotts cite the In re Jerome County case as authority for the proposition that incorporated entities are to be
treated differently from unincorporated nonprofit associations. In re Jerome County says nothing of the sort. See 153
Idaho at 308, 281 P.3d at 1086.
5

Note that the Court here was interpreting a former version of I.C. § 67-6535, but the language discussed here was
precisely the same as it is now, it was just found in subsection (c) as opposed to subsection (3).
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The existence of real or potential harm is the standard set forth by Citizens in their Opening
Brief (pg. 24 ). Citizens have proven the existence of real or potential harm to many, if not all, of
its members. Citizens' Opening Brief at 23-24. Far from merely alleging harm "of a general
nature, not particular to any individual member or his/her property" as alleged by Interstate
(Interstate' s Response at 14), Citizens pointed to specific harm suffered by specific members who
own real property immediately adjacent to or within a mile of the proposed plant. Citizens'
Opening Brief at 28. Citizens have pointed to specific record citations that support that the
Decision negatively impacts: the value of Citizens' members' real property; the air quality of that
real property; the right to quietly enjoy that real property; and the water quality of that real
property. Citizens' Opening Brief at 28. The specific record citations provided by citizens contain
direct and credible evidence of the potential harms alleged.
Interstate, on the other hand, makes factual assertions with no citation to the record at all.
Interstate' s Response at 14-15. Without any citation, Interstate alleges that the threat to water
quality "was proven false through testimony ofinterstate's hydrogeologist and not rebutted by the
Water District or any evidence presented by the public." Interstate's Response at 14-15. Again, as
much as Interstate may not want to direct the Court to relevant authority, its argument must
"contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to the ... parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R.
35(b)(6). Because Interstate failed to cite to the parts of the record on which it relies, this Court
cannot consider Interstate's assertion at all. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152.
Therefore, Citizens have demonstrated a bona fide interest in real property that may be
affected by the CUP and Decision. They have standing to pursue this Petition.
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B.

The other procedural issues the Linscotts raise provide no grounds to deny Citizens'
Petition and have already been decided by this Court.

In addition to raising improper standing challenges, the Linscotts attempt to re-litigate
procedural issues that have already been conclusively decided by this Court. They attempt to raise
from the dead contentions that Citizens failed to timely file their Petition and that it was fatal for
the Citizens to not serve the Petition upon the Linscotts. The Linscotts are wrong in both regards.
1.

As already decided by this Court, the Citizens timely filed their Petition under
the applicable rules.

The Linscotts raise two arguments regarding the timeliness of Citizens' Petition: First, they
incorrectly assert that the time between the initial agency decision and the motion for
reconsideration of the same counts toward the twenty-eight-day time period to file a petition for
judicial review (Linscott's Response at 18-21); and second the Linscotts incorrectly re-raise the
assertion that the errors in the electronic filing system should work against Citizens. Neither
assertion holds water.
(a)

The twenty-eight-day period for Citizens to file their Petition is measured
from the date all administrative remedies have been exhausted, not from the
date of the original agency action.

Idaho Code section§ 67-6521(1)(d) is clear and unambiguous and provides a party twentyeight (28) days after administrative remedies have been exhausted to seek judicial review. The
Court need look no further, and the Linscotts ignore this unambiguous statutory language in an
attempt to muddy the waters.
Idaho Code section 67-6521(1)(d) provides: "An affected person aggrieved by a final
decision concerning matters identified in section 67-6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twentyeight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial

review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d) (emphasis added).
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The Bonner County Revised Code is the local ordinance here that sets procedures for
exhausting administrative remedies. Bonner County Revised Code section 12-263.A requires
persons affected by Board decisions to seek reconsideration before they can seek judicial review,
and notes that a failure to seek reconsideration is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Bonner County Revised Code ("BCRC") § 12-263.A. So Citizens did not exhaust their
administrative remedies until they were denied reconsideration, and thus, by the plain language of
section 67-6521 (1 )(d), the twenty-eight day period to seek judicial review began running after
Citizens' motion for reconsideration was denied. To find otherwise would require ignoring plain
and unambiguous statutory language.

Arthur v. Shoshone County (133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 617 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000)) affirms
that Citizens' Petition was timely. In Arthur, the Idaho Court of Appeals made clear that the
twenty-eight day period to seek judicial review under section 67-6521(1)(d) beings running after
a petitioner exhausts his administrative remedies under local ordinances. 133 Idaho at 859-60, 993
P.2d at 622-23. In Arthur, there was no local ordinance that required Arthur to move for
reconsideration, but in this case there is: Bonner County Code 12-263.A. Because Citizens' timely
complied with its requirement to seek reconsideration, the twenty-eight day period for it to seek
judicial review did not begin running until the decision on that reconsideration came down.
Citizens' Petition was timely.
The Linscotts erroneously cite Arthur for the proposition that section 67-6521(1)(d)
incorporates IDAPA's judicial review time limits, meaning that the time limit begins running from
the date of the initial decision, regardless of whether reconsideration is sought. The Linscotts are
wrong, and their assertion is misstatement of both the holding of Arthur and the plain language of
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LLUPA and IDAPA. Linscotts' Response at 20. 6 Arthur holds that the tolling provisions ofIDAP A
do not apply to judicial review sought under LLUPA, precisely the opposite of what the Linscotts
cite it for. 7
The Linscotts similarly misstate IDAP A. Contrary to the Linscotts' argument, it does not
modify the clear and specific time frame established by section 67-6521(1)(d). Rather, IDAPA
provides that its paradigms for judicial review govern "unless other provision of law is applicable
to the particular matter." I.C. § 67-5270(1) (emphasis added). Here, another provision oflaw is
applicable to the time frame for seeking judicial review under LLUPA: Section 67-6521(1)(d). So
by its own language, IDAPA's provisions on the timing of judicial review simply do not apply to
this case. 8 Arthur confirms that IDAPA's timing provisions do not apply to LLUPA. Arthur, 133
Idaho at 859-60, 993 P.2d at 622-23.

6

In addition to their argument being directly refuted by statute and case law the Linscotts again make claims they do
not even attempt to back up with citation. They claim that section 67-6521(1)(d)'s reference to chapter 52, title 67 is
to section 67-5273 specifically. But they provide no reason nor argument why that reference does not point to other
parts of chapter 52, title 67 dealing with judicial review such as section§ 67-5272 (dealing with venue and the form
ofaction), 67-5274 (stay), 67-5275 (agency record), or§ 67-5279 (scope ofreview and type ofrelief). Arthur supports
this latter interpretation.
7

For the Court's convenience, a more complete description of Arthur is as follows. In Arthur, the petitioner, Arthur,
sought a conditional use permit from Shoshone County, but it was denied, leading Arthur to appeal to the board of
county commissioners, which upheld the denial. 133 Idaho at 855, 993 P.2d at 618. Arthur then filed a motion for
reconsideration in front of the board, but no local ordinance provided for reconsideration, and the board was without
authority to reconsider its decision. Id. (see n. I). He waited more than twenty-eight days from the initial decision and
filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that it was timely because provisions of IDAPA ( specifically section 675246(4) and (5)) authorized reconsideration which tolled the twenty-eight day period set forth by section 676521(1)(d). Id. The Idaho Supreme Court found Arthur's petition untimely, holding that the time limits for judicial
review and tolling provisions ofIDAPA did not apply to cases brought under LLUPA. Id., 133 Idaho at 859-60, 993
P.2d at 622-23. Instead, the time limit for Arthur's LLUPA case was controlled by section 67-6521(1)(d), meaning
that Arthur's petition should have been filed within twenty-eight days after the exhaustion of Arthur's administrative
remedies. Because the local ordinances at issue did not allow for reconsideration, Arthur had exhausted his
administrative remedies when the board issued its decision, and that exhaustion of remedies began the twenty-eight
day period. Id.
8

Even if I.C. § 67-5273 did apply, the Linscotts ignore subsection (2) thereof which provides that the deadline to
petition for judicial review, "ifreconsideration is sought, [is] within twenty-eight (28) days after the service date of
the decision thereon."
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The time frame for Citizens to seek judicial review is clearly and unambiguously set by
section 67-6521(1)(d): twenty-eight days after administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Citizens met that deadline here.
(b)

As already decided by this Court, the errors in filing the Petition in this case
are attributable to iCourt and to Citizens, and the Petition was timely filed.

In re-raising the issues with the iCourt system as they relate to timeliness, the Linscotts do
not present any argument or authority not already considered and addressed by this Court in the
County's previously filed Motion to Dismiss. Rather than simply repeat the arguments as the
Linscotts have done, Citizens hereby incorporate the entirety of their Opposition to Bonner
County's Motion to Dismiss, filed May 30, 2019, as well as the surrounding documents.
For the reasons previously provided by Citizens, this Court should reach the same
conclusion as it did in its Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss, filed July 26, 2019, and find
that nothing surrounding the procedural filing of the Petition warrants denying Citizens the relief
they seek.
2.

Citizens timely served all necessary parties.

The Linscotts assert that relief cannot be granted which affects them because they were not
served with the Petition. In raising that argument, the Linscotts cite only Rule 84( d) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. And as has been the Linscotts' pattern throughout their Response, they
misstate the law, and omit relevant authority directly contrary to their incorrect assertion.
The Linscotts state, without citation to authority, that "[ s]ervice is jurisdictional and
required to obtain jurisdiction to grant relief which effects [sic] a party." Linscotts' Response at
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24. That is a misstatement of the law and directly contradicted by the plain language of Rule 84(n)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 Rule 84(n) provides:
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed by statute
and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic dismissal of the petition
for judicial review on motion of any party, or on initiative of the district court.
Failure of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review
[like service under Rule 84(d)] will not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be
grounds only for such other action or sanction as the district court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the petition for review.
I.R.C.P. 84(n) (emphasis added).
So even if Citizens had been required to serve Linscotts-there is no such requirementany failure to do so is expressly not jurisdictional. The remedy would be actions or sanctions the
Court deems appropriate. No action or sanctions would be appropriate for any alleged failure to
serve here because there is no prejudice to the Linscotts. The Linscotts do not allege any prejudice,
and it would be hard to see how they could given that they were afforded the full amount of time
under the relevant rules to consider and respond to Citizens' Opening Brief. In any event, Citizens
were not required to serve the Linscotts as was previously briefed by Citizens.
C.

The Decision was improper and nothing in the Response Briefs mandates a decision
otherwise.

As Citizens raised in their Opening brief, the Decision is improper because the CUP was
not lawfully issued. Nothing in the Response Briefs defeats the arguments that the Decision failed
to comply with the Ordinance and prejudices the substantial rights of Citizens. Citizens are
therefore entitled to the relief they seek.

9

Even if the Linscotts' assertion were not legally unsound, this Court could not consider it because the Linscott's
failed to support it with authority or substantive argument. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152.
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1.

Citizens may argue the invalidity of Ordinance 557 in demonstrating the
Decision is in error.

Respondents do not challenge the merits of the argument that Ordinance 557 is invalid
because it did not contain a "summary of the plan to be discussed" in violation of Idaho Code
Section 67-6509(a). See generally Response Briefs; and see Jerome Cnty. By & Through Bd. of
Comm'rs for Jerome Cnty., State of Idaho v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 684, 799 P.2d 969, 972
(1990) (holding that a material failure to contain a summary of a plan to be discussed invalidated
an ordinance). Such a summary would have put the public on notice that an asphalt batch plants
could be conditionally permitted outside the industrial zone in an "active gravel pit", allowing for
public debate on that proposal. The failure to have that debate led to the disputes that are the heart
this case.
Rather than address the merits, the County and Interstate assert Citizens are barred from
challenging the validity of Ordinance 557. Respondents mistakenly rely on Idaho Code section 676521 for this argument. The fundamental flaw in the argument is Respondents wrongly assume
Citizens are asking the Court to overturn the ordinance. This is not so. 10 Rather, Citizens are asking
the Court to determine that the County's approval of the Application was improper because it
relied on a void ordinance in doing so. This improper application of law violated Idaho Code
Section§ 67-5279(3) (incorporated into LLUPA by Idaho Code Section 67-6521(1)(d) and Idaho
Code Section§ 67-6535(1)). Under Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3), a land use decision may be
overturned if it is "in excess of the agency's statutory authority" or "in violation of constitutional

10

Citizens would have brought a declaratory judgment action if that was their intent. See, e.g. Jerome County, 118
Idaho at 685, 799 P .2d at 973 (distinguishing a LLUP A action challenging a use permit from a declaratory relief action
seeking invalidation of an ordinance); Foster v. St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 888, 841 P.2d 413, 418 (1992) (citing
Jerome County to hold the same). Further, Euclid Avenue may prohibit combining a declaratory action and this one.
Euclid Ave. Tr. v. Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853,856 (2008) ("Thus, we are constrained to hold that actions
seeking civil damages or declaratory relief may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under IDAP A.").
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or statutory provisions". A decision that relies on a void ordinance is also void. See, e.g., Hillman
v. Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69, 72, 256 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1953) ("The ordinance when passed being

void, it remains void, and it cannot be given life or effect by acts or conduct of appellant ... There
being no authority for the enactment of the ordinance in question, it never had and does not now
have any validity."). 11 Idaho Code Section 67-6535(1) states, in pertinent part, "The approval or
denial of any application ... shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in
the ... zoning ordinance ... of the ... county." A decision based on a void ordinance violates this
provision because a void ordinance is not one of the "standards and criteria" in the zoning
ordinance. Both of these authorities allow the court to assess what ordinances are properly applied
to the Application, without having to rule directly to void the ordinance itself.
The County further argues that any challenge to Ordinance 557 is barred because it was
not challenged within twenty-eight days under LLUPA. County's Response at 9. This assertion,
which contradicts the County's position in the same section that LLUP A does not apply to an
ordinance challenge, lacks any authority under law. LLUP A only allows challenges to certain
permitting and rezoning actions, as follows:
( 1)(a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean one having a bona fide interest
in real property which may be adversely affected by:
(i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a
subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter;
(ii) The approval of an ordinance first establishing a zoning district upon
annexation or the approval or denial of an application to change the zoning
district applicable to specific parcels or sites pursuant to section 67-6511,
Idaho Code; or

11

Hillman was disagreed with by Alexander v. Trustees of Vil!. of Middleton (92 Idaho 823, 827, 452 P.2d 50, 54
(1969)) on unrelated grounds. The disagreement came from the imposition of equitable estoppel as a defense.
Alexander, 92 Idaho at 827,452 P.2d at 54.
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(iii) An approval or denial of an application for conditional rezoning
pursuant to section§ 67-651 lA, Idaho Code.
Idaho Code 67-6521(1)(a).
The adoption of a zoning ordinance of general applicability is not included, and numerous
Idaho cases support this conclusion. See, e.g., Highlands Dev. Corp. v. Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 961,
188 P.3d 900, 903 (2008); Burt v. Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 68, 665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983).
Further, an unlawfully adopted ordinance is always void, whenever it is challenged. Jerome Cnty.,
118 Idaho at 684, 799 P.2d at 972 (upholding district court's holding that ordinance was void even
if challenged years later); Hillman, 74 Idaho at 72, 256 P.2d at 1073 ("The ordinance when passed
being void, it remains void .... "). The County's arguments to the contrary are completely circular,
relying on LLUPA and related case law, which plainly does not apply. The County acknowledges
that local ordinances with substantive defects, like inconsistency with state law but presumably
also constitutional defects, may always be challenged. County's Response at 9. The County tries
to distinguish procedural defects, such as lack of notice, saying it would be "radical" to allow such
ordinances to be challenged after LLUPA's twenty-eight-day clock has run. The County cites no
authority for its position, and cannot, as LLUP A expressly does not apply and Jerome Cnty. and a
great deal of other authority expressly permits ordinance challenges outside of LLUPA's judicial
review framework. See, e.g., LC. § 67-6521(1)(a); Jerome Cnty, 118 Idaho at 684, 799 P.2d at
972; Foster v. St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 888, 841 P.2d 413,418 (1992); State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho
584, 587, 798 P.2d 43, 46 (1990) (discussing challenging a criminal ordinance as too vague to be
enforceable); Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 207, 657 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1983) (challenging an
ordinance on the grounds it prohibited lawful business).
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Finally, Interstate argues that Citizens failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. As
LLUPA's judicial review provisions do not apply, there are no administrative remedies to exhaust.
LC. § 67-6521(1)(a).
2.

The County erred by failing to address the legality of the Gravel Pit.

BCRC section 12-336 states that "[a] batch plant is conditionally permitted [in the R-5
zone] only in association with an active gravel pit." The County initially interpreted the ordinance
in the context of the Gravel Pit as meaning "[ t]his condition is satisfied as the proposal will occur
within an active legal non-conforming gravel pit". (R. at 1002.) Confronted with overwhelming
evidence it is not, the County changed its tune and in the final decision interpreted the ordinance
only to require that the pit be in operation. The question is whether the County's most recent
interpretation is "reasonable." Lane Ranch P'ship v. Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776,
780 (2007); Wohrle v. Kootenai Cnty., 147 Idaho 267, 274, 207 P.3d 998, 1005 (2009).
Furthermore, the County cannot cherry-pick a single provision in the ordinance. The interpretation
must be consistent with other provisions in the ordinance and with the ordinance as a whole. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 87, 356 P.3d 377, 380 (2015) ("The

Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void,
superfluous, or redundant.").
The County's interpretation is neither reasonable nor is it consistent with other provisions
of the County's zoning ordinance. BCRC Section 12-130.A. states "[t]he planning director shall
not issue a permit unless the intended uses of the buildings and land conform in all respects with
the provisions of this title." This is a straightforward requirement that an applicant needs to be in
compliance with the law to get a permit. The County and Interstate both argue this section applies
only to the Batch Plant and not to the Gravel Pit. That interpretation is unreasonable. This would
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allow an applicant to dig an illegal gravel pit and get a permit for an asphalt plant as long as the
County turns a blind eye to the illegal gravel pit, as it has done here. It is akin to saying an applicant
is entitled to a liquor license if he complies with the liquor laws, even if he is doing so within an
illegal house of ill-repute.
Sandwiched around this argument is a lot of irrelevant nonsense that requiring a showing
that the Gravel Pit is a legal, nonconforming use (the County's original interpretation) violates the
applicant's due process rights, and is trying to "shoehorn" a civil or criminal enforcement action
into the permitting process. This is not an enforcement action and Citizens do not argue the Gravel
Pit can be shut down as part of this permitting action. That would require a separate enforcement
action that the County should, but has not, undertaken, despite citizen complaints. None of this
takes away from the real point, which is the only reasonable interpretation of sections 12-336(22)
and 12-130.A., read together, is the Gravel Pit has to be in compliance with law, not just the asphalt
plant.
The County also argues, in so many words, that Linscott was not put on notice it needed to
provide evidence of the Gravel Pit's compliance with law. If that is the case, and Citizens think it
is dubious, then it is the County's problem and not Citizens'. The only evidence in the record is
that the Gravel Pit violates the law. The County was required to make its decision on that record.
LC. § 67-6535(2).

Finally, the County asserts the "plain meaning" of "active" mandates its interpretation. This
argument fails for two reasons. First, the County itself interpreted this section to require the
nonconforming Gravel Pit be lawful, before it changed its mind on reconsideration. Second, the
word active must be read in the context of the whole ordinance, including the provision stating
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"the intended uses of the buildings and land [must] conform in all respects with the provisions of
this title."
Interstate attempts to argue that Baxter and the associated cases cited by Citizens are
distinguishable because the Asphalt Plant need only be situated on an active gravel mine to be
proper. Interstate' s Response at 13. Interstate appears to claim that where a use is permitted by the
zoning ordinance outright, that use is approved "without regard to any nonconfirming [sic] use
standard." Interstate' s Response at 13. Interstate' s argument is simply irrelevant to the instant
analysis, because neither an asphalt plant nor a gravel pit are permitted outright. 12 Instead, an
asphalt plant must be tied to an active gravel pit to be conditionally permitted, and a gravel pit is
not permitted outright, but rather only in certain districts and under certain conditions. BCRC §
12-336, Table 3-6.
The Linscotts' argument regarding the inapplicable doctrine of diminishing assets fares no
better. The Linscotts acknowledge that the doctrine is not the law in Idaho. 13 Linscotts' Response
at 29. But what they ignore is that such a doctrine could not apply in this case, as it would run
contrary to both Bonner County ordinances and to Idaho's settled precedent such as Baxter and its
progeny. It may very well be the case in Washington state that a nonconforming use may become
vested and defeat a subsequent zoning limitation. So what? Unfortunately for the Respondents,
this is an Idaho case involving property in Idaho, and in Idaho, Baxter v. Preston, 14 provides clear

12

Even iflnterstate's assertion were not legally unsound, this Court could not consider it because Interstate failed to
support it with authority or substantive argument. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P .3d at 1152.
13

The Linscotts also assert without authority that "most states" have adopted this doctrine, despite citing a single state
court case from Washington. Because the Linscotts have again failed to support an assertion with authority, this Court
cannot consider the argument. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152.
14

115 Idaho 607, 768 P.2d 1340 (1989).
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authority for the County to restrict the enlargement, expansion, extension or alteration of a
nonconforming use as discussed in Citizens' Opening Brief (pg. 20).
3.

Placement of a batch plant in a non-conforming gravel pit constitutes the
unlawful expansion of the non-conforming use.

The County argues the Batch Plant is a separate use from the Gravel Pit and therefore the
non-conforming use rules prohibiting expansion and enlargement do not apply. This is inconsistent
with both the batch plant ordinance and the nonconforming use ordinance. The batch plant rule
requires the Batch Plant must be "associated with" the Gravel Pit, indicating more than a "physical
relationship". The impacts of the two uses are in no way separate. Imagine a grandfathered gravel
pit in the middle of a city residential neighborhood. Based on the nonconforming use ordinance,
the residents there have a right to expect that the use, and its impacts, will not be expanded or
enlarged. It is unreasonable to allow other uses to be tacked on that have the effect of increasing
the impact of the nonconforming use. The batch plant section of the Ordinance must be read in
context with the nonconforming use sections, which are very strict in prohibiting uses from being
"extended", "altered", "enlarged" or "increased". The County's interpretation completely ignores
the application of that language.
The County cites a number of technical differences between how gravel pits and batch
plants are regulated in the Ordinance. None of this matters, because the Ordinance requires the
Batch Plant be "associated with" the Gravel Pit, thus bringing all the impacts along with it.
Therefore, the Batch Plant and Gravel Pit create an unlawful expansion of a non-conforming use.
The Decision was therefore improper.
4.

Citizens have demonstrated prejudice to its substantial rights.

Despite devoting approximately five (5) pages of their Response to Hawkins v. Bonneville
Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs (151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011)), the Linscotts
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fundamentally misunderstand that case. Where a party opposes a decision to grant a permit-like
Citizens do here-that party must "show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or
her substantial rights." 151 Idaho at 233,254 P.3d at 1229 (citing LC.§ 67-5279(4)). The Citizens
have done so here.
The Linscotts assert that Citizens have not demonstrated prejudice to their substantial rights
because the issues and claims asserted "are all of a speculative nature and not based upon actual
identified prejudice to a substantial right (of either the entity association, or its members
identified)." Linscotts' Response at 31. That a prejudice to substantial rights has not materialized
does not defeat a petition for judicial review. All prospective harms require some projection of the
future, and are in that respect speculative, which is why Hawkins deemed it sufficient to show
"potential prejudice" to substantial rights. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229.
As examples of the kind of "potential" harm that could suffice, the Hawkins Court pointed
to the possibility of "a reduction in the opponent's [of the permit] land value or interference with
his or her use or ownership of the land" if the project goes forward. Id. (citing Price v. Payette
Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998)). Citizens have

demonstrated the potential for both of these harms and others should the project go forward.
Citizens' Opening Brief at 24. Citizens, unlike the Linscotts, pointed to specific and credible
evidence in the record supporting their assertions.
For example, at Record pages 1025 and 1060 (as well as the exhibits referenced on those
pages), Citizens discuss specific studies and historical data demonstrating that property values
drop within one mile of asphalt plants (as already demonstrated, a large number of Citizens'
members own property within one mile of the site in question). Citizens also demonstrated a
potential harm to air quality on its members' real property which could harm the health of those
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members. Citizens' Opening Brief at 24. Specific evidence in the record supports their points. (R.
at 1025 (Exh. 1, subtitle 7); R. at 1028; R. at 1046-1051.) Citizens demonstrated similar potential
harms to their ability to quietly enjoy their property due to nuisances like noise, vibrations, odors,
glare and impacts to water quality. Citizens' Opening Brief at 24. All of Citizens' claims with
regard to harm have been accompanied by citations to credible evidence in the record.
The above sorts of harms, nuisance and property rights issues, are precisely the sort of
harms the Hawkins Court deemed "instructive" to determining whether or not there is a potential
for harm to a substantial right. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229.
The Linscotts, on the other hand, merely wave their hands and say that Citizens have not
done enough. The Linscotts attempt to challenge Citizens' factual assertions, but again provide no
record cite to support their own allegations. Linscotts' Response at 36. As before, the Linscotts'
failure to provide any record citations to support their position is fatal, and means that this Court
cannot consider their arguments. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152.
Therefore, Citizens have established the requisite potential for prejudice to a substantial
right sufficiently to satisfy Idaho Code Section 67-5279(4).
D.

Citizens are entitled to their attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this action
and the Respondents are not.
As described in Citizens' Opening Brief, the County in this case acted without a reasonable

basis in fact or law, and that entitles Citizens to their reasonable costs and fees incurred to date.
LC. § 12-117 (1 )-(2). Similarly, the Linscotts and Interstate have also acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. Citizens are entitled to obtain fees against intervenors pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-117. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 133 Idaho 833,846,993 P.2d 596,
609 (1999) (citing section 12-117 and awarding appellate costs against an intervenor aligned with
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a non-prevailing county). 15 As described above, neither Interstate nor the Linscotts made any valid
argument in opposition to Citizens' Petition. In many instances, they misstated the law, omitted
material statutory or rule provisions, cited to inapplicable cases, or simply cited no authority
whatsoever. Assertions without reference to legal or factual authority are, by definition, without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. 16 Citizens are entitled to their reasonable costs and fees in
responding to them.
As against Linscotts in particular, Citizens were forced to respond to unsubstantiated and
unsupported arguments that have already been litigated and decided by this Court. This Court
should award Citizens their costs and fees incurred in having to re-litigate decided issues.
The County is not entitled to any attorney fees because, even if ultimately unsuccessful,
Citizens have presented legitimate questions for review by this Court. Based on the arguments
raised here and in Citizens' Opening Brief, they brought and pursued this matter with a reasonable
basis in law and fact.
The Linscotts have not requested fees, and Interstate is not entitled to fees in this case for
several reasons. Interstate asserts that it, as an intervenor, may be awarded fees under Idaho Code
section § 12-121 if it ends up as a prevailing party. Interstate's Response at 15. Here again it
misstates the law. Clear Idaho precedent establishes that section 12-121 applies only to "civil
action[s]," and this judicial review proceeding is not a "civil action." Krempasky v. Nez Perce
Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 239, 245 P.3d 983, 991 (2010) ("A party can only be

15
Citizens recognize that Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. has been called into question by a more recent case which held
that the "reference to LC. § 12-117 as a basis for the award of costs is mere dicta." Neighbors For Responsible Growth
v. Kootenai Cnty., 147 Idaho 173, 177,207 P.3d 149, 153 (2009). Because that language in Rural Kootenai Org., Inc.
has not been overruled, Citizens raise it here to preserve their rights.
16
To the extent this Court believes the Linscotts' and Interstate's arguments so misstated the law, failed to find legal
support, or omitted relevant authority harmful to the Respondents' positions that they were not made in good faith or
merely to delay or increase the costs of litigation, Citizens request sanctions for the same pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 11.2 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84.
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awarded attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 in a 'civil action.' This is a petition for judicial review
from an administrative decision and thus is not a civil action. Thus, no attorney fees will be
awarded .... " (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Linscotts are not entitled to their costs or
fees.
Even if the Linscotts cited the applicable code provision, section 12-117, they would not
be entitled to costs and fees because they are not an adverse party to the County as required by that
code sections. Sylte v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 165 Idaho 238,443 P.3d 252,261 (2019) ("While
intervenors may request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-11 7, this statute still requires
an entity and a state agency to be adverse parties .... Here, the Intervenors prevailed on the issues
but they were not adverse to IDWR."); Neighbors For Responsible Growth, 147 Idaho at 177,207
P.3d at 153 ("Furthermore, Appellants are intervenors on the side of the county-perhaps the most
obvious indicator that the two are not adverse. Thus, because Appellants are not adverse to the
county, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-117.")
Therefore, Citizens are entitled to their reasonable costs and attorney fees and none of the
Respondents are so entitled.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in Citizens' Opening Brief, Petitioner respectfully
requests that the Court set the Decision aside and award Petitioner its reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred in this proceeding.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2019.
Givens Pursley LLP
Isl Gary G. Allen
Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day ofNovember, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be filed electronically through the iCourt system, which caused the
following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected below:

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Email: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Email: bill. wilson@bonnercountyid.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company
John A. Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Intervenors Linscott

Isl Jack W. Relf
Jack W. Relf
Gary G. Allen
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Filed: January 08, 2020 at 9:27 AM.
First Judicial District, Bonner County
By: Sandra Rasor Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CV09-19-0629

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant
Petitioner,

vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
VS.
Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott
Respondent.
JUDGE: Brudie, Jeff M.

DATE:December13,2019

CLERK: Sandra Rasor

LOCATION: Courtroom 3

HEARING TYPE: Review Hearing

COURT REPORTER: Linda Carlton
INTERPRETER:

Parties:
Bonner County Board of Commissioners,
Respondent, not present
Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant, Petitioner, not present

William Wilson, Attorney of Record, present
Gary Allen, Attorney of Record, present

Hearing Start Time: 10:00 AM
Journal Entries:
- JUDGE: PETITION SEEKING REVIEW INVOLVING RELOCATION OF ASPHALT PLANT,
APPEALED TO BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONER WHICH APPROVED CONDITIONAL
USE. PETITIONERS SOUGHT RECONSIDERATION, APPROVAL REAPPROVED, FOUR
ATTORNEYS
MR. ALLEN, MR. FINNEY, MS TELLESON AND MR. WILSON
ISSUES BRIEFED EXTENSIVELY AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE BRIEFS AND AWARE OF
THE ISSUES TO DISCUSS, MR. ALLEN
GA: INTRODUCES CLIENTS, ARGUMENT, COUNTY IGNORING LANGUAGE OF ITS OWN
ORDINANCE, NEIGHBORS HAVE TOLERATED A LONG TIME (CONTINUES ARGUMENT)
10:07: (DOCTRINE QUOTED) SELKIRK BASIN CASE
IMPACTS CITIZENS PHYSICALLY AND FINANCIALLY
10:15: SPEAKS REGARDING TIMELINESS AND SERVICE
(CITES ARTHUR VS SHOSHONE COUNTY)
10:18: CITIZENS FILED A FULLY COMPLIANT COMPLAINT THAT WAS MISTAKENLY
REJECTED BY ICOURT SYSTEM
FURTHER ARGUMENT REGARDING TIMELINESS INVOLVING LINSCOTTS SERVICE
NO PREJUDICE TO LINSCOTTS, THEY INTERVENED AND PARTICIPATED IN ALL
ASPECTS
10:21: SUBSTANTIVE USE,
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10:28: ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, NONE TO EXHAUST THAT ARGUMENT HAS NO
MERIT
NEXT ARGUMENT IS THE COUNTIES FAILURE TO ADDRESS LEGALITY UNDER
NONCONFORMING USE ELEMENTS
THIS IS NOT AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION, THE GRAVEL PIT IS ILLEGAL, REAL POINT IS
THE ONLY REASONABLE INTERPRETATION-THE USE OF LAND WHERE THE BATCH
PLANT WILL BE LOCATED HAS TO COMPLY WITH ORDINANCE. THE GRAVEL PIT
VIOLATES THE LAW THAT IS IN THE RECORD,
13:33: CONTINUES ARGUMENT
10:40: ARGUMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
10:42: IN SUMMARY
MUST BE OVERTURNED
I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TAKE ANY QUESTIONS BUT THAT CONCLUDES MY REMARKS
JUDGE: THANK YOU MR. ALLEN, MR. WILSON COUNTY NEXT PLEASE
BW: DEFER TIME TO MR. FINNY
JF: NATURE OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE BRIEFING.
10:43: JF: THIS IS AN APPELLATE PROCEEDING, HERE TO ADDRESS APPLICATION,
START WITH ATTORNEY FEES, NO BASIS FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS BETWEEN
CITIZENS AND LINSCOTTS PERIOD.
10:44: AS RELATES TO STANDING
NONE OF THE ADJOINING LANDOWNERS HAVE PUT THEIR NAME ON THE PETITION
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW,
FURTHER ARGUMENT
10:48: JF: REGARDING 28 DAY TIME PERIOD
LUPAACT.
THERE IS AN ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT A MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION
BEGINS A NEW 28 DAY PERIOD OR..
HAWKINS CASE I SET OUT IN BULK IN MY CASE, IT COVERS A BROAD RANGE OF
ISSUES,
IN HAWKINS THAT COURT RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE NO INDEPENDENT
HEARINGS
SUBMIT THAT THE APPROVAL SHOULD BE UP HELD
10:51: JUDGE: QUESTIONS MR. FINNEY
JF: RESPONSE
JUDGE: MS. TELLESON?

ET: : ARGUMENT
GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, DECLARATORY ACTIONS ARE THE PROPER WAY TO
DETERMINE
IT IS NOT THIS ACTION, THAT TIME HAS PASSED, IF IS STILL EXISTS COULD EXPLORE
BUT NOT HERE AND NOT TODAY, NOT DEALING WITH NEW FACTS TODAY, DEALING
WITH APPELLATE RECORD, CONTAINS CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, AS RELATES TO
STANDING AND CODE REQUIREMENTS, TO HAVE STANDING THERE MAY BE
POTENTIAL HARM TO HAVE REMEDY MUST BE HARM.
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PROPER MEANS OF REDRESSING HARMS IS A CIVIL ACTION,
ACTIVE IS A PLAIN TERM AND HAS A PLAIN MEANING
10:57: ET: CONFORMITY OR NON CONFORMITY NOT AN EXPRESS ELEMENT
(FURTHER ARGUMENT)
BAXTER'S SPECIFICALLY HAD A COW/CALF OPERATION IN THE NEW ZONE, THOSE
ARE THE KINDS OF EXPANSIONS IN THE BAXTER CASE AND THE OTHERS THAT THE
COURT DISALLOWS,
IF PIT BECOMES INACTIVE THEN THE OPERATIONS OF THE BATCH PLANT MUST
CEASE
NOT AMBIGUOUS
THE HYPOTHETICALS ARE NOT REALISTIC,
THIS PLANT WAS IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE THESE CODES WERE IN EXISTENCE,
PRESENT FACTUAL SITUATION, COUNTY BELIEVES THE PIT IS A LEGAL
NONCONFORMING USE,
WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF PREJUDICE TO THE ASSOCIATION OR ANY INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS ASK THAT YOU AFFIRM.
11 :03: ET: (SPEAKS REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES)
JUDGE :THANK YOU MS. TELLESSEN, MR. WILSON?
11 :06: BW: ARGUMENT
TAKE ISSUE WITH CHARACTERIZATION OF TURNING A BLIND EYE,
NOISE COMPLAINTS TO SHERRIFF'S OFFICE IS ALL
TO EXTENT COUNTY HAS MOVED TO ENFORCE ACTION NEITHER HAVE ANY OF THE
NEIGHBORS
ALSO TAKE ISSUE THAT WE WRONGLY INTERPRET OUR OWN LAW. ASK THE COURT
TO CONSIDER THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS (FURTHER ARGUMENT)
EVEN IF IT IS A TIE IT GOES TO THE COUNTY, I THINK A VERY REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION, HAS BEEN NO CIVIL ACTIONS REGARDING VIOLATIONS, DUE
PROCESS VIOLATION,
JUDGE: THANK YOU MR. WILSON, MR. ALLEN REBUTTAL
11 :09: GA: REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
IF WE DO NEED TO ADD NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WE REQUEST LEAVE TO ADD
WHICH IS ALLOWED, WE DON'T THINK NECESSARY THOUGH,
RESPONDS TO ARGUMENT ABOUT EXTENSION OF THE 28 DAY PERIOD TO FILE
VERSUS
IF POTENTIAL HARM IS NOT POSSIBLE ...
RE: PLAIN LANGUAGE ARGUMENT, IGNORES THE LAW THAT SAYS YOU HAVE TO
REVIEW THE ENTIRE CODE
THE ARGUMENTS ARE TOTALLY APPROPRIATE,
CONCLUDES MY REMARKS
11 :15: JUDGE, THANK YOU MR. ALLEN
THANK ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL FOR YOUR BRIEFS, OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF ISSUES
THAT I NEED TO ADDRESS, I WILL TRY TO ADDRESS ISSUES AS BEST I CAN,
AT THIS POINT THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IS UNDER ADVISEMENT
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Hearing End Time: 11:17 AM
Exhibits:
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Filed:02/05/2020 15:49:01
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Oppelt, Linda

THE
IN THE DISTRICT COUR T OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN TY OF BONN ER

CASE NO. CV09-19-629

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ers,
Petition
)
)
v.
)
)
OF
D
BOAR
TY
BONN ER COUN
)
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
)
Idaho
of the State of
)
)
Respondent,
)
)
FRAN KE. LINSC OTT and CARO L
)
RETE
LINSCOTT; INTER STATE CONC
)
& ASPHA LT COMPANY
)
COMP ANY
)
Intervenors.

CITIZENS AGAIN ST LINSC OTT/
INTER STATE ASPHA LT PLANT,
An unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the State ofldah o

OPINION AND ORDE R ON
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIE W

held on the
This matter is before the Court on petition for judicia l review. A hearing was
The Respondent
matter on Decem ber 13, 2019. The Petitioner was represented by Gary Allen.
Wilson. The
Bonner County was represented by Bonner County Deputy Prosecutor William
Intervenor Interstate
Intervenors Frank and Carol Linscott were represented by John Finney. The
having reviewed the
Concrete & Asphalt was represented by Elizabeth Tellessen. The Court
in this matter,
briefs of the parties, having heard arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
hereby renders its decision.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
te and
On August 8, 2018, Frank and Carol Linscott (the Linscotts) and Interstate Concre
move the Interstate
Asphalt Company (Interstate) jointly applied for a conditional use permit to
gravel pit located
asphalt batch plant located within the city limits of Sandpoint, to the Linscott
Zoning
in Sagle, Idaho. The CUP was approved by the Bonner County Planning and
several of the
Commission (the Commission) on Novem ber 15, 2018. On December 11, 2018,
ission to the
landowners adjacent to Linscotts' gravel pit appealed the decision of the Comm
1
on the matter on
Bonner County Board of Commissioners (the Board). The Board held a hearing

ruling to that
January 11, 2019, and voted to approve the CUP. The Board later issued a written
decision on
effect on January 14, 2019. The landowners sought reconsideration of the Boards
January 24, 2019.
that
On March 22, 2019, the Board held a hearing on the motion to reconsider. During
use. 2 On March
hearing, the Board limited its reconsideration to one issue: non-conforming land
tt/Interstate
25, 2019, the Board approved the CUP. On May 1, 2019, Citizens Against Linsco
Asphalt Plant (Citizens), filed this petition for judicia l review.

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
al
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows judicia l review of an approv
or denial of a land use application for an affected person, as provided for in the
.
Idaho Administrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code§ 67-652 l(l)(d)
ns,
This Court has stated that for the purposes of judicia l review of LLUP A decisio
be
where a board of county commissioners makes a land use decision, it will
treated as a government agency under IDAP A.

1

Agency Record, at 1115.
Bonner County Planning Director.
The Board limited reconsideration to this issue on the recommendation of the
Record, at 1021.
includes the landowners who
3
The petitioner is an unincorporated non-profit association whose membership
entity was formed or at what
this
when
record
the
previously challenged the issuance of the CUP. It is unclear from
show this occurred at some
does
record
the
r
Howeve
ers.
point it began to represent the interests of the landown
362.
at
Record,
Agency
eration.
point prior to the Board's hearing on reconsid

2

2
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(intemal
In re Jerome Cty. Bd ofComm'rs, 153 Idaho 298,30 7,281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012)
citations omitted).
may not
In a judicia l review under the Administrative Procedures Act, a district court
presented.
substitute its judgme nt for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
67-5279(1).
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998); LC. §
clearly erroneous;
"The court will defer to the agency 's findings of fact unless those findings are
when there is
the agency 's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
ted by evidence
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are suppor
in the record. " Id.
y
An agency 's decision will be set aside if it (a) violates constitutional or statutor
upon unlawful
provisions; (b) exceeds the Comm issione rs' statutory authority; (c) is made
or (e) is
procedures; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
even if a court
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). Nevertheless,
n of the
finds the agency decisio n to violate the provisions of LC. §67-5279(3), the decisio
prejudiced. LC. §
agency will be affirmed unless substantial rights of the petitioners have been
or in part, and
67-5279(4). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
remand ed for further proceedings as necessary. LC.§ 67-5279.

ANALYSIS
BCRC § 12Citizens raises three issues on judicia l review: 1) that the 2018 amend ment to
4
with the
336 was not lawfully enacted; 2) that the decision by the Board did not comply

5
Interstate and the
ordinance; and 3) that Citizens is entitled to attorne y's fees. The Intervenors

was amended on May 23, 2018
This code details the standards for permitting an asphalt batch plant. This code
basis for the approval of the
the
formed
ent
through Bonner County Ordinance 557. The language of the amendm
CUP at issue.
5
Memorandum in Support ofPetitioner's Petition for Judicial Review, at 9.

4

3
'rs, et al.
Citizens Against Linscott/ Interstate Asphalt Plant v. Bonner County Bd. Of Comm
Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review

Page 287

6
Linscotts assert that Citizens lacks standing to bring the petition. The Linscotts independently

assert that the petition was not timely filed and that the failure to properly serve them prevents
Citizens from obtaining relief in the matter. Bonner County and Interstate request an award of
fees and costs.
1. Standing

The Linscotts and Interstate both assert that Citizens does not have standing to challenge
the decision of the Board. Both parties cite LC. §30-27-105 which states that an unincorporated
non-profit association is an entity distinct from its members and managers. That statute came
into effect July 1, 2015, repealing LC.§§ 53 - 701-717, the previous provisions governing such
associations.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously stated that" As applied to associations
seeking standing for its members, this Court considers whether the association has alleged that at
least one of its members face injury and could meet the requirements of standing on an
individual basis." In re Jerome Cty. Bd of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho at 308, 281 P.3d at 1086.
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as
the representative of its members. The association must allege that its members,
or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit. So long as this can be established, and so long
as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual
participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the case,
the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to
invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239,241, 899 P.2d 949, 951
(1995)(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211-12, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
While the Intervenors argue that the 2015 repeal ofl.C. §53-707 served to remove an
unincorporated non-profit association's standing through its members, Idaho's Appellate Courts
Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 14; Intervenor Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company's Opposition
to Petition for Judicial Review, at 14.

6
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determined
have yet to express such a holding. Additionally, Idaho's Appellate Courts have
does not find
associational standing independent of specific grants in Idaho Code. The Court
§30-27-105.
such a prohibition on associational standing to be present in the language of LC.
Here it is clear the membership of Citizen 's consists of landowners immediately

adjacent

the CUP on
to the gravel pit. Those landowners have previously challenged the issuance of
granting of the
numerous claims of potential injury. As Citizens seeks an order reversing the
CUP, the relief sought does not require individual participation of any of its membe

rs.

rs.
Accordingly, Citizens has standing to bring this action on behalf of its membe

2. Service
on them
The Linscotts assert that the failure of Citizens to serve notice of the petition
7
prevents Citizen 's from obtaining relief. 1.R.C.P. 84(d) states:

of
When the petition for judicial review is filed, the petitioner must serve copies
be
will
action
whose
the notice of petition for judicial review upon the agency
reviewed and all other parties to the proceeding before the agency
in service
While Citizens failed to serve the notice of petition on the Linscotts, this defect
states:
is not, as the Linscotts assert, automatically fatal to their petition. I.R.C.P. 84(n)
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed by statute
and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic dismissal of the petition
for judicial review on motion of any party, or on initiative of the district court.
Failure of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review
will not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action
al
or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismiss
of the petition for review.
While the Linscotts should have been served notice at the beginning of this action,

the

tts ability to be
failure to do so was harmless error and has not fundamentally affected the Linsco
motion was
heard. The Linscotts filed a motion to intervene on August 1, 2019. After that

1

Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 23-24.
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granted on August 19, 2019, the Linscotts filed an extensive brief in opposition to Citizens'
petition. Counsel for the Linscotts appeared at the hearing on the petition and presented
argument in opposition. Therefore the Court does not find dismissal due to lack of service to be
appropriate in this matter.

3. Timeliness
The Linscotts argue that the petition was not timely filed and that the actual filing date
8
does not relate back. The Linscotts assert that once the Board issued its original decision, the 28

day period in which to file a petition for judicial review began to toll. The Linscotts further assert
that the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration did not reset the tolling of the 28 day
period but only stopped the tolling until the Board issued its decision. The Linscotts argue that as
ten days elapsed between the initial decision of the Board and the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, Citizens only had 18 days to file the petition after the Board ruled on the motion.
LC. §67-5273(3) states:
A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other than a rule or order
must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as
provided by other provision of law. The time for filing a petition for review shall
be extended during the pendency of the petitioner's timely attempts to exhaust
administrative remedies, if the attempts are clearly not frivolous or repetitious. A
cross-petition for judicial review may be filed within fourteen (14) days after a
party is served with a copy of the notice of the petition for judicial review.
LC. §67-6521 (d) contains similar tolling provisions when challengin~ the issuance of a
special use permit stating:
An affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters identified in
section 67-652l(l)(a) , Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days after all
remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as
provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.

8

Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 18-23.
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. This motion
Here Citizens timely filed their motion for reconsideration with the Board
was among the various administrative remedies that Citizens rightly attemp

ted to exhaust before

n for judicial review
the filing of a petition for review. Therefore, the time for filing the petitio
motion for
did not begin to toll until after the issuance of the Boards order on the
ess of the
reconsideration. The Linscotts remaining argument concerning the timelin
in its Opinion and
electronically filed petition has been previously addressed by this Court
restated here.
Order on Motion to Dismiss issued on July 26, 2019, and need not be
Accordingly, the Court finds that Citizens' petition was timely filed.

4. Enactment of the 2018 Amendment
12-336 was
Citizens asserts that the 2018 amendment (the Amendment) to BCRC
ltural and residential
unlawfully adopted. The Amendment permitted asphalt plants in agricu
dment was unlawfully
zones if located in an active gravel pit. Citizens argues that the Amen
by the Board in
enacted and void. Accordingly, Citizens contends that any decision made
reliance on the Amendment should be reversed.
"Promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is

legislative

1077 (1983). Legislative
action." Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 67,66 5 P.2d 1075,
9
activity is not subject to direct judicial review. Id. at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076.

for
The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action
or its
declaratory judgm ent in the district court, if it is alleged that the rule,
re with or
interfe
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to
impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.
LC. § 67-5278
land use decisions by local authorities are
"Direct judicial review in this case means an appellate process by which
decision is not subject to direct judicial review,
appealed to a judicial forum. While we hold that a legislative zoning
as declaratory actions."
it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions such

9

Burt, 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076, n. 2
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. However,
Citizens' argument rests on a conclusory belief that the Amend ment is invalid
review. While the
Citizens has not sought such a declaratory ruling prior to filing this petition for
of the amendment, a
Court understands the basis for Citizen s' arguments concerning the validity
tory action,
challenge to the validity of the amendment should have been brought as a declara
separate from the petition for judicia l review.

10

Accordingly, the Court is constrained from

considering the validity of the amendment on review.

5. The Board's decision
Citizens assert that the Board' s decision did not comply with the ordinance and
gravel pit's noncompliance with other Bonner County land ordinances preven

that the

ts the issuance of

nt part:
the CUP pursuant to the provisions of BCRC 12-130, which states in pertine
The Planning Director shall not issue a permit unless the intended uses of the
buildings and land conform in all respects with the provisions of this title.
On appeal from the decision of the Commission, the Board determined that the
issuance of the CUP complied with all Bonner County Ordinances.

11

Citizens challenged

gravel pit's
that determination in a motion to reconsider. The Board determined that the
pit and the
"non-conforming use" was not at issue, as the relationship between the gravel
ng or
batch plant was a physical one and that the use of the gravel pit, non-conformi
d the gravel
otherwise, had no bearing on the decision as BCRC 12-336(22) only require
pit to be active.

12

Further, the Board determined that the addition of the batch plant would

may not be combined with
are constrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief
309, 193 P.3d 853, 856
306,
146 Idaho
petitions for judicial review under IDAPA." Euclid Ave. Tr. v. City of Boise,
(2008).
11
Record, at 997.
at 995.
12
Transcript of March 22, 2019 Hearing on Motion to Reconsider, at 66-68; Record,
10

" ••• we
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not expand on the alleged nonconforming use of the gravel pit, as Bonner County BCRC
§ 12-821 distinguishes prohibited/ nonconforming use from conditionally permitted use.

13

Citizens offers extensive argument concerning the gravel pit's violations of
Bonner County Ordinances. However, no such determination has ever been reached as no
party has filed an action with the Bonner County Prosecutor to enforce those ordinances.
On review this Court is constrained to review the decision of The Board on clearly
defined criteria. The Court is not empowered to render a legal conclusion on a property's
compliance with county ordinances when the issue has not been properly raised below.
The Board determined that Bonner County Code only required that the gravel pit
be active in order to permit the installation of a batch plant. The Board determined that
the gravel pit had been active for over 40 years and therefore Bonner County Code
allowed for the addition of the asphalt batch plant. The Board further reasoned that the
CUP did not unlawfully expand the pit's alleged non-conforming use as a conditionally
permitted use was not a non-conforming use under Bonner County Code.
This Court will defer to the Board's interpretation and application of its own
zoning ordinances unless they are capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory. In re Jerome
Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho at 308,281 P.3d at 1086 (2012). In reviewing the
Board's decision with such deference, the Court is unable to find error. Accordingly, the
decision of the Board is affirmed.
6. Attorney's fees
Both Bonner County and Interstate have requested attorney's fees in this matter pursuant
to LC. §12-117 and LC. §12-121 respectively.

13

14

Record, at 995.
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A. Bonner County
LC. § 12-117 states:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
As the Court has affirmed the decision of the Board, Bonner County is clearly a
prevailing party in this matter. Bonner County argues that Citizens' petition was part of a
repeated attempt to "discredit the County's interpretation of its own ordinances"; and therefore
this petition was brought without reasonable basis in fact or law.

15

However, the Court finds that

that Citizens did raise legitimate issues in its petition, and therefore did not file the petition
without reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, Bonner County's motion for fees is denied.

B. Interstate
Interstate requests attorney fees pursuant to 1.C§12-121 which states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall
not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the award of
attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof.
The Court finds that a similar analysis supports denial of an award of fees to Interstate.
While Citizens' petition was ultimately unsuccessful, the Court finds it raised sufficient novel
issues and therefore was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Interstate' s motion for fees is denied.

The Linscotts did not seek attorney's fees in the matter under the belief that they were precluded from requesting
them as interveners. Intervener Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 9.
15
Respondent's Brief, at 15.
14
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bonner County's request for
fees is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Interstate's request for fees is DENIED.

/"

Dated this..=:!___ day of February 2020.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON PETION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW was:

E-Mailed by the undersigned this _s_ign-ed_:2_151_202_0 _03_:so_P_M- - , to:
William Wilson: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary Allen: garyallen@givenspursley.com
Elizabeth Tellessen: eat@winstoncashatt.com
John Finney: johnfinney@finneylaw.net

By:

~QpP<Jt
Deputy
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Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
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P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
state of Idaho,

Case No.: CV09-19-629

Petitioners,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho ,
Respondent.
and
FRANKE. LINSCOTT AND CAROL
LINSCOTT; INTERSTATE CONCRETE
AND ASPHALT COMPANY,
Intervenors.
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TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS
HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

Petitioners Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (the "Citizens"), an
unincorporated Idaho non-profit association, by and through its attorneys of record
Givens Pursley LLP, and pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court from the Bonner County District Court's February 5, 2020 Opinion and Order on Petition
for Judicial Review (the "Order"). A copy of the Order is attached to this Notice of Appeal.
1.

The title of this action or proceeding is Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate

Asphalt Plant, Petitioners v. Bonner County Board of Commissioners, et al., Respondent, Bonner
County Case No. CV09-19-629, and is more fully described in the caption above. The specific
decision being appealed is the District Court's February 5, 2020 Opinion and Order on Petition
for Judicial Review.
2.

The title of the court which heard the proceeding being appealed is the District

Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner,
Honorable Jeff M. Brodie, District Judge, presiding, which, in tum, was reviewing an order of
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners.
3.

The number assigned to the action or proceeding by the District Court was

Bonner County Case No. CV09-19-629, which was a judicial review of an action assigned
Docket No. C1015-18 by the Bonner County Board of Commissioners.
4.

The appealing party is Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant, and

Citizens' attorney, Givens Pursley

LLP,

is identified with address, phone number, and email

address on Page 1 above. The adverse party is the Bonner County Board of Commissioners, and
its attorney William Steven Wilson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Bonner County Prosecutor's
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Office, is identified with address, phone number, and email address is set forth below. Frank and
Carol Linscott and the Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company both intervened and
participated in this case, and their respective attorneys are identified with address, phone number,
and email address below.
PARTY

ATTORNEY

Bonner County Board
of Commissioners

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Bonner County Prosecutor's
Office

Frank and Carol
Linscott

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Attorneys at Law

Interstate Concrete and
Asphalt Company

5.

ADDRESS, PHONE NUMBER,
and EMAIL ADDRESS
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
208.263.6714
prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov

Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
208.263.7712
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, P.S. Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
208.667.2103
eat@winstoncashatt.com

Citizens' preliminary statement of the issues it intends to assert on appeal, which

under Rule 17, Idaho Appellate Rules, does not preclude Citizens from asserting other issues as
Citizens deems necessary, is as follows:
a.

Whether the District Court erred when it affirmed the Bonner County

Board of Commissioners' March 25, 2019 final decision approving a conditional use
permit to Frank and Carol Linscott and Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company and
denying Citizens' request for reconsideration of the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners' denial of the Citizens' prior appeal of the grant of the conditional use
permit.
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b.

Whether the District Court erred by failing to consider issues and

arguments raised by Citizens in this judicial review.
c.

Whether the District Court erred by concluding that it was constrained

from considering the validity of 2018 amendment to Bonner County Revised Code
section 12-336 in this judicial review.
d.

Whether the District Court erred by deferring to the Bonner County Board

of Commissioners' interpretation and application of its own zoning ordinances at issue
when such interpretation and application failed to comply with Bonner County
ordinances and/or other statutes and/or regulations.
e.

Whether the District Court erred by concluding that the Bonner County

Board of Commissioners' interpretation and application of its zoning ordinances at issue
were not capricious, arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable.
6.

Citizens has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order

described above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(f).
7.

Citizens requests a transcript of the December 13, 2019 hearing before the District

Court in the above-captioned matter, and specifically requests that an electronic copy of the
transcript be provided.
8.

Citizens designates the following documents to be included in the clerk's record,

in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.

Each and every document comprising the Agency Record and Transcripts

lodged with the District Court, as set forth in the Notice of Filing with District Court,
dated August 21, 2019 and the Notice of Clerical Correction, dated September 3, 2019,
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and comprising documents numbered 1-1245 (including 1022-A, 1022-B, 1022-C, and
1022-D);
b.

To the extent not automatically included in the Standard Record pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, each and every pleading, brief, and other document filed by
any party or intervenor before the District Court in this judicial review proceeding,
including without limitation the following:
Date

Document

05-01-2019

Petition for Judicial Review

05-16-2019

Notice of Special Appearance

05-16-2019

Motion to Dismiss

05-16-2019

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

05-16-2019

Affidavit of William S. Wilson

05-30-2019

Opposition to Bonner County's Motion to Dismiss

05-30-2019

Declaration of Jack W. Relf

05-30-2019

Declaration of Stacey W ardein

07-26-2019

Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss

08-02-2019

Notice of Lodging with Agency

08-15-2019

Scheduling Order

08-21-2019

Notice of Filing with District Court

09-03-2019

Notice of Clerical Correction

10-08-2019

Memorandum in Support of Petition for Judicial Review

10-11-2019

Scheduling Order

11-04-2019

Respondent's Brief
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11-07-2019

Interstate's Opposition to Petition for Judicial Review

11-07-2019

Intervenor Linscotts' Respondents' Brief

11-07-2019

Intervenor Linscotts' Respondents' Brief Attachment

11-27-2019

Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Judicial Review

02-05-2020

Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review

c.

To the extent not automatically included in the Standard Record pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 or listed above, each and every decision, judgment, order, or
other decision issued by the District Court in this case.
9.

No exhibits were offered or admitted at the District Court's hearing of this matter.

10.

There has not been an order entered sealing any part of the record or transcript.

11.

The undersigned hereby certifies:
a.

That the service of the notice of appeal has been made upon the Court

Reporter of the trial or proceeding;
b.

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimate of Court

Reporter's Fees in the sum of $200.00 pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 24(c);
c.

That the estimated fees for preparation of the Clerk's record have been

paid in the sum of $100.00 pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 27(d);
d.

That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and

e.

That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
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Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Isl Gary G. Allen
Gary G. Allen- Of the Firm
Givens Pursley LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of March, 2020, I caused to be filed and served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
DOCUMENT FILED:
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt

First Judicial District Court, Bonner County
215 South First A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Fax: (888) 960-4885
Email: clerks@bonnercountyid.gov
DOCUMENT SERVED:

□
□
□
□

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

Elizabeth A. Tellessen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for Intervenors Interstate Concrete &
Asphalt Company

□
□
□
□

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

John A. Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Intervenors Linscott

□
□
□
□

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
iCourt service

Bonner County Board of Commissioners
1500 Hwy 2, Ste. 308
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Fax: (208) 265-1460
Email: jessi.webster@bonnercountyid.gov

~
Linda Carlton, Court Reporter
clo Nez Perce County Courthouse
1230 Main Street
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 93501

□
□
□
□

clo Bonner County Courthouse
215 South First A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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Isl Gary G. Allen
Gary G. Allen
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Filed:02/05/2020 15:49:01
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Oppelt, Linda

THE
IN THE DISTRICT COUR T OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN TY OF BONN ER

CASE NO. CV09-19-629

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ers,
Petition
)
)
v.
)
)
OF
D
BOAR
TY
BONN ER COUN
)
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
)
Idaho
of the State of
)
)
Respondent,
)
)
FRAN KE. LINSC OTT and CARO L
)
RETE
LINSCOTT; INTER STATE CONC
)
& ASPHA LT COMPANY
)
COMP ANY
)
Intervenors.

CITIZENS AGAIN ST LINSC OTT/
INTER STATE ASPHA LT PLANT,
An unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the State ofldah o

OPINION AND ORDE R ON
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIE W

held on the
This matter is before the Court on petition for judicia l review. A hearing was
The Respondent
matter on Decem ber 13, 2019. The Petitioner was represented by Gary Allen.
Wilson. The
Bonner County was represented by Bonner County Deputy Prosecutor William
Intervenor Interstate
Intervenors Frank and Carol Linscott were represented by John Finney. The
having reviewed the
Concrete & Asphalt was represented by Elizabeth Tellessen. The Court
in this matter,
briefs of the parties, having heard arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
hereby renders its decision.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
te and
On August 8, 2018, Frank and Carol Linscott (the Linscotts) and Interstate Concre
move the Interstate
Asphalt Company (Interstate) jointly applied for a conditional use permit to
gravel pit located
asphalt batch plant located within the city limits of Sandpoint, to the Linscott
Zoning
in Sagle, Idaho. The CUP was approved by the Bonner County Planning and
several of the
Commission (the Commission) on Novem ber 15, 2018. On December 11, 2018,
ission to the
landowners adjacent to Linscotts' gravel pit appealed the decision of the Comm
1
on the matter on
Bonner County Board of Commissioners (the Board). The Board held a hearing

ruling to that
January 11, 2019, and voted to approve the CUP. The Board later issued a written
decision on
effect on January 14, 2019. The landowners sought reconsideration of the Boards
January 24, 2019.
that
On March 22, 2019, the Board held a hearing on the motion to reconsider. During
use. 2 On March
hearing, the Board limited its reconsideration to one issue: non-conforming land
tt/Interstate
25, 2019, the Board approved the CUP. On May 1, 2019, Citizens Against Linsco
Asphalt Plant (Citizens), filed this petition for judicia l review.

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
al
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows judicia l review of an approv
or denial of a land use application for an affected person, as provided for in the
.
Idaho Administrative Procedural Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code§ 67-652 l(l)(d)
ns,
This Court has stated that for the purposes of judicia l review of LLUP A decisio
be
where a board of county commissioners makes a land use decision, it will
treated as a government agency under IDAP A.

1

Agency Record, at 1115.
Bonner County Planning Director.
The Board limited reconsideration to this issue on the recommendation of the
Record, at 1021.
includes the landowners who
3
The petitioner is an unincorporated non-profit association whose membership
entity was formed or at what
this
when
record
the
previously challenged the issuance of the CUP. It is unclear from
show this occurred at some
does
record
the
r
Howeve
ers.
point it began to represent the interests of the landown
362.
at
Record,
Agency
eration.
point prior to the Board's hearing on reconsid

2

2
'rs, et al.
Citizens Against Linscott/ Interstate Asphalt Plant v. Bonner County Bd. Of Comm
Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review

Page 306

(intemal
In re Jerome Cty. Bd ofComm'rs, 153 Idaho 298,30 7,281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012)
citations omitted).
may not
In a judicia l review under the Administrative Procedures Act, a district court
presented.
substitute its judgme nt for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
67-5279(1).
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998); LC. §
clearly erroneous;
"The court will defer to the agency 's findings of fact unless those findings are
when there is
the agency 's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
ted by evidence
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are suppor
in the record. " Id.
y
An agency 's decision will be set aside if it (a) violates constitutional or statutor
upon unlawful
provisions; (b) exceeds the Comm issione rs' statutory authority; (c) is made
or (e) is
procedures; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
even if a court
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). Nevertheless,
n of the
finds the agency decisio n to violate the provisions of LC. §67-5279(3), the decisio
prejudiced. LC. §
agency will be affirmed unless substantial rights of the petitioners have been
or in part, and
67-5279(4). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole
remand ed for further proceedings as necessary. LC.§ 67-5279.

ANALYSIS
BCRC § 12Citizens raises three issues on judicia l review: 1) that the 2018 amend ment to
4
with the
336 was not lawfully enacted; 2) that the decision by the Board did not comply

5
Interstate and the
ordinance; and 3) that Citizens is entitled to attorne y's fees. The Intervenors

was amended on May 23, 2018
This code details the standards for permitting an asphalt batch plant. This code
basis for the approval of the
the
formed
ent
through Bonner County Ordinance 557. The language of the amendm
CUP at issue.
5
Memorandum in Support ofPetitioner's Petition for Judicial Review, at 9.
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6
Linscotts assert that Citizens lacks standing to bring the petition. The Linscotts independently

assert that the petition was not timely filed and that the failure to properly serve them prevents
Citizens from obtaining relief in the matter. Bonner County and Interstate request an award of
fees and costs.
1. Standing

The Linscotts and Interstate both assert that Citizens does not have standing to challenge
the decision of the Board. Both parties cite LC. §30-27-105 which states that an unincorporated
non-profit association is an entity distinct from its members and managers. That statute came
into effect July 1, 2015, repealing LC.§§ 53 - 701-717, the previous provisions governing such
associations.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously stated that" As applied to associations
seeking standing for its members, this Court considers whether the association has alleged that at
least one of its members face injury and could meet the requirements of standing on an
individual basis." In re Jerome Cty. Bd of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho at 308, 281 P.3d at 1086.
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as
the representative of its members. The association must allege that its members,
or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit. So long as this can be established, and so long
as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual
participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the case,
the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to
invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239,241, 899 P.2d 949, 951
(1995)(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211-12, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
While the Intervenors argue that the 2015 repeal ofl.C. §53-707 served to remove an
unincorporated non-profit association's standing through its members, Idaho's Appellate Courts
Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 14; Intervenor Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company's Opposition
to Petition for Judicial Review, at 14.

6
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determined
have yet to express such a holding. Additionally, Idaho's Appellate Courts have
does not find
associational standing independent of specific grants in Idaho Code. The Court
§30-27-105.
such a prohibition on associational standing to be present in the language of LC.
Here it is clear the membership of Citizen 's consists of landowners immediately

adjacent

the CUP on
to the gravel pit. Those landowners have previously challenged the issuance of
granting of the
numerous claims of potential injury. As Citizens seeks an order reversing the
CUP, the relief sought does not require individual participation of any of its membe

rs.

rs.
Accordingly, Citizens has standing to bring this action on behalf of its membe

2. Service
on them
The Linscotts assert that the failure of Citizens to serve notice of the petition
7
prevents Citizen 's from obtaining relief. 1.R.C.P. 84(d) states:

of
When the petition for judicial review is filed, the petitioner must serve copies
be
will
action
whose
the notice of petition for judicial review upon the agency
reviewed and all other parties to the proceeding before the agency
in service
While Citizens failed to serve the notice of petition on the Linscotts, this defect
states:
is not, as the Linscotts assert, automatically fatal to their petition. I.R.C.P. 84(n)
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed by statute
and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic dismissal of the petition
for judicial review on motion of any party, or on initiative of the district court.
Failure of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review
will not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action
al
or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismiss
of the petition for review.
While the Linscotts should have been served notice at the beginning of this action,

the

tts ability to be
failure to do so was harmless error and has not fundamentally affected the Linsco
motion was
heard. The Linscotts filed a motion to intervene on August 1, 2019. After that

1

Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 23-24.
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granted on August 19, 2019, the Linscotts filed an extensive brief in opposition to Citizens'
petition. Counsel for the Linscotts appeared at the hearing on the petition and presented
argument in opposition. Therefore the Court does not find dismissal due to lack of service to be
appropriate in this matter.

3. Timeliness
The Linscotts argue that the petition was not timely filed and that the actual filing date
8
does not relate back. The Linscotts assert that once the Board issued its original decision, the 28

day period in which to file a petition for judicial review began to toll. The Linscotts further assert
that the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration did not reset the tolling of the 28 day
period but only stopped the tolling until the Board issued its decision. The Linscotts argue that as
ten days elapsed between the initial decision of the Board and the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, Citizens only had 18 days to file the petition after the Board ruled on the motion.
LC. §67-5273(3) states:
A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other than a rule or order
must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as
provided by other provision of law. The time for filing a petition for review shall
be extended during the pendency of the petitioner's timely attempts to exhaust
administrative remedies, if the attempts are clearly not frivolous or repetitious. A
cross-petition for judicial review may be filed within fourteen (14) days after a
party is served with a copy of the notice of the petition for judicial review.
LC. §67-6521 (d) contains similar tolling provisions when challengin~ the issuance of a
special use permit stating:
An affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters identified in
section 67-652l(l)(a) , Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days after all
remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as
provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.

8

Intervenor Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 18-23.

6
Citizens Against Linscott/ Interstate Asphalt Plant v. Bonner County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, et al.
Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review

Page 310

. This motion
Here Citizens timely filed their motion for reconsideration with the Board
was among the various administrative remedies that Citizens rightly attemp

ted to exhaust before

n for judicial review
the filing of a petition for review. Therefore, the time for filing the petitio
motion for
did not begin to toll until after the issuance of the Boards order on the
ess of the
reconsideration. The Linscotts remaining argument concerning the timelin
in its Opinion and
electronically filed petition has been previously addressed by this Court
restated here.
Order on Motion to Dismiss issued on July 26, 2019, and need not be
Accordingly, the Court finds that Citizens' petition was timely filed.

4. Enactment of the 2018 Amendment
12-336 was
Citizens asserts that the 2018 amendment (the Amendment) to BCRC
ltural and residential
unlawfully adopted. The Amendment permitted asphalt plants in agricu
dment was unlawfully
zones if located in an active gravel pit. Citizens argues that the Amen
by the Board in
enacted and void. Accordingly, Citizens contends that any decision made
reliance on the Amendment should be reversed.
"Promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is

legislative

1077 (1983). Legislative
action." Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 67,66 5 P.2d 1075,
9
activity is not subject to direct judicial review. Id. at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076.

for
The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action
or its
declaratory judgm ent in the district court, if it is alleged that the rule,
re with or
interfe
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to
impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.
LC. § 67-5278
land use decisions by local authorities are
"Direct judicial review in this case means an appellate process by which
decision is not subject to direct judicial review,
appealed to a judicial forum. While we hold that a legislative zoning
as declaratory actions."
it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions such

9

Burt, 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076, n. 2
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. However,
Citizens' argument rests on a conclusory belief that the Amend ment is invalid
review. While the
Citizens has not sought such a declaratory ruling prior to filing this petition for
of the amendment, a
Court understands the basis for Citizen s' arguments concerning the validity
tory action,
challenge to the validity of the amendment should have been brought as a declara
separate from the petition for judicia l review.

10

Accordingly, the Court is constrained from

considering the validity of the amendment on review.

5. The Board's decision
Citizens assert that the Board' s decision did not comply with the ordinance and
gravel pit's noncompliance with other Bonner County land ordinances preven

that the

ts the issuance of

nt part:
the CUP pursuant to the provisions of BCRC 12-130, which states in pertine
The Planning Director shall not issue a permit unless the intended uses of the
buildings and land conform in all respects with the provisions of this title.
On appeal from the decision of the Commission, the Board determined that the
issuance of the CUP complied with all Bonner County Ordinances.

11

Citizens challenged

gravel pit's
that determination in a motion to reconsider. The Board determined that the
pit and the
"non-conforming use" was not at issue, as the relationship between the gravel
ng or
batch plant was a physical one and that the use of the gravel pit, non-conformi
d the gravel
otherwise, had no bearing on the decision as BCRC 12-336(22) only require
pit to be active.

12

Further, the Board determined that the addition of the batch plant would

may not be combined with
are constrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief
309, 193 P.3d 853, 856
306,
146 Idaho
petitions for judicial review under IDAPA." Euclid Ave. Tr. v. City of Boise,
(2008).
11
Record, at 997.
at 995.
12
Transcript of March 22, 2019 Hearing on Motion to Reconsider, at 66-68; Record,
10

" ••• we
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not expand on the alleged nonconforming use of the gravel pit, as Bonner County BCRC
§ 12-821 distinguishes prohibited/ nonconforming use from conditionally permitted use.

13

Citizens offers extensive argument concerning the gravel pit's violations of
Bonner County Ordinances. However, no such determination has ever been reached as no
party has filed an action with the Bonner County Prosecutor to enforce those ordinances.
On review this Court is constrained to review the decision of The Board on clearly
defined criteria. The Court is not empowered to render a legal conclusion on a property's
compliance with county ordinances when the issue has not been properly raised below.
The Board determined that Bonner County Code only required that the gravel pit
be active in order to permit the installation of a batch plant. The Board determined that
the gravel pit had been active for over 40 years and therefore Bonner County Code
allowed for the addition of the asphalt batch plant. The Board further reasoned that the
CUP did not unlawfully expand the pit's alleged non-conforming use as a conditionally
permitted use was not a non-conforming use under Bonner County Code.
This Court will defer to the Board's interpretation and application of its own
zoning ordinances unless they are capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory. In re Jerome
Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho at 308,281 P.3d at 1086 (2012). In reviewing the
Board's decision with such deference, the Court is unable to find error. Accordingly, the
decision of the Board is affirmed.
6. Attorney's fees
Both Bonner County and Interstate have requested attorney's fees in this matter pursuant
to LC. §12-117 and LC. §12-121 respectively.

13

14

Record, at 995.
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A. Bonner County
LC. § 12-117 states:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
As the Court has affirmed the decision of the Board, Bonner County is clearly a
prevailing party in this matter. Bonner County argues that Citizens' petition was part of a
repeated attempt to "discredit the County's interpretation of its own ordinances"; and therefore
this petition was brought without reasonable basis in fact or law.

15

However, the Court finds that

that Citizens did raise legitimate issues in its petition, and therefore did not file the petition
without reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, Bonner County's motion for fees is denied.

B. Interstate
Interstate requests attorney fees pursuant to 1.C§12-121 which states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall
not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the award of
attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof.
The Court finds that a similar analysis supports denial of an award of fees to Interstate.
While Citizens' petition was ultimately unsuccessful, the Court finds it raised sufficient novel
issues and therefore was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Interstate' s motion for fees is denied.

The Linscotts did not seek attorney's fees in the matter under the belief that they were precluded from requesting
them as interveners. Intervener Linscotts Respondent's Brief, at 9.
15
Respondent's Brief, at 15.
14
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bonner County's request for
fees is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Interstate's request for fees is DENIED.

/"

Dated this..=:!___ day of February 2020.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON PETION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW was:

E-Mailed by the undersigned this _s_ign-ed_:2_151_202_0 _03_:so_P_M- - , to:
William Wilson: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary Allen: garyallen@givenspursley.com
Elizabeth Tellessen: eat@winstoncashatt.com
John Finney: johnfinney@finneylaw.net

By:

~QpP<Jt
Deputy
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Electronically Filed
3/30/2020 10:16 AM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone: 208-263-7712
Fax:
208-263-8211
iCourt: johnfinney@f inneylaw.net
ISB No. 5413
Attorney for Cross-Appell ants LINSCOTT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/
INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, an
unincorporat ed non-profit
association organized under
the laws of the State of
Idaho,

)
)

)
)

v.
BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho,

and
FRANKE. LINSCOTT and CAROL
LINSCOTT, and INTERSTATE
CONCRETE AND ASPHALT COMPANY,
Intervenors.

TO:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

)
)

Petitioner,

Respondent,

Case No. CV09-19-0629

)

Category: L.4.
Fee : $12 9 . 0 0

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTE RSTATE ASPHALT PLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS
GARY G. ALLEN AND JACK W. RELF, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1
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1.

The above named Cross-App ellants FRANKE. LINSCOTT and

CAROL LINSCOTT, appeal against the above named Cross-Res pondent
CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/I NTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Opinion And Order On Petition For
Judicial Review, entered in the above entitled proceedin g
(judicial review) on February 5, 2020, the Honorable Jeff M.
Brudie, District Judge, presiding .
2.

That the party has a right to cross-app eal to the Idaho

Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders described in paragraph
1 above are appealabl e orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(f),
I.A.R.
3.

A prelimina ry statement of the issues on appeal which

the Cross-App ellants intend to assert in the appeal; provided, any
such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the CrossAppellant s from asserting other issues on appeal, include, but are
not limited to:
(a)

Did the District Court err in finding and
concludin g that the Petitione r Citizens Against
Linscott/ Interstate Asphalt Plant, an
unincorpo rated non-profi t associatio n, is an
affected person pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-6521
(which means one having a bona fide interest in
real property which may be adversely affected)?

(b)

Did the District Court err in finding and
concluding that the Petitione r Citizens Against
Linscott/ Interstate Asphalt Plant, an
unincorpo rated non-profi t associatio n, has standing
contrary to Idaho Code§ 30-27-105 (effective July
1, 2015) (which amends to provide an unincorpo rated
associatio n is an entity separate and distinct from
its members)?

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2
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4.

(c)

Did the District Court err in finding and
~oncluding that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Int erstate Asphalt Plant timely filed
within 28 days?

(d)

Did the District Court err in finding and
concluding that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Int erstate Asphalt Plant's rejected filing
was timely resubmitted in the electronic filing
system?

(e)

Did the District Court err in finding and
concluding that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Int erstate Asphalt Plant did not have to
serve its petition on the landowner applicants
Linscott?

The Cross-Appell ants request as additional reporter's

transcript, the hearings held on June 27, 2019 and August 15, 2019
before the District Court.

Any and all transcripts to be provided

in electronic format.
5.

The Cross-Appell ants request the following documents to

be included in the clerk's record in addition to those
automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated
by the Appellant in the initial notice of appeal:
05-10-2019

Summons

08-01-2019

Motion To Intervene (By Special Appearance)

08-14-2019

Joint Response To Motions To Intervene Filed
By Interstate Concrete

&

Asphalt Company and

Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott
08-19-2019
6.

Order For Intervention

The Cross-Appell ants request the following documents,
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charts, or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied
and sent to the Supreme Court:

N/A.

7.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any

request for additional transcript have been served on the Court
reporter, at the following address (via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid):
Linda Carlton
Court Reporter
425 Warner Avenue
Lewiston, ID 83501
(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the additional reporter's
transcript in the sum of $200.00 and any additional documents
requested in the cross-appeal clerk's record in the sum of
$100.00.
(c)

That the cross-appeal filing fee has been paid in the

amount of $129.00.
(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to

be served pursuant to Rule 20.
Dated this

?D

day of March, 2020.

/Jt/rg~; ~~
I

FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney For Cross-Appellants
LINSCOTT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by iCourt efile and serve or via U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, as indicated, this 2J ,1)
day of March, 2020 and
was addressed to:
Gary G. Allen
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
Boise, Idaho
iCourt Service Contacts:
garyallen@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursely.com
William S. Wilson
Deputy Bonner County Prosecutor
Sandpoint, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Elizabeth A. Tellessen
Winston & Cashatt, Lawyers, P.S.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
iCourt Service Contact: eat@winstoncashatt.com
Linda Carlton
Court Reporter
425 Warner Avenue
Lewiston, ID 83501
Via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
By:
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Electronically Filed
3/31/2020 3:16 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

1

2
3
4

ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S .
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
eat@winstoncashatt.com

5

6

Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company

7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
9

10
11

12
13

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho,

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

14

15

Petitioner,
Category: L.4
Fee: $129.00

vs.

16
17
18

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent,

19
20

21

22

Case No. CV09-19-0629

and
FRANK and CAROL LINSCOTT, and
INTERSTATE CONCRETE AND ASPHALT
COMPANY,

23
Intervenors.
24
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1

2
3
4

5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14

15
16
17
18
19
20

21

22
23
24

TO:

APPELLANT, CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT

PLANT;
AND TO: GARY G. ALLEN AND JACK W. RELF, GIVENS PURSLEP LLP;
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
1.

The above named Cross-Appellant INTERSTATE CONCRETE AND

ASPHALT COMPANY, appeal against the above named Cross-Respondent CITIZENS
AGAINST LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT, to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review, entered in the above entitled
proceeding (judicial review) on February 5, 2020, the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, District
Judge, presiding.
2.

The party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under Rule 1 l(t), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that Cross-Appellant intends to

assert in the appeal (provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the CrossAppellant from asserting other issues on appeal) include, but are not limited to:
(a)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding that the Petitioner

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant, an unincorporated non-profit
association, is an affected person under Idaho Code § 67-6521 (which means one
having a bona fide interest in real property that may be adversely affected)?
(b)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding that the Petitioner

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant, an unincorporated non-profit
association, has standing contrary to Idaho Code§ 30-27-105 (effective July 1, 2015)
(amended to provide an unincorporated association is an entity separate and distinct
from its members)?
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - PAGE 2
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1

(c)

2

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant timely filed within 28 days?

3

(d)

4

resubmitted in the electronic filing system?

6

(e)

7

on the applicants Linscott and Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company?

9

4.

5.

16

requested by Appellant and Cross-Appellant Linscott.
6.

No exhibits were offered or admitted at the District Court's hearing of this

7.

I certify:

matter.

17
18
19
20

Cross-Appellant requests no additional clerk's record be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those

14
15

Cross-Appellant requests no additional reporter's transcripts, other than those

requested by Appellant and Cross-Appellant Linscott.

11

13

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding that the Petitioner

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant did not have to serve its petition

8

12

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding that the Petitioner

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant's rejected filing was timely

5

10

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding that the Petitioner

(a)

That the cross-appeal filing fee has been paid in the amount of

(b)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

$129.00; and

pursuant to Rule 20.

21

22
23
24
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1

DATED this 31 st day of March, 2020.

2
3
4

5

ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN, ISB No. 7393
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, P.S.
Attorneys for Interstate Concrete & Asphalt
Company
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8
9

10
11

12
13

14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21

22
23
24

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - PAGE 4

~~~Wru.UaN

A PROFESSK)NAL SERVICE GORPORATKlN
200 Nortlwraet Blitd .• Suite 200

Coeur d' Alane,. Idaho 83B14
Phone: (208) 667-2103

Page 324

1

2
3
4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and complete copy of the foregoing to be
iCourt/Email Transmission on March 31, 2020, to:
Bonner County Board of Commissioners
Jessi. webster@bonnercountyid.gov

5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov
Gary G. Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
John A. Finney
johnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorneys for Linscott
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ls/Elizabeth A. Tellessen
ELIZABETH A. TELLESSEN
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Electronically Filed
4/1/2020 12:04 PM
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Anne Marie Norling, Deputy Clerk

William Steven Wilson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
127 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-6714
Facsimile: (208) 263-6726
Idaho State Bar No. 9687
prosefile@bonnercountyid. gov
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant Bonner County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITIZENS AGAINST
LINSCOTT /INTERSTATE ASPHALT
PLANT, an unincorporated non-profit
association organized under the laws
of the state of Idaho,

Case No. CV09-19-0629

Petitioner/ Cross-Respondent,

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
CATEGORY: L.4
FEE: n/a

V.

BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, a public agency
of the State of Idaho,
Respondent/ Cross-Appellant,
FRANK and CAROL LINSCOTT, and
INTERSTATE CONCRETE AND
ASPHALT COMPANY,
In tervenors.

llPage
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TO:

THE

ABOVE-NAMED

LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE

CROSS-RESPONDENT
ASPHALT

PLANT

CITIZENS

AGAINST

THE

PARTY'S

AND

ATTORNEYS GARY G. ALLEN AND JACK W. RELF, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The

above-named

cross-appellant,

Bonner

County

Board

of

Commissioners (Bonner County), appeals against the above-named
cross-respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion and
Order on Motion to Dismiss, entered in the above-entitled proceeding
on the 26 th day of July, 2019, and the Opinion and Order On Petition
For Judicial Review, entered in the above-entitled proceeding on the 5 th
day of February, 2019, the Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brudie, presiding.
2. That Bonner County has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court, and the judgments and orders described in paragraph 1 above
are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
11 (f).
3. The issues on appeal are as follows, provided that this list is nonexhaustive and shall not prevent Bonner County from asserting other
issues on appeal:
a. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the crossappellant filed its petition for judicial review within 28 days of
Bonner County's final decision;

21Page
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b. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the crossappellant

was

prevented

from

filing

said

petition

by

circumstances outside if its control; and
c. Whether the District Court erred in denying Bonner County's
Motion to Dismiss, brought on the basis that the cross-appellant
failed to timely file the petition for judicial review, "in the interest
of justice."
4. No additional reporter's transcripts are requested.
5. No additional documents are requested for inclusion in the record.
6. No additional exhibits are requested.
7. I certify:
a. This cross-appeal does not request additional transcripts and,
therefore, notice to court reporters in not needed; and
b. That Bonner County is exempt from paying the appellate filing
fee pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 23(a) and Idaho Code
section 67-2301; and
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this 1st day of April 2020.

William S. Wilson
Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of April, 2020, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing via !court electronic submission to:
Gary Allen
garyallen@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners/ Cross-Respondents
Jack Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Attorney for the Petitioners/ Cross-Respondents
John Finney
j ohnfinney@finneylaw.net
Attorney for Intervenors- Linscott
Elizabeth Tellessen
eat@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney for Intervenors- Interstate Concrete and Asphalt

William S. Wilson
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Filed:05/06/2020 15:26:49
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hendrickson, Joette
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

Citizens Against Linscott/ Interstate
Asphalt Plant, an unincorporated non-profit

Supreme Court No. 4 7909-2020
District Court No. CR09-19-0629

association organized under the laws of the
State of Idaho

Certificate of Exhibits

Petitioner/ Appellant /
Cross Respondent
vs.

Bonner County Board of
Commissioners, a public agency of the
State of Idaho
Respondent-Cross Appellant

and
Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott,
Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company
lntervenors / Cross Appellants

I, Joette Hendrickson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Idaho in and for the County of Bonner do hereby certify:

There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the course of
this action.

It should be noted that all original exhibits will be retained at the district court clerk's office and
will be made available for viewing upon request. Digital images of photos and documents have
been provided with the exception of the following:
1.

N/A

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as CONFIDENTIAL
EXHIBITS to the Record:

1. N/A

Appeal SC2 - Certificate of Exhibits
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6th
IN WITNESS, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court on this the _
_ _day
of _ _May
_ _ _ 2020.
Clerk of the Court

By:

Toette J-fendrickson
Deputy Clerk

Appeal SC2 - Certificate of Exhibits
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Filed:05/06/2020 15:16:10
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hendrickson, Joette
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt
Plant, an unincorporated non-profit association
organized under the laws of the State of Idaho

Supreme Court No. 4 7909-2020
District Court No. CV09-19-0629
Clerk's Certificate of Service

Petitioner / Appellant / Cross Respondent

vs.
Bonner County Board of Commissioners, a
public agency of the State of Idaho,
Respondent/ Cross Appellant

vs.
Frank E. Linscott and Carol Linscott,
Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Company,
lntervenors / Cross Appellants

I, Joette Hendrickson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if
requested), along with copies of D all Exhibits offered or admitted;

IZI No Exhibits submitted;

D Pre-sentence Investigation, or D Other Confidential Documents; or D Confidential Exhibits
(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

May
7th,
I certify that on _
__
_ 2020
_ _ _ _ , I served a copy of the attached to:
[X] By E-mail
Gary G. Allen
garyal len@g ivenspu rsley .com
Givens Pursley LLP USPS Certified Mail - Tracking No. 70190700000208179058
[X] By E-mail
Jack W. Relf
jackrelf@g ivenspu rsley. com
Givens Pursley LLP USPS Certified Mail - Tracking No. 70190700000208179065

Appeal SC3 - Certificate of Service
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William S. Wilson
Bonner County
Prosecutor's Office

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney

prosefile@bonnercountyid.gov

[X] By E-mail

Hand delivery / pick up at the clerks office

johnfinney@finneylaw.net

[X] By E-mail

Hand delivery / pick up at the clerks office

Elizabeth A.Tellessen
eat@winstoncashatt.com
[X] By E-mail
Wilson & Cashatt USPS Certified Mail - Tracking No. 70190700000208179218

Michael W. Rosedale
Clerk of the Court
Dated:

May 6th, 2020

--------

By:

Toette Jfendrickson
Deputy Clerk

Appeal SC3 - Certificate of Service
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1

1

TO:

2
3

Filed:04/27/2020 12:52:05
First Judicial District, Bonner County
Michael W Rosedale, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Hendrickson, Joette

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Fax (208) 334-2616
supremecourtdocuments@idcourts.net

4
5

RE:
6

Docket No. 47909-2020
Citizens Against Linscott V Bonner
Bonner County Case No. CV09-19-0629

7

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

8

9

10
11

Notice is hereby given that on April 27, 2020, I lodged
a transcript of 103 pages in length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Bonner in the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho.

12
Included Motions Hearing:
13
14

Motion to Dismiss 6-27-19
Motion to Intervene 8-15-19
Motion Hearing 12-13-19

15
16
17
18
19
Linda L.

Carlton,

CSR #336

20
21
22
23
24
25
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